From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: leonro@mellanox.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
jgg@mellanox.com, noaos@mellanox.com, stable@vger.kernel.org,
syzkaller@googlegroups.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "RDMA/uverbs: Sanitize user entered port numbers prior to access it" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 17:18:31 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15196619114979@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
RDMA/uverbs: Sanitize user entered port numbers prior to access it
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
rdma-uverbs-sanitize-user-entered-port-numbers-prior-to-access-it.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From 5d4c05c3ee36f67ddc107ab5ea0898af01a62cc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 12:35:40 +0200
Subject: RDMA/uverbs: Sanitize user entered port numbers prior to access it
From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
commit 5d4c05c3ee36f67ddc107ab5ea0898af01a62cc1 upstream.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006476a198 by task syzkaller697701/265
CPU: 0 PID: 265 Comm: syzkaller697701 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #90
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xde/0x164
? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c
? show_regs_print_info+0x17/0x17
? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0
print_address_description+0x83/0x3e0
kasan_report+0x18c/0x4b0
? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
? lookup_get_idr_uobject+0x120/0x200
? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
? modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350
modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350
ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xf9/0x170
? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70
ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0
? attach_entity_load_avg+0x8b0/0x8b0
? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70
? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280
? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670
__vfs_write+0x10d/0x700
? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
? kernel_read+0x170/0x170
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
? finish_task_switch+0x1bd/0x7a0
? finish_task_switch+0x194/0x7a0
? prandom_u32_state+0xe/0x180
? rcu_read_unlock+0x80/0x80
? security_file_permission+0x93/0x260
vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550
SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0
? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0
? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
RIP: 0033:0x433c29
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf2be82a8 EFLAGS: 00000217
Allocated by task 62:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
kmem_cache_alloc+0x141/0x480
dup_fd+0x101/0xcc0
copy_process.part.62+0x166f/0x4390
_do_fork+0x1cb/0xe90
kernel_thread+0x34/0x40
call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0x112/0x260
process_one_work+0x929/0x1aa0
worker_thread+0x5c6/0x12a0
kthread+0x346/0x510
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
Freed by task 259:
kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
kmem_cache_free+0xf3/0x4c0
put_files_struct+0x225/0x2c0
exit_files+0x88/0xc0
do_exit+0x67c/0x1520
do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380
SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88006476a000
which belongs to the cache files_cache of size 832
The buggy address is located 408 bytes inside of
832-byte region [ffff88006476a000, ffff88006476a340)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000191da80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head)
raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100080008
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff88006bcf7a80 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88006476a080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88006476a100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88006476a180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff88006476a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88006476a280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11
Fixes: 44c58487d51a ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types")
Reported-by: Noa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c
@@ -1981,8 +1981,15 @@ static int modify_qp(struct ib_uverbs_fi
goto release_qp;
}
+ if ((cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_AV) &&
+ !rdma_is_port_valid(qp->device, cmd->base.dest.port_num)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto release_qp;
+ }
+
if ((cmd->base.attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH) &&
- !rdma_is_port_valid(qp->device, cmd->base.alt_port_num)) {
+ (!rdma_is_port_valid(qp->device, cmd->base.alt_port_num) ||
+ !rdma_is_port_valid(qp->device, cmd->base.alt_dest.port_num))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto release_qp;
}
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro@mellanox.com are
queue-4.14/rdma-uverbs-fix-bad-unlock-balance-in-ib_uverbs_close_xrcd.patch
queue-4.14/rdma-uverbs-fix-circular-locking-dependency.patch
queue-4.14/rdma-uverbs-sanitize-user-entered-port-numbers-prior-to-access-it.patch
queue-4.14/rdma-uverbs-protect-from-races-between-lookup-and-destroy-of-uobjects.patch
queue-4.14/rdma-uverbs-protect-from-command-mask-overflow.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-02-26 16:19 UTC|newest]
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