From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "[Variant 1/Spectre-v1] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 14:53:23 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15186164038852@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
[Variant 1/Spectre-v1] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
arm64-uaccess-mask-__user-pointers-for-__arch_-clear-copy_-_user.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From foo@baz Wed Feb 14 14:44:54 CET 2018
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 15:34:23 +0000
Subject: [Variant 1/Spectre-v1] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Commit f71c2ffcb20d upstream.
Like we've done for get_user and put_user, ensure that user pointers
are masked before invoking the underlying __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user
operations.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 ++--
arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S | 6 +++---
arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -391,20 +391,35 @@ do { \
#define put_user __put_user
extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
-#define raw_copy_from_user __arch_copy_from_user
+#define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \
+({ \
+ __arch_copy_from_user((to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n)); \
+})
+
extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n);
-#define raw_copy_to_user __arch_copy_to_user
-extern unsigned long __must_check raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
-extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long n);
+#define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \
+({ \
+ __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), (from), (n)); \
+})
+
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
+#define raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n) \
+({ \
+ __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), \
+ __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n)); \
+})
+
#define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
#define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
-static inline unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n);
+static inline unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
{
if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
- n = __clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
+ n = __arch_clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
return n;
}
+#define clear_user __clear_user
extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
@@ -418,7 +433,7 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __copy
static inline int __copy_from_user_flushcache(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
{
kasan_check_write(dst, size);
- return __copy_user_flushcache(dst, src, size);
+ return __copy_user_flushcache(dst, __uaccess_mask_ptr(src), size);
}
#endif
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_page);
/* user mem (segment) */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(raw_copy_in_user);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_clear_user);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user);
/* physical memory */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memstart_addr);
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
.text
-/* Prototype: int __clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz)
+/* Prototype: int __arch_clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz)
* Purpose : clear some user memory
* Params : addr - user memory address to clear
* : sz - number of bytes to clear
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
*
* Alignment fixed up by hardware.
*/
-ENTRY(__clear_user)
+ENTRY(__arch_clear_user)
uaccess_enable_not_uao x2, x3, x4
mov x2, x1 // save the size for fixup return
subs x1, x1, #8
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ uao_user_alternative 9f, strb, sttrb, wz
5: mov x0, #0
uaccess_disable_not_uao x2, x3
ret
-ENDPROC(__clear_user)
+ENDPROC(__arch_clear_user)
.section .fixup,"ax"
.align 2
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
@@ -64,14 +64,15 @@
.endm
end .req x5
-ENTRY(raw_copy_in_user)
+
+ENTRY(__arch_copy_in_user)
uaccess_enable_not_uao x3, x4, x5
add end, x0, x2
#include "copy_template.S"
uaccess_disable_not_uao x3, x4
mov x0, #0
ret
-ENDPROC(raw_copy_in_user)
+ENDPROC(__arch_copy_in_user)
.section .fixup,"ax"
.align 2
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from will.deacon@arm.com are
queue-4.14/arm64-make-user_ds-an-inclusive-limit.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-remove-pre_ttbr0_update_workaround-for-falkor-erratum-e1003.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-don-t-bother-eliding-access_ok-checks-in-__-get-put-_user.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cpufeature-pass-capability-structure-to-enable-callback.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-mask-__user-pointers-for-__arch_-clear-copy_-_user.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-add-arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0-helper.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-reword-comment-about-post_ttbr_update_workaround.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kaslr-put-kernel-vectors-address-in-separate-data-page.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-smccc-make-function-identifiers-an-unsigned-quantity.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-move-bp-hardening-to-check_and_switch_context.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-advertise-smccc-v1.1.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-move-post_ttbr_update_workaround-to-c-code.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-turn-on-kpti-only-on-cpus-that-need-it.patch
queue-4.14/firmware-psci-expose-psci-conduit.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-force-kpti-to-be-disabled-on-cavium-thunderx.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-apply-bp-hardening-for-high-priority-synchronous-exceptions.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-fix-the-interaction-between-asid-switching-and-software-pan.patch
queue-4.14/firmware-psci-expose-smccc-version-through-psci_ops.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-permit-transitioning-from-global-to-non-global-without-bbm.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-allocate-asids-in-pairs.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-tls-avoid-unconditional-zeroing-of-tpidrro_el0-for-native-tasks.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-use-ret-instruction-for-exiting-the-trampoline.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-futex-mask-__user-pointers-prior-to-dereference.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-explicitly-pass-exception-level-to-kernel_ventry-macro.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-affected-cortex-a-cpus.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-make-use-of-ng-dependent-on-arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-add-psci_version-helper.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kill-psci_get_version-as-a-variant-2-workaround.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-ensure-branch-through-syscall-table-is-bounded-under-speculation.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-use-non-global-mappings-for-kernel-space.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-apply-bp-hardening-for-suspicious-interrupts-from-el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-capabilities-handle-duplicate-entries-for-a-capability.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-hook-up-entry-trampoline-to-exception-vectors.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-branch-predictor-hardening-for-cavium-thunderx2.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-uaccess-prevent-speculative-use-of-the-current-addr_limit.patch
queue-4.14/.arm64-add-software-workaround-for-falkor-erratum-1041.patch.swp
queue-4.14/arm64-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-uaccess-speculation.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-add-arm_smccc_arch_workaround_1-bp-hardening-support.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-erratum-work-around-falkor-erratum-e1003-in-trampoline-code.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-fix-and-re-enable-arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-invalidate-both-kernel-and-user-asids-when-performing-tlbi.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-firmware-expose-psci_get_version-through-psci_ops-structure.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-rename-post_ttbr0_update_workaround.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-map-entry-trampoline-into-trampoline-and-kernel-page-tables.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-turn-kvm_psci_version-into-a-static-inline.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-implement-psci-1.0-support.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-move-task_-definitions-to-asm-processor.h.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kconfig-reword-unmap_kernel_at_el0-kconfig-entry.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-move-asid-from-ttbr0-to-ttbr1.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-introduce-ttbr_asid_mask-for-getting-at-the-asid-in-the-ttbr.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-add-smccc_arch_workaround_1-fast-handling.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-take-into-account-id_aa64pfr0_el1.csv3.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cputype-add-missing-midr-values-for-cortex-a72-and-cortex-a75.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-report-smccc_arch_workaround_1-bp-hardening-support.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-barrier-add-csdb-macros-to-control-data-value-prediction.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-smccc-implement-smccc-v1.1-inline-primitive.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-implement-branch-predictor-hardening-for-falkor.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kconfig-add-config_unmap_kernel_at_el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-add-software-workaround-for-falkor-erratum-1041.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-idmap-use-awx-flags-for-.idmap.text-.pushsection-directives.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-run-enable-method-for-errata-work-arounds-on-late-cpus.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-mm-temporarily-disable-arm64_sw_ttbr0_pan.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-add-exception-trampoline-page-for-exceptions-from-el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-make-psci_version-a-fast-path.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cpufeature-__this_cpu_has_cap-shouldn-t-stop-early.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kpti-add-enable-callback-to-remap-swapper-using-ng-mappings.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-consolidate-the-psci-include-files.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-add-skeleton-to-harden-the-branch-predictor-against-aliasing-attacks.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-define-cputype-macros-for-falkor-cpu.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cpu_errata-add-kryo-to-falkor-1003-errata.patch
queue-4.14/arm-arm64-kvm-add-smccc-accessors-to-psci-code.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-entry-add-fake-cpu-feature-for-unmapping-the-kernel-at-el0.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-use-per-cpu-vector-when-bp-hardening-is-enabled.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-cputype-add-midr-values-for-cavium-thunderx2-cpus.patch
queue-4.14/arm64-kvm-increment-pc-after-handling-an-smc-trap.patch
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