From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, krzk@kernel.org,
linux.amoon@gmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "crypto: s5p-sss - Fix kernel Oops in AES-ECB mode" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 17:53:40 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1519404820252255@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix kernel Oops in AES-ECB mode
to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
crypto-s5p-sss-fix-kernel-oops-in-aes-ecb-mode.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From c927b080c67e3e97193c81fc1d27f4251bf4e036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 16:52:09 +0100
Subject: crypto: s5p-sss - Fix kernel Oops in AES-ECB mode
From: Kamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>
commit c927b080c67e3e97193c81fc1d27f4251bf4e036 upstream.
In AES-ECB mode crypt is done with key only, so any use of IV
can cause kernel Oops. Use IV only in AES-CBC and AES-CTR.
Signed-off-by: Kamil Konieczny <k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com>
Reported-by: Anand Moon <linux.amoon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Anand Moon <linux.amoon@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # can be applied after commit 8f9702aad138
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/crypto/s5p-sss.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/crypto/s5p-sss.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/s5p-sss.c
@@ -401,16 +401,21 @@ static void s5p_aes_crypt_start(struct s
uint32_t aes_control;
int err;
unsigned long flags;
+ u8 *iv;
aes_control = SSS_AES_KEY_CHANGE_MODE;
if (mode & FLAGS_AES_DECRYPT)
aes_control |= SSS_AES_MODE_DECRYPT;
- if ((mode & FLAGS_AES_MODE_MASK) == FLAGS_AES_CBC)
+ if ((mode & FLAGS_AES_MODE_MASK) == FLAGS_AES_CBC) {
aes_control |= SSS_AES_CHAIN_MODE_CBC;
- else if ((mode & FLAGS_AES_MODE_MASK) == FLAGS_AES_CTR)
+ iv = req->info;
+ } else if ((mode & FLAGS_AES_MODE_MASK) == FLAGS_AES_CTR) {
aes_control |= SSS_AES_CHAIN_MODE_CTR;
-
+ iv = req->info;
+ } else {
+ iv = NULL; /* AES_ECB */
+ }
if (dev->ctx->keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_192)
aes_control |= SSS_AES_KEY_SIZE_192;
else if (dev->ctx->keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_256)
@@ -440,7 +445,7 @@ static void s5p_aes_crypt_start(struct s
goto outdata_error;
SSS_AES_WRITE(dev, AES_CONTROL, aes_control);
- s5p_set_aes(dev, dev->ctx->aes_key, req->info, dev->ctx->keylen);
+ s5p_set_aes(dev, dev->ctx->aes_key, iv, dev->ctx->keylen);
s5p_set_dma_indata(dev, req->src);
s5p_set_dma_outdata(dev, req->dst);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from k.konieczny@partner.samsung.com are
queue-4.4/crypto-s5p-sss-fix-kernel-oops-in-aes-ecb-mode.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-02-23 16:53 UTC|newest]
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