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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jcm@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 09:33:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151600520111247@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 445b69e3b75e42362a5bdc13c8b8f61599e2228a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 14:49:39 -0800
Subject: x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

commit 445b69e3b75e42362a5bdc13c8b8f61599e2228a upstream.

The inital fix for trusted boot and PTI potentially misses the pgd clearing
if pud_alloc() sets a PGD.  It probably works in *practice* because for two
adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first will
clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear).  The second
call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit.

Defer the NX clearing to a point after it is known that all top-level
allocations have occurred.  Add a comment to clarify why.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Fixes: 262b6b30087 ("x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: "Tim Chen" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ning.sun@intel.com
Cc: tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: andi@firstfloor.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: law@redhat.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Cc: dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Cc: nickc@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110224939.2695CD47@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long
 	p4d = p4d_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);
 	if (!p4d)
 		return -1;
-	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
 	pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, p4d, vaddr);
 	if (!pud)
 		return -1;
@@ -139,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long
 		return -1;
 	set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
 	pte_unmap(pte);
+
+	/*
+	 * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
+	 * name of making them unusable for userspace.  To execute
+	 * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
+	 *
+	 * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_
+	 * pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging.
+	 */
+	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dave.hansen@linux.intel.com are

queue-4.14/x86-pti-unbreak-efi-old_memmap.patch
queue-4.14/x86-documentation-add-pti-description.patch
queue-4.14/x86-tboot-unbreak-tboot-with-pti-enabled.patch
queue-4.14/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2018-01-15  8:33 UTC|newest]

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