From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com, bp@suse.de, dwmw2@infradead.org,
dwmw@amazon.co.uk, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
jpoimboe@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86/nospec: Fix header guards names" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 17:39:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1519403955199160@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1519382538-15143-7-git-send-email-jinpu.wangl@profitbricks.com>
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From foo@baz Fri Feb 23 17:23:58 CET 2018
From: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 11:41:55 +0100
Subject: x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, riel@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, jikos@kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net, dave.hansen@intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, keescook@google.com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, gregkh@linux-foundation.org, pjt@google.com, David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>, Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com>
Message-ID: <1519382538-15143-7-git-send-email-jinpu.wangl@profitbricks.com>
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit 7a32fc51ca938e67974cbb9db31e1a43f98345a9)
... to adhere to the _ASM_X86_ naming scheme.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: riel@redhat.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: jikos@kernel.org
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Cc: pjt@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180126121139.31959-3-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
[cherry-pick to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
-#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
+#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
@@ -195,4 +195,4 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
}
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
-#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com are
queue-4.4/x86-paravirt-remove-noreplace-paravirt-cmdline-option.patch
queue-4.4/documentation-document-array_index_nospec.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch
queue-4.4/x86-nospec-fix-header-guards-names.patch
queue-4.4/x86-retpoline-avoid-retpolines-for-built-in-__init-functions.patch
queue-4.4/vfs-fdtable-prevent-bounds-check-bypass-via-speculative-execution.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-nvmx-invvpid-handling-improvements.patch
queue-4.4/x86-cpu-bugs-make-retpoline-module-warning-conditional.patch
queue-4.4/x86-spectre-check-config_retpoline-in-command-line-parser.patch
queue-4.4/x86-implement-array_index_mask_nospec.patch
queue-4.4/array_index_nospec-sanitize-speculative-array-de-references.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch
queue-4.4/x86-spectre-fix-spelling-mistake-vunerable-vulnerable.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-nvmx-fix-kernel-panics-induced-by-illegal-invept-invvpid-types.patch
queue-4.4/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch
queue-4.4/x86-kvm-update-spectre-v1-mitigation.patch
queue-4.4/x86-get_user-use-pointer-masking-to-limit-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/x86-syscall-sanitize-syscall-table-de-references-under-speculation.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch
queue-4.4/x86-spectre-simplify-spectre_v2-command-line-parsing.patch
queue-4.4/x86-speculation-fix-typo-ibrs_att-which-should-be-ibrs_all.patch
queue-4.4/x86-spectre-report-get_user-mitigation-for-spectre_v1.patch
queue-4.4/x86-introduce-barrier_nospec.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-async_pf-fix-df-due-to-inject-page-not-present-and-page-ready-exceptions-simultaneously.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-vmx-clean-up-declaration-of-vpid-ept-invalidation-types.patch
queue-4.4/x86-bugs-drop-one-mitigation-from-dmesg.patch
queue-4.4/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch
queue-4.4/nl80211-sanitize-array-index-in-parse_txq_params.patch
queue-4.4/kvm-nvmx-kmap-can-t-fail.patch
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-23 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-23 10:41 [stable 4.4 00/29] some stable-4.4 backport Jack Wang
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 01/29] KVM: async_pf: Fix #DF due to inject "Page not Present" and "Page Ready" exceptions simultaneously Jack Wang
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 02/29] x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 03/29] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:37 ` Patch "KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 04/29] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:37 ` Patch "KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 05/29] module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:37 ` Patch "module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 06/29] x86/nospec: Fix header guards names Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` gregkh [this message]
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 07/29] x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 08/29] x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 09/29] x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:41 ` [stable 4.4 10/29] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:36 ` Patch "Documentation: Document array_index_nospec" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 11/29] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:36 ` Patch "array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 12/29] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 13/29] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86: Introduce barrier_nospec" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 14/29] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 15/29] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 16/29] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:38 ` Patch "vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 17/29] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:38 ` Patch "nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 18/29] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 19/29] x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable" Jack Wang
2018-02-23 10:42 ` Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 20/29] x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 21/29] x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 22/29] x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 23/29] x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 24/29] x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 25/29] KVM: nVMX: kmap() can't fail Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:37 ` Patch "KVM: nVMX: kmap() can't fail" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 26/29] KVM: nVMX: vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() can't fail Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:37 ` Patch "KVM: nVMX: vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() can't fail" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 27/29] kvm: nVMX: Fix kernel panics induced by illegal INVEPT/INVVPID types Jack Wang
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 28/29] KVM: VMX: clean up declaration of VPID/EPT invalidation types Jack Wang
2018-02-23 10:54 ` Greg KH
2018-02-23 11:03 ` Jinpu Wang
2018-02-23 16:37 ` Patch "KVM: VMX: clean up declaration of VPID/EPT invalidation types" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "KVM: VMX: clean up declaration of VPID/EPT invalidation types" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:42 ` [stable 4.4 29/29] KVM: nVMX: invvpid handling improvements Jack Wang
2018-02-23 16:37 ` Patch "KVM: nVMX: invvpid handling improvements" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 16:39 ` Patch "KVM: nVMX: invvpid handling improvements" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree gregkh
2018-02-23 10:53 ` [stable 4.4 00/29] some stable-4.4 backport Greg KH
2018-02-23 11:07 ` Jinpu Wang
2018-02-23 16:19 ` Greg KH
2018-02-23 16:36 ` Greg KH
2018-02-26 8:29 ` Jinpu Wang
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