From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
marc.zyngier@arm.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "[Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 14:53:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1518616385163231@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
[Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-affected-cortex-a-cpus.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From foo@baz Wed Feb 14 14:44:54 CET 2018
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 12:46:21 +0000
Subject: [Variant 2/Spectre-v2] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Commit aa6acde65e03 upstream.
Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing
and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code.
This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available.
The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing
any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts.
Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 66 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S
@@ -53,3 +53,27 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start)
vectors __kvm_hyp_vector
.endr
ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end)
+ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start)
+ sub sp, sp, #(8 * 18)
+ stp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)]
+ stp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)]
+ stp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)]
+ stp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)]
+ stp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)]
+ stp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)]
+ stp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)]
+ stp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)]
+ stp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)]
+ mov x0, #0x84000000
+ smc #0
+ ldp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)]
+ ldp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)]
+ ldp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)]
+ ldp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)]
+ ldp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)]
+ ldp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)]
+ ldp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)]
+ ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)]
+ ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)]
+ add sp, sp, #(8 * 18)
+ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ static int cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(vo
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM
+extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[];
+
static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
@@ -108,6 +110,9 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp
spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
}
#else
+#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL
+#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL
+
static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
@@ -132,6 +137,21 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(con
__install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
}
+
+#include <linux/psci.h>
+
+static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data)
+{
+ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data;
+
+ if (psci_ops.get_version)
+ install_bp_hardening_cb(entry,
+ (bp_hardening_cb_t)psci_ops.get_version,
+ __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start,
+ __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end);
+
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
#define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
@@ -282,6 +302,28 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
},
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+ {
+ .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
+ .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+ },
+ {
+ .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+ .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+ },
+ {
+ .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
+ .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+ },
+ {
+ .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
+ .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+ },
+#endif
{
}
};
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from will.deacon@arm.com are
queue-4.14/arm64-make-user_ds-an-inclusive-limit.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-remove-pre_ttbr0_update_workaround-for-falkor-erratum-e1003.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-don-t-bother-eliding-access_ok-checks-in-__-get-put-_user.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cpufeature-pass-capability-structure-to-enable-callback.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-mask-__user-pointers-for-__arch_-clear-copy_-_user.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-add-arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0-helper.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-reword-comment-about-post_ttbr_update_workaround.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kaslr-put-kernel-vectors-address-in-separate-data-page.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-smccc-make-function-identifiers-an-unsigned-quantity.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-move-bp-hardening-to-check_and_switch_context.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-advertise-smccc-v1.1.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-move-post_ttbr_update_workaround-to-c-code.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-turn-on-kpti-only-on-cpus-that-need-it.patch
queue-4.14/firmware-psci-expose-psci-conduit.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-force-kpti-to-be-disabled-on-cavium-thunderx.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-apply-bp-hardening-for-high-priority-synchronous-exceptions.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-fix-the-interaction-between-asid-switching-and-software-pan.patch
queue-4.14/firmware-psci-expose-smccc-version-through-psci_ops.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-permit-transitioning-from-global-to-non-global-without-bbm.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-allocate-asids-in-pairs.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-tls-avoid-unconditional-zeroing-of-tpidrro_el0-for-native-tasks.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-use-ret-instruction-for-exiting-the-trampoline.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-futex-mask-__user-pointers-prior-to-dereference.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-explicitly-pass-exception-level-to-kernel_ventry-macro.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-affected-cortex-a-cpus.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-make-use-of-ng-dependent-on-arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-add-psci_version-helper.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kill-psci_get_version-as-a-variant-2-workaround.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-ensure-branch-through-syscall-table-is-bounded-under-speculation.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-use-non-global-mappings-for-kernel-space.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-apply-bp-hardening-for-suspicious-interrupts-from-el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-capabilities-handle-duplicate-entries-for-a-capability.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-hook-up-entry-trampoline-to-exception-vectors.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-branch-predictor-hardening-for-cavium-thunderx2.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-prevent-speculative-use-of-the-current-addr_limit.patch
queue-4.14/.arm64-add-software-workaround-for-falkor-erratum-1041.patch.swp
queue-4.14/arm64-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-uaccess-speculation.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-add-arm_smccc_arch_workaround_1-bp-hardening-support.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-erratum-work-around-falkor-erratum-e1003-in-trampoline-code.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-fix-and-re-enable-arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-invalidate-both-kernel-and-user-asids-when-performing-tlbi.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-firmware-expose-psci_get_version-through-psci_ops-structure.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-rename-post_ttbr0_update_workaround.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-map-entry-trampoline-into-trampoline-and-kernel-page-tables.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-turn-kvm_psci_version-into-a-static-inline.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-implement-psci-1.0-support.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-move-task_-definitions-to-asm-processor.h.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kconfig-reword-unmap_kernel_at_el0-kconfig-entry.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-move-asid-from-ttbr0-to-ttbr1.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-introduce-ttbr_asid_mask-for-getting-at-the-asid-in-the-ttbr.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-add-smccc_arch_workaround_1-fast-handling.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-take-into-account-id_aa64pfr0_el1.csv3.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cputype-add-missing-midr-values-for-cortex-a72-and-cortex-a75.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-report-smccc_arch_workaround_1-bp-hardening-support.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-barrier-add-csdb-macros-to-control-data-value-prediction.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-smccc-implement-smccc-v1.1-inline-primitive.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-falkor.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kconfig-add-config_unmap_kernel_at_el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-add-software-workaround-for-falkor-erratum-1041.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-idmap-use-awx-flags-for-.idmap.text-.pushsection-directives.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-run-enable-method-for-errata-work-arounds-on-late-cpus.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-temporarily-disable-arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-add-exception-trampoline-page-for-exceptions-from-el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-make-psci_version-a-fast-path.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cpufeature-__this_cpu_has_cap-shouldn-t-stop-early.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-add-enable-callback-to-remap-swapper-using-ng-mappings.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-consolidate-the-psci-include-files.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-add-skeleton-to-harden-the-branch-predictor-against-aliasing-attacks.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-define-cputype-macros-for-falkor-cpu.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cpu_errata-add-kryo-to-falkor-1003-errata.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-add-smccc-accessors-to-psci-code.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-add-fake-cpu-feature-for-unmapping-the-kernel-at-el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-use-per-cpu-vector-when-bp-hardening-is-enabled.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cputype-add-midr-values-for-cavium-thunderx2-cpus.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-increment-pc-after-handling-an-smc-trap.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-02-14 13:54 UTC|newest]
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