From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.90_1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1fczE9-0006Jm-6E for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:27:14 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098399.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w6AKPsU7106182 for ; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:58 -0400 Received: from e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.97]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2k50my0e6y-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:58 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 21:26:56 +0100 Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:51 -0400 In-Reply-To: <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1530542283-26145-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <1531254411.3332.146.camel@linux.ibm.com> List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook Hi Eric, Can I get your Ack on this patch? Mimi On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 10:37 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load > and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must > call an LSM hook. This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data() > in the original kexec_load syscall. > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar > Cc: Eric Biederman > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez > Cc: Kees Cook > Cc: David Howells > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > --- > kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c > index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, > static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, > unsigned long flags) > { > + int result; > + > /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > return -EPERM; > > + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ > + result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE); > + if (result < 0) > + return result; > + > /* > * Verify we have a legal set of flags > * This leaves us room for future extensions. _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: zohar@linux.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar) Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:51 -0400 Subject: [PATCH v5 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall In-Reply-To: <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1530542283-26145-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-ID: <1531254411.3332.146.camel@linux.ibm.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org Hi Eric, Can I get your Ack on this patch? Mimi On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 10:37 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load > and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must > call an LSM hook. This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data() > in the original kexec_load syscall. > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar > Cc: Eric Biederman > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez > Cc: Kees Cook > Cc: David Howells > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > --- > kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c > index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, > static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, > unsigned long flags) > { > + int result; > + > /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > return -EPERM; > > + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ > + result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE); > + if (result < 0) > + return result; > + > /* > * Verify we have a legal set of flags > * This leaves us room for future extensions. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 998EDC3279B for ; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:27:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52972208E5 for ; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:27:02 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 52972208E5 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732618AbeGJU1k (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:27:40 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:38534 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732365AbeGJU1k (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:27:40 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w6AKO8WL060176 for ; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:58 -0400 Received: from e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.97]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2k4yhmmn7j-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:57 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 10 Jul 2018 21:26:53 +0100 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w6AKQq9T7995402 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:26:52 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id EEF274C040; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 23:27:14 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 573B24C044; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 23:27:14 +0100 (BST) Received: from dhcp-9-31-103-18.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.31.103.18]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 10 Jul 2018 23:27:14 +0100 (BST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall From: Mimi Zohar To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Kees Cook Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:26:51 -0400 In-Reply-To: <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1530542283-26145-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1530542283-26145-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18071020-4275-0000-0000-000002972DB1 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18071020-4276-0000-0000-0000379ECA35 Message-Id: <1531254411.3332.146.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-07-10_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=3 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1806210000 definitions=main-1807100217 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Eric, Can I get your Ack on this patch? Mimi On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 10:37 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load > and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must > call an LSM hook. This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data() > in the original kexec_load syscall. > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar > Cc: Eric Biederman > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez > Cc: Kees Cook > Cc: David Howells > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > --- > kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c > index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, > static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, > unsigned long flags) > { > + int result; > + > /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > return -EPERM; > > + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ > + result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE); > + if (result < 0) > + return result; > + > /* > * Verify we have a legal set of flags > * This leaves us room for future extensions.