From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux@dominikbrodowski.net, bp@alien8.de, brgerst@gmail.com,
dvlasenk@redhat.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, hpa@zytor.com,
jpoimboe@redhat.com, luto@kernel.org, mingo@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86/entry/64: Interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH instructions" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 11:26:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1519122403137230@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/entry/64: Interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH instructions
to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-entry-64-interleave-xor-register-clearing-with-push-instructions.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From f7bafa2b05ef25eda1d9179fd930b0330cf2b7d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2018 11:49:44 +0100
Subject: x86/entry/64: Interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH instructions
From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
commit f7bafa2b05ef25eda1d9179fd930b0330cf2b7d1 upstream.
Same as is done for syscalls, interleave XOR with PUSH instructions
for exceptions/interrupts, in order to minimize the cost of the
additional instructions required for register clearing.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211104949.12992-4-linux@dominikbrodowski.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -101,44 +101,42 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
addq $-(15*8), %rsp
.endm
- .macro SAVE_REGS offset=0
+ .macro SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS offset=0
+ /*
+ * Save registers and sanitize registers of values that a
+ * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
+ * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
+ * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
+ * Interleave XOR with PUSH for better uop scheduling:
+ */
movq %rdi, 14*8+\offset(%rsp)
movq %rsi, 13*8+\offset(%rsp)
movq %rdx, 12*8+\offset(%rsp)
movq %rcx, 11*8+\offset(%rsp)
movq %rax, 10*8+\offset(%rsp)
movq %r8, 9*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */
movq %r9, 8*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */
movq %r10, 7*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
movq %r11, 6*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */
movq %rbx, 5*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
movq %rbp, 4*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
movq %r12, 3*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */
movq %r13, 2*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */
movq %r14, 1*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */
movq %r15, 0*8+\offset(%rsp)
+ xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */
UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset
.endm
- /*
- * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
- * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
- * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
- * a speculative execution gadget:
- */
- .macro CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
- xorl %ebp, %ebp
- xorl %ebx, %ebx
- xorq %r8, %r8
- xorq %r9, %r9
- xorq %r10, %r10
- xorq %r11, %r11
- xorq %r12, %r12
- xorq %r13, %r13
- xorq %r14, %r14
- xorq %r15, %r15
- .endm
-
.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0
popq %r15
popq %r14
@@ -177,7 +175,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
* is just setting the LSB, which makes it an invalid stack address and is also
* a signal to the unwinder that it's a pt_regs pointer in disguise.
*
- * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* SAVE_REGS because it corrupts
+ * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS because it corrupts
* the original rbp.
*/
.macro ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER ptregs_offset=0
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -565,8 +565,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
1:
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
- SAVE_REGS
- CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+ SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
testb $3, CS(%rsp)
@@ -1114,8 +1113,7 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
pushq $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
- SAVE_REGS
- CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+ SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
jmp error_exit
END(xen_failsafe_callback)
@@ -1159,8 +1157,7 @@ idtentry machine_check do_mce has_err
ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
cld
- SAVE_REGS 8
- CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+ SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS 8
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
movl $1, %ebx
movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
@@ -1211,8 +1208,7 @@ END(paranoid_exit)
ENTRY(error_entry)
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
cld
- SAVE_REGS 8
- CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
+ SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS 8
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
jz .Lerror_kernelspace
@@ -1399,18 +1395,34 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
pushq (%rdx) /* pt_regs->dx */
pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */
pushq %rax /* pt_regs->ax */
+ /*
+ * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
+ * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
+ * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
+ * a speculative execution gadget. Interleave XOR with PUSH
+ * for better uop scheduling:
+ */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */
+ xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */
pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
+ xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */
pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
+ xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
+ xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11*/
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
+ xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx*/
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
+ xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp*/
pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
+ xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12*/
pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
+ xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13*/
pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
+ xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14*/
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
+ xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15*/
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
- CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
/*
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from linux@dominikbrodowski.net are
queue-4.15/selftests-x86-fix-build-bug-caused-by-the-5lvl-test-which-has-been-moved-to-the-vm-directory.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-interleave-xor-register-clearing-with-push-instructions.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-merge-the-pop_c_regs-and-pop_extra_regs-macros-into-a-single-pop_regs-macro.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-remove-the-unused-icebp-macro.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-use-push_and_clean_regs-in-more-cases.patch
queue-4.15/selftests-x86-disable-tests-requiring-32-bit-support-on-pure-64-bit-systems.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-fix-paranoid_entry-frame-pointer-warning.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-merge-save_c_regs-and-save_extra_regs-remove-unused-extensions.patch
queue-4.15/selftests-x86-do-not-rely-on-int-0x80-in-single_step_syscall.c.patch
queue-4.15/selftests-x86-fix-vdso-selftest-segfault-for-vsyscall-none.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-indent-push_and_clear_regs-and-pop_regs-properly.patch
queue-4.15/selftests-x86-clean-up-and-document-sscanf-usage.patch
queue-4.15/selftests-x86-do-not-rely-on-int-0x80-in-test_mremap_vdso.c.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-get-rid-of-the-alloc_pt_gpregs_on_stack-and-save_and_clear_regs-macros.patch
queue-4.15/x86-entry-64-introduce-the-push_and_clean_regs-macro.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-02-20 10:29 UTC|newest]
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