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Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Wed, 28 Nov 2018 16:45:44 -0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA From: Mimi Zohar Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 11:45:27 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20181125151500.8298-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20181125151500.8298-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <1543423527.3902.239.camel@linux.ibm.com> List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: Nayna Jain , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, jforbes@redhat.com, vgoyal@redhat.com 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<20181125151500.8298-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <20181125151500.8298-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> To: Nayna Jain , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, vgoyal@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au Hi Nayna, On Sun, 2018-11-25 at 20:44 +0530, Nayna Jain wrote: > On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec > additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing > to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. > In such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel > image. > > It is possible that the new kernel image is signed with third party keys > which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. The > kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an > administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. > In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the > necessary separation of trust the kernel needs an additional keyring to > store platform/firmware keys. > > The secure boot key database is expected to store the keys as EFI > Signature List(ESL). The patch set uses David Howells and Josh Boyer's > patch to access and parse the ESL to extract the certificates and load > them onto the platform keyring. > > The last patch in this patch set adds support for IMA-appraisal to > verify the kexec'ed kernel image based on keys stored in the platform > keyring. > > Changelog: > > v0: > - The original patches loaded the certificates onto the secondary > trusted keyring. This patch set defines a new keyring named > ".platform" and adds the certificates to this new keyring > - removed CONFIG EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER and LOAD_UEFI_KEYS > - moved files from certs/ to security/integrity/platform_certs/ This patch set is looking really good!  There are a couple of checkpatch.pl warnings that need to be addressed before these patches can be upstreamed.  I'd also like to see some Reviews/Acks for them as well. For the time being these patches are queued in the #next-integrity- queued branch. https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity. git/ thanks! Mimi > > Dave Howells (2): > efi: Add EFI signature data types > efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser > > Josh Boyer (2): > efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot > efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed > > Nayna Jain (3): > integrity: define a trusted platform keyring > integrity: load certs to the platform keyring > ima: support platform keyring for kernel appraisal > > include/linux/efi.h | 34 ++++ > security/integrity/Kconfig | 11 ++ > security/integrity/Makefile | 5 + > security/integrity/digsig.c | 115 ++++++++---- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 23 ++- > security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c | 112 ++++++++++++ > security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 192 +++++++++++++++++++++ > .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 62 +++++++ > 9 files changed, 527 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c > From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Mimi Zohar Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 11:45:27 -0500 Message-ID: <1543423527.3902.239.camel@linux.ibm.com> References: <20181125151500.8298-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20181125151500.8298-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Nayna Jain , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, vgoyal@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Hi Nayna, On Sun, 2018-11-25 at 20:44 +0530, Nayna Jain wrote: > On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec > additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing > to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. > In such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel > image. > > It is possible that the new kernel image is signed with third party keys > which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. The > kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an > administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. > In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the > necessary separation of trust the kernel needs an additional keyring to > store platform/firmware keys. > > The secure boot key database is expected to store the keys as EFI > Signature List(ESL). The patch set uses David Howells and Josh Boyer's > patch to access and parse the ESL to extract the certificates and load > them onto the platform keyring. > > The last patch in this patch set adds support for IMA-appraisal to > verify the kexec'ed kernel image based on keys stored in the platform > keyring. > > Changelog: > > v0: > - The original patches loaded the certificates onto the secondary > trusted keyring. This patch set defines a new keyring named > ".platform" and adds the certificates to this new keyring > - removed CONFIG EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST_PARSER and LOAD_UEFI_KEYS > - moved files from certs/ to security/integrity/platform_certs/ This patch set is looking really good!  There are a couple of checkpatch.pl warnings that need to be addressed before these patches can be upstreamed.  I'd also like to see some Reviews/Acks for them as well. For the time being these patches are queued in the #next-integrity- queued branch. https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity. git/ thanks! Mimi > > Dave Howells (2): > efi: Add EFI signature data types > efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser > > Josh Boyer (2): > efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot > efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed > > Nayna Jain (3): > integrity: define a trusted platform keyring > integrity: load certs to the platform keyring > ima: support platform keyring for kernel appraisal > > include/linux/efi.h | 34 ++++ > security/integrity/Kconfig | 11 ++ > security/integrity/Makefile | 5 + > security/integrity/digsig.c | 115 ++++++++---- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 23 ++- > security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c | 112 ++++++++++++ > security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 192 +++++++++++++++++++++ > .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 62 +++++++ > 9 files changed, 527 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/efi_parser.c > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c >