From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: dwmw@amazon.co.uk, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, mingo@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>, <stable-commits@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Patch "x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 17:34:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <152087245512313@kroah.com> (raw)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From dd84441a797150dcc49298ec95c459a8891d8bb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 10:50:54 +0000
Subject: x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
commit dd84441a797150dcc49298ec95c459a8891d8bb1 upstream.
Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect branches.
But firmware isn't, so use IBRS for firmware calls if it's available.
Block preemption while IBRS is set, although in practice the call sites
already had to be doing that.
Ignore hpwdt.c for now. It's taking spinlocks and calling into firmware
code, from an NMI handler. I don't want to touch that with a bargepole.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: jmattson@google.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519037457-7643-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h | 6 +++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 17 +++++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++-
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H
#define _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
#ifdef APM_ZERO_SEGS
# define APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS \
"pushl %%ds\n\t" \
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32
* N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call
* because we always save and restore the flags.
*/
+ firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start();
__asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
"pushl %%edi\n\t"
"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
@@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32
"=S" (*esi)
: "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
: "memory", "cc");
+ firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end();
}
static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in,
@@ -56,6 +60,7 @@ static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_
* N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call
* because we always save and restore the flags.
*/
+ firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start();
__asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
"pushl %%edi\n\t"
"pushl %%ebp\n\t"
@@ -68,6 +73,7 @@ static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_
"=S" (si)
: "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in)
: "memory", "cc");
+ firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end();
return error;
}
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
* We map the EFI regions needed for runtime services non-contiguously,
@@ -36,8 +37,18 @@
extern asmlinkage unsigned long efi_call_phys(void *, ...);
-#define arch_efi_call_virt_setup() kernel_fpu_begin()
-#define arch_efi_call_virt_teardown() kernel_fpu_end()
+#define arch_efi_call_virt_setup() \
+({ \
+ kernel_fpu_begin(); \
+ firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \
+})
+
+#define arch_efi_call_virt_teardown() \
+({ \
+ firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \
+ kernel_fpu_end(); \
+})
+
/*
* Wrap all the virtual calls in a way that forces the parameters on the stack.
@@ -73,6 +84,7 @@ struct efi_scratch {
efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(); \
preempt_disable(); \
__kernel_fpu_begin(); \
+ firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \
\
if (efi_scratch.use_pgd) { \
efi_scratch.prev_cr3 = __read_cr3(); \
@@ -91,6 +103,7 @@ struct efi_scratch {
__flush_tlb_all(); \
} \
\
+ firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \
__kernel_fpu_end(); \
preempt_enable(); \
})
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -219,17 +219,38 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
#endif
}
+#define alternative_msr_write(_msr, _val, _feature) \
+ asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", \
+ "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" \
+ "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" \
+ "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" \
+ "wrmsr", \
+ _feature) \
+ : : [msr] "i" (_msr), [val] "i" (_val) \
+ : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory")
+
static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
{
- asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
- "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
- "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
- "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
- "wrmsr",
- X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB)
- : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
- [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
- : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB,
+ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+}
+
+/*
+ * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
+ * before calling into firmware.
+ */
+static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(void)
+{
+ preempt_disable();
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,
+ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
+}
+
+static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(void)
+{
+ alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0,
+ X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
+ preempt_enable();
}
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -300,6 +300,15 @@ retpoline_auto:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
}
+
+ /*
+ * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
+ * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
+ pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
+ }
}
#undef pr_fmt
@@ -326,8 +335,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
}
#endif
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw@amazon.co.uk are
queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-support-retpoline-builds-with-clang.patch
queue-4.14/revert-x86-retpoline-simplify-vmexit_fill_rsb.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-ibrs-if-available-before-calling-into-firmware.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-objtool-annotate-indirect-calls-jumps-for-objtool.patch
reply other threads:[~2018-03-12 16:34 UTC|newest]
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