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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, achirvasub@gmail.com,
	bp@alien8.de, brgerst@gmail.com, dvlasenk@redhat.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, luto@kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86-32: Fix kexec with stack canary (CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR)" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Mon, 01 Jan 2018 13:45:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <15148107153337@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86-32: Fix kexec with stack canary (CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR)

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-32-fix-kexec-with-stack-canary-config_cc_stackprotector.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From ac461122c88a10b7d775de2f56467f097c9e627a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2017 11:48:50 -0800
Subject: x86-32: Fix kexec with stack canary (CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR)

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit ac461122c88a10b7d775de2f56467f097c9e627a upstream.

Commit e802a51ede91 ("x86/idt: Consolidate IDT invalidation") cleaned up
and unified the IDT invalidation that existed in a couple of places.  It
changed no actual real code.

Despite not changing any actual real code, it _did_ change code generation:
by implementing the common idt_invalidate() function in
archx86/kernel/idt.c, it made the use of the function in
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c be a real function call rather than an
(accidental) inlining of the function.

That, in turn, exposed two issues:

 - in load_segments(), we had incorrectly reset all the segment
   registers, which then made the stack canary load (which gcc does
   using offset of %gs) cause a trap.  Instead of %gs pointing to the
   stack canary, it will be the normal zero-based kernel segment, and
   the stack canary load will take a page fault at address 0x14.

 - to make this even harder to debug, we had invalidated the GDT just
   before calling idt_invalidate(), which meant that the fault happened
   with an invalid GDT, which in turn causes a triple fault and
   immediate reboot.

Fix this by

 (a) not reloading the special segments in load_segments(). We currently
     don't do any percpu accesses (which would require %fs on x86-32) in
     this area, but there's no reason to think that we might not want to
     do them, and like %gs, it's pointless to break it.

 (b) doing idt_invalidate() before invalidating the GDT, to keep things
     at least _slightly_ more debuggable for a bit longer. Without a
     IDT, traps will not work. Without a GDT, traps also will not work,
     but neither will any segment loads etc. So in a very real sense,
     the GDT is even more core than the IDT.

Fixes: e802a51ede91 ("x86/idt: Consolidate IDT invalidation")
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexandru Chirvasitu <achirvasub@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.21.1712271143180.8572@i7.lan
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ static void load_segments(void)
 		"\tmovl $"STR(__KERNEL_DS)",%%eax\n"
 		"\tmovl %%eax,%%ds\n"
 		"\tmovl %%eax,%%es\n"
-		"\tmovl %%eax,%%fs\n"
-		"\tmovl %%eax,%%gs\n"
 		"\tmovl %%eax,%%ss\n"
 		: : : "eax", "memory");
 #undef STR
@@ -232,8 +230,8 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
 	 * The gdt & idt are now invalid.
 	 * If you want to load them you must set up your own idt & gdt.
 	 */
-	set_gdt(phys_to_virt(0), 0);
 	idt_invalidate(phys_to_virt(0));
+	set_gdt(phys_to_virt(0), 0);
 
 	/* now call it */
 	image->start = relocate_kernel_ptr((unsigned long)image->head,


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from torvalds@linux-foundation.org are

queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-allow-nx-poison-to-be-set-in-p4d-pgd.patch
queue-4.14/x86-dumpstack-indicate-in-oops-whether-pti-is-configured-and-enabled.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-remove-preempt_disable-enable-from-__native_flush_tlb.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-clarify-the-whole-asid-kernel-pcid-user-pcid-naming.patch
queue-4.14/x86-ldt-plug-memory-leak-in-error-path.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-abstract-switching-cr3.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-optimize-restore_cr3.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-force-entry-through-trampoline-when-pti-active.patch
queue-4.14/x86-entry-align-entry-text-section-to-pmd-boundary.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-64-make-a-full-pgd-entry-size-hole-in-the-memory-map.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpu_entry_area-add-debugstore-entries-to-cpu_entry_area.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-share-entry-text-pmd.patch
queue-4.14/x86-ldt-make-the-ldt-mapping-ro.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-dump_pagetables-check-user-space-page-table-for-wx-pages.patch
queue-4.14/x86-pti-map-the-vsyscall-page-if-needed.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-disable-global-pages-if-page_table_isolation-y.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-dump_pagetables-allow-dumping-current-pagetables.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-add-infrastructure-for-page-table-isolation.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpufeatures-add-x86_bug_cpu_insecure.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-use-fix-pcid-to-optimize-user-kernel-switches.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-use-invpcid-for-__native_flush_tlb_single.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-prepare-the-x86-entry-assembly-code-for-entry-exit-cr3-switching.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-allow-flushing-for-future-asid-switches.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-add-kconfig.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-add-mapping-helper-functions.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-map-espfix-into-user-space.patch
queue-4.14/x86-smpboot-remove-stale-tlb-flush-invocations.patch
queue-4.14/kbuild-add-fno-stack-check-to-kernel-build-options.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-share-cpu_entry_area-with-user-space-page-tables.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-add-functions-to-clone-kernel-pmds.patch
queue-4.14/x86-pti-add-the-pti-cmdline-option-and-documentation.patch
queue-4.14/x86-events-intel-ds-map-debug-buffers-in-cpu_entry_area.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-allocate-a-separate-user-pgd.patch
queue-4.14/x86-pti-put-the-ldt-in-its-own-pgd-if-pti-is-on.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-pti-populate-user-pgd.patch
queue-4.14/x86-32-fix-kexec-with-stack-canary-config_cc_stackprotector.patch
queue-4.14/x86-espfix-64-fix-espfix-double-fault-handling-on-5-level-systems.patch
queue-4.14/x86-mm-dump_pagetables-add-page-table-directory-to-the-debugfs-vfs-hierarchy.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2018-01-01 12:45 UTC|newest]

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