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From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: elena.reshetova@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
Date: Mon, 05 Feb 2018 09:38:52 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151785233213297@kroah.com> (raw)


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


Subject: vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:03:05 2018 -0800

From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com

commit 56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507

'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to
read from the 'fdt->fd' array.  In order to avoid potential leaks of
kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from
__fcheck_files.

Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 include/linux/fdtable.h |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/linux/fdtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -82,8 +83,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_file
 {
 	struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt);
 
-	if (fd < fdt->max_fds)
+	if (fd < fdt->max_fds) {
+		fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds);
 		return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]);
+	}
 	return NULL;
 }
 


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from elena.reshetova@intel.com are

queue-4.15/nl80211_Sanitize_array_index_in_parse_txq_params.patch
queue-4.15/vfs_fdtable_Prevent_bounds-check_bypass_via_speculative_execution.patch

                 reply	other threads:[~2018-02-05 17:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

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