From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, monty.wiseman@ge.com,
Monty Wiseman <montywiseman32@gmail.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: Re: Documenting the proposal for TPM 2.0 security in the face of bus interposer attacks
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 15:58:51 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1542758331.2814.48.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181120231320.GI8391@linux.intel.com>
On Wed, 2018-11-21 at 01:13 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 09:25:43AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Tue, 2018-11-20 at 14:41 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 01:10:49PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > This is basically rewrite of TPM genie paper with extras. Maybe
> > > > just shorten it to include the proposed architecture and point
> > > > to the TPM Genie paper (which is not in the references at all
> > > > ATM).
> > > >
> > > > The way I see it the data validation is way more important than
> > > > protecting against physical interposer to be frank.
> > > >
> > > > The attack scenario would require to open the damn device. For
> > > > laptop that would leave physical marks (i.e. evil maid). In a
> > > > data center with armed guards I would wish you good luck
> > > > accomplishing it. It is not anything like sticking a USB stick
> > > > and run.
> > > >
> > > > We can take a fix into Linux with a clean implementation but it
> > > > needs to be an opt-in feature because not all users will want
> > > > to use it.
> > >
> > > Someone (might have been either Mimi or David Howells but cannot
> > > recall) correctly pointed out at LSS 2018 that you could just as
> > > easily spy and corrupt RAM if you have a time window to perform
> > > this type of attack.
> >
> > Not using the simple plug in on the TPM bus, you can't. The point
> > is basically the difference in the technology: the interposer is a
> > simple, easy to construct, plugin; a RAM spy is a huge JTAG thing
> > that would be hard even to fit into a modern thin laptop, let alone
> > extremely difficult to build.
>
> Why you wouldn't use DMA to spy the RAM?
You mean from a plugin on the TPM bus? most of the buses the TPM is on
don't get DMA access. Some of them barely get interrupts, which is why
we waste a lot of time polling in TPM drivers.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-20 23:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-19 17:34 Documenting the proposal for TPM 2.0 security in the face of bus interposer attacks James Bottomley
2018-11-19 20:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-19 20:20 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-19 21:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-19 21:34 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-19 21:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-19 22:36 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-19 23:08 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-20 0:54 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 3:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-20 17:17 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 21:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-20 22:34 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 23:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-21 2:24 ` EXTERNAL: " Jeremy Boone
2018-11-21 5:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-20 23:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 23:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 11:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 12:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 17:25 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 23:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 23:58 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2018-11-21 0:33 ` EXTERNAL: " Jeremy Boone
2018-11-21 6:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-21 5:42 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2018-11-21 7:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <F10185EF-C618-45DC-B1F3-0053B8FE417F@gmail.com>
2018-11-21 9:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-21 9:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-11-20 17:23 ` James Bottomley
2018-11-20 23:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-12-10 16:33 ` Ken Goldman
2018-12-10 17:30 ` James Bottomley
2018-12-11 21:47 ` Ken Goldman
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