From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:48264 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750761AbeDMP2B (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 Apr 2018 11:28:01 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098413.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w3DFQtlH033164 for ; Fri, 13 Apr 2018 11:28:00 -0400 Received: from e06smtp15.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp15.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.111]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2haw9qxa50-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 13 Apr 2018 11:28:00 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp15.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Fri, 13 Apr 2018 16:27:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] lockdown: fix coordination of kernel module signature verification From: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells Cc: Luca Boccassi , "Bruno E. O. Meneguele" , linux-integrity , linux-security-module , linux-kernel Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 11:27:52 -0400 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <1523633272.3272.30.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: If both IMA-appraisal and sig_enforce are enabled, then both signatures are currently required. If the IMA-appraisal signature verification fails, it could rely on the appended signature verification; but with the lockdown patch set, the appended signature verification assumes that if IMA-appraisal is enabled, it has verified the signature. Basically each signature verification method would be relying on the other to verify the kernel module signature. This patch addresses the problem of requiring both kernel module signature verification methods, when both are enabled, by verifying just the appended signature. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- kernel/module.c | 4 +--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 9c1709a05037..60861eb7bc4d 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2803,9 +2803,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags, if (sig_enforce) { pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason); return -EKEYREJECTED; - } - - if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled()) + } else if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled()) return 0; if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) return -EPERM; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 754ece08e1c6..2155b1f316a4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -490,7 +491,11 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, return 0; } - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ + /* + * If both IMA-appraisal and appended signature verification are + * enabled, rely on the appended signature verification. + */ + if (sig_enforce && read_id == READING_MODULE) return 0; /* permit signed certs */ -- 2.7.5 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar) Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 11:27:52 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] lockdown: fix coordination of kernel module signature verification Message-ID: <1523633272.3272.30.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org If both IMA-appraisal and sig_enforce are enabled, then both signatures are currently required. If the IMA-appraisal signature verification fails, it could rely on the appended signature verification; but with the lockdown patch set, the appended signature verification assumes that if IMA-appraisal is enabled, it has verified the signature. Basically each signature verification method would be relying on the other to verify the kernel module signature. This patch addresses the problem of requiring both kernel module signature verification methods, when both are enabled, by verifying just the appended signature. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- kernel/module.c | 4 +--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 9c1709a05037..60861eb7bc4d 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2803,9 +2803,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags, if (sig_enforce) { pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason); return -EKEYREJECTED; - } - - if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled()) + } else if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled()) return 0; if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) return -EPERM; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 754ece08e1c6..2155b1f316a4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -490,7 +491,11 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, return 0; } - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ + /* + * If both IMA-appraisal and appended signature verification are + * enabled, rely on the appended signature verification. + */ + if (sig_enforce && read_id == READING_MODULE) return 0; /* permit signed certs */ -- 2.7.5 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html