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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: shuahkh@osg.samsung.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, vuln@secunia.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 10:36:19 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151695937910383@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input

to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     usbip-fix-stub_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:16:48 -0700
Subject: usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input

From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>

commit c6688ef9f29762e65bce325ef4acd6c675806366 upstream.

Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations. Validate early in get_pipe() and return
failure.

Reported-by: Secunia Research <vuln@secunia.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_rx.c
@@ -338,11 +338,13 @@ static struct stub_priv *stub_priv_alloc
 	return priv;
 }
 
-static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, int epnum, int dir)
+static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *sdev, struct usbip_header *pdu)
 {
 	struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
 	struct usb_host_endpoint *ep;
 	struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd = NULL;
+	int epnum = pdu->base.ep;
+	int dir = pdu->base.direction;
 
 	if (epnum < 0 || epnum > 15)
 		goto err_ret;
@@ -355,6 +357,7 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
 		goto err_ret;
 
 	epd = &ep->desc;
+
 	if (usb_endpoint_xfer_control(epd)) {
 		if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
 			return usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, epnum);
@@ -377,6 +380,27 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
 	}
 
 	if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(epd)) {
+		/* validate packet size and number of packets */
+		unsigned int maxp, packets, bytes;
+
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT  11
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_MASK   (3 << USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT)
+#define USB_EP_MAXP_MULT(m) \
+	(((m) & USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_MASK) >> USB_EP_MAXP_MULT_SHIFT)
+
+		maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
+		maxp *= (USB_EP_MAXP_MULT(
+				__le16_to_cpu(epd->wMaxPacketSize)) + 1);
+		bytes = pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
+		packets = DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, maxp);
+
+		if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets < 0 ||
+		    pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets > packets) {
+			dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev,
+				"CMD_SUBMIT: isoc invalid num packets %d\n",
+				pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets);
+			return -1;
+		}
 		if (dir == USBIP_DIR_OUT)
 			return usb_sndisocpipe(udev, epnum);
 		else
@@ -385,7 +409,7 @@ static int get_pipe(struct stub_device *
 
 err_ret:
 	/* NOT REACHED */
-	dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "get pipe() invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
+	dev_err(&sdev->udev->dev, "CMD_SUBMIT: invalid epnum %d\n", epnum);
 	return -1;
 }
 
@@ -450,7 +474,7 @@ static void stub_recv_cmd_submit(struct
 	struct stub_priv *priv;
 	struct usbip_device *ud = &sdev->ud;
 	struct usb_device *udev = sdev->udev;
-	int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu->base.ep, pdu->base.direction);
+	int pipe = get_pipe(sdev, pdu);
 
 	if (pipe == -1)
 		return;


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from shuahkh@osg.samsung.com are

queue-4.4/usbip-fix-stub_rx-harden-cmd_submit-path-to-handle-malicious-input.patch
queue-4.4/usbip-fix-potential-format-overflow-in-userspace-tools.patch
queue-4.4/usbip-fix-implicit-fallthrough-warning.patch
queue-4.4/usbip-prevent-leaking-socket-pointer-address-in-messages.patch
queue-4.4/usbip-fix-stub_rx-get_pipe-to-validate-endpoint-number.patch
queue-4.4/usbip-prevent-vhci_hcd-driver-from-leaking-a-socket-pointer-address.patch
queue-4.4/usb-usbip-fix-possible-deadlocks-reported-by-lockdep.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2018-01-26  9:36 UTC|newest]

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