From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 0/3] enable early printing of hashed pointers
Date: Wed, 16 May 2018 09:17:36 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1526426259-23012-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc> (raw)
Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is
enough entropy then '(____ptrval____)' is printed. This makes debugging
stack traces during early boot difficult.
One partial solution to this problem is to use the hw RNG if it is
available.
Patch 1 - Whitespace fixes.
Patch 2 - Fix get_random_bytes_arch()
Patch 3 - Use hw RNG for pointer hashing if available (by default).
thanks,
Tobin.
v4 -> v5
- Use 'upside-down-xmas-tree' style to declare local variables (Steve)
- Added Reviewed-by tag from Steve (patch 2 and 3).
v3 -> v4
- remove last patch of series (command line option patch)
v2 -> v3
- Add __ro_after_init (suggested by Kees).
v1 -> v2
- Use min_t() instead of min() (thanks checkpatch).
- Add __must_check to function declaration (thanks Steve).
- Use hw RNG by default if available (as originally suggested by Kees).
- Add command line option to use cryptographically insecure hashing.
If debug_early_boot is enabled use hash_long() instead of siphash
(as requested by Steve, and solves original problem for Anna-Maria).
- Added Acked-by tag from Ted (patch 1 and 2)
*** BLURB HERE ***
Tobin C. Harding (3):
random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
drivers/char/random.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
include/linux/random.h | 2 +-
lib/vsprintf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-05-15 23:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-15 23:17 Tobin C. Harding [this message]
2018-05-15 23:17 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-15 23:17 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-15 23:17 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-16 15:13 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] enable early printing of hashed pointers Steven Rostedt
2018-05-16 22:41 ` Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-22 15:33 ` Steven Rostedt
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