diff for duplicates of <1530024994.27091.0.camel@intel.com> diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N1/1.txt index 3b289d7..17a937e 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N1/1.txt @@ -37,3 +37,7 @@ Yes, I will do that. Thanks, Yu-cheng +-- +To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in +the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org +More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N1/content_digest index acca4b8..0a79f97 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N1/content_digest @@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ "Yes, I will do that.\n" "\n" "Thanks,\n" - Yu-cheng + "Yu-cheng\n" + "--\n" + "To unsubscribe from this list: send the line \"unsubscribe linux-doc\" in\n" + "the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org\n" + More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html -ea96ed16d40dea493c4d193276d9db7667d7401c00f93c7d1dee9748579c066b +31c7f06a62b8f83fa63a8c0ccfc0e344440ce19823e6c74341f0fa5ff75a809c
diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N2/1.txt index 3b289d7..e99971a 100644 --- a/a/1.txt +++ b/N2/1.txt @@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ On Tue, 2018-06-26 at 04:46 +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > > > > At the high level, shadow stack is: > > -> > Allocated from a task's address space with vm_flags +> > A A A A A A A A Allocated from a task's address space with vm_flags > > VM_SHSTK; -> > Its PTEs must be read-only and dirty; -> > Fixed sized, but the default size can be changed by sys +> > A A A A A A A A Its PTEs must be read-only and dirty; +> > A A A A A A A A Fixed sized, but the default size can be changed by sys > > admin. > > > > For a forked child, the shadow stack is duplicated when the next @@ -21,16 +21,16 @@ On Tue, 2018-06-26 at 04:46 +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > > The signal handler uses the same shadow stack as the main program. > > > > Yu-cheng Yu (10): -> > x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support -> > x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction -> > x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack -> > x86/cet: Handle thread shadow stack -> > x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement -> > x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack -> > mm: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack -> > mm: Prevent mremap of shadow stack -> > mm: Prevent madvise from changing shadow stack -> > mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of shadow stack +> > A x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support +> > A x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction +> > A x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack +> > A x86/cet: Handle thread shadow stack +> > A x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement +> > A x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack +> > A mm: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack +> > A mm: Prevent mremap of shadow stack +> > A mm: Prevent madvise from changing shadow stack +> > A mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of shadow stack > Shouldn't patches like these be CC'ed to linux-api@vger.kernel.org? Yes, I will do that. diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N2/content_digest index acca4b8..a96f99f 100644 --- a/a/content_digest +++ b/N2/content_digest @@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ "> > \n" "> > At the high level, shadow stack is:\n" "> > \n" - "> > \302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240Allocated from a task's address space with vm_flags\n" + "> > A A A A A A A A Allocated from a task's address space with vm_flags\n" "> > VM_SHSTK;\n" - "> > \302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240Its PTEs must be read-only and dirty;\n" - "> > \302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240\302\240Fixed sized, but the default size can be changed by sys\n" + "> > A A A A A A A A Its PTEs must be read-only and dirty;\n" + "> > A A A A A A A A Fixed sized, but the default size can be changed by sys\n" "> > admin.\n" "> > \n" "> > For a forked child, the shadow stack is duplicated when the next\n" @@ -46,16 +46,16 @@ "> > The signal handler uses the same shadow stack as the main program.\n" "> > \n" "> > Yu-cheng Yu (10):\n" - "> > \302\240 x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support\n" - "> > \302\240 x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction\n" - "> > \302\240 x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack\n" - "> > \302\240 x86/cet: Handle thread shadow stack\n" - "> > \302\240 x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement\n" - "> > \302\240 x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack\n" - "> > \302\240 mm: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack\n" - "> > \302\240 mm: Prevent mremap of shadow stack\n" - "> > \302\240 mm: Prevent madvise from changing shadow stack\n" - "> > \302\240 mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of shadow stack\n" + "> > A x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support\n" + "> > A x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction\n" + "> > A x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack\n" + "> > A x86/cet: Handle thread shadow stack\n" + "> > A x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement\n" + "> > A x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack\n" + "> > A mm: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack\n" + "> > A mm: Prevent mremap of shadow stack\n" + "> > A mm: Prevent madvise from changing shadow stack\n" + "> > A mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of shadow stack\n" "> Shouldn't patches like these be CC'ed to linux-api@vger.kernel.org?\n" "\n" "Yes, I will do that.\n" @@ -63,4 +63,4 @@ "Thanks,\n" Yu-cheng -ea96ed16d40dea493c4d193276d9db7667d7401c00f93c7d1dee9748579c066b +d4e19f0afe138ade63c02df4ab985d2cd505cd4ebad0e65803ce9e8651229b68
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