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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ebiederm@xmission.com, aryabinin@virtuozzo.com,
	davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, ktkhai@virtuozzo.com,
	nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Sun, 31 Dec 2017 11:14:05 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1514715245104171@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     net-fix-double-free-and-memory-corruption-in-get_net_ns_by_id.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From foo@baz Sun Dec 31 11:12:48 CET 2017
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 11:27:56 -0600
Subject: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>


[ Upstream commit 21b5944350052d2583e82dd59b19a9ba94a007f0 ]

(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
 after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)

Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.

It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:

put_net(peer)                                   rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]     ...
__put_net(peer)                                 get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
  spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
  list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
  spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work()                                      peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
  |                                               get_net(peer) [count=1]
  |                                               ...
  |                                               (use after final put)
  v                                               ...
  cleanup_net()                                   ...
    spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)                 ...
    list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..)          ...
    spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)               ...
    ...                                           ...
    ...                                           put_net(peer)
    ...                                             atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
    ...                                               spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
    ...                                               list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
    ...                                               spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
    ...                                             queue_work()
    ...                                           rtnl_unlock()
    rtnl_lock()                                   ...
    for_each_net(tmp) {                           ...
      id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer)                ...
      spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock)              ...
      idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id)             ...
      ...                                         ...
      net_drop_ns()                               ...
	net_free(peer)                            ...
    }                                             ...
  |
  v
  cleanup_net()
    ...
    (Second free of peer)

Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.

Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.

(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).

Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/net_namespace.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ struct net *get_net_ns_by_id(struct net
 	spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
 	peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id);
 	if (peer)
-		get_net(peer);
+		peer = maybe_get_net(peer);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiederm@xmission.com are

queue-4.14/net-fix-double-free-and-memory-corruption-in-get_net_ns_by_id.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2017-12-31 10:14 UTC|newest]

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