From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 3/3] EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs
Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 13:19:14 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1526318354.3898.159.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJuuve3OrJPvBYeRoTfaan022hi9p0dDbDbZJuKHCU4t3xA@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 2018-05-14 at 10:01 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 9:41 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 16:12 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > +
> > > + if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) {
> > > + evm_xattrs_locked = 1;
> > > + inode = evm_xattrs->d_inode;
> > > + inode_lock(inode);
> > > + newattrs.ia_mode = S_IFREG | 0440;
> > > + newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
> > > + err = notify_change(evm_xattrs, &newattrs, NULL);
> > > + inode_unlock(inode);
> > > + audit_log_format(ab, "locked");
> > > + if (!err)
> > > + err = count;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + audit_log_format(ab, "xattr=");
> > > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, xattr->name);
> > > +
> > > + if (strncmp(xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> > > + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0) {
> > > + err = -EINVAL;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
>
> > This test now prevents locking the xattr names list. Making this an
> > else clause will fix it.
>
> Are you sure? The check for "." happens before this, and jumps over the
> rest of the function.
Oh! It did work, but the messages are confusing.
# cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
security.selinux
security.ima
security.capability
security.foo
# echo foo > /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted
# echo security.foo > /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted
# cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
security.selinux
security.ima
security.capability
security.foo
# echo . > /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted
# echo security.boo > /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted
# ls -lat //sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
-rw-rw----. 1 root root 0 May 14 13:10
//sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
"security.boo" wasn't added. So writing '.' worked, but the chmod did
not work. Maybe the error messages are coming from there.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-14 17:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-11 23:12 [PATCH V5 1/3] integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs Matthew Garrett
2018-05-11 23:12 ` [PATCH V5 2/3] EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list Matthew Garrett
2018-05-11 23:12 ` [PATCH V5 3/3] EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs Matthew Garrett
2018-05-13 16:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-14 17:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-05-14 17:19 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-05-14 17:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-14 17:36 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-05-14 18:50 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-05-14 21:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-14 23:12 ` Matthew Garrett
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1526318354.3898.159.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--to=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mjg59@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.