From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ebiggers@google.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, joe.lawrence@redhat.com,
keescook@chromium.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, mpatocka@redhat.com,
mtk.manpages@gmail.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, w@1wt.eu
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 09:34:49 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15186836894122@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits
to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 85c2dd5473b2718b4b63e74bfeb1ca876868e11f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 15:41:53 -0800
Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
commit 85c2dd5473b2718b4b63e74bfeb1ca876868e11f upstream.
pipe-user-pages-hard and pipe-user-pages-soft are only supposed to apply
to unprivileged users, as documented in both Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
and the pipe(7) man page.
However, the capabilities are actually only checked when increasing a
pipe's size using F_SETPIPE_SZ, not when creating a new pipe. Therefore,
if pipe-user-pages-hard has been set, the root user can run into it and be
unable to create pipes. Similarly, if pipe-user-pages-soft has been set,
the root user can run into it and have their pipes limited to 1 page each.
Fix this by allowing the privileged override in both cases.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 759c01142a5d ("pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/pipe.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -618,6 +618,11 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(u
return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard;
}
+static bool is_unprivileged_user(void)
+{
+ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
@@ -634,12 +639,12 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(
user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
- if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) {
+ if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) {
user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1);
pipe_bufs = 1;
}
- if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs))
+ if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user())
goto out_revert_acct;
pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
@@ -1069,7 +1074,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_in
if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers &&
(too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) ||
too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ is_unprivileged_user()) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out_revert_acct;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers@google.com are
queue-4.15/pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits.patch
queue-4.15/crypto-hash-annotate-algorithms-taking-optional-key.patch
queue-4.15/crypto-cryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch
queue-4.15/crypto-hash-prevent-using-keyed-hashes-without-setting-key.patch
queue-4.15/ubifs-free-the-encrypted-symlink-target.patch
queue-4.15/pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits.patch
queue-4.15/kernel-relay.c-revert-kernel-relay.c-fix-potential-memory-leak.patch
queue-4.15/nfs-reject-request-for-id_legacy-key-without-auxdata.patch
queue-4.15/crypto-poly1305-remove-setkey-method.patch
queue-4.15/crypto-sha512-mb-initialize-pending-lengths-correctly.patch
queue-4.15/crypto-hash-introduce-crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey.patch
queue-4.15/crypto-mcryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-02-15 8:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=15186836894122@kroah.com \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=ebiggers@google.com \
--cc=joe.lawrence@redhat.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
--cc=mpatocka@redhat.com \
--cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
--cc=stable-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=w@1wt.eu \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.