From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: andre.przywara@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, corbet@lwn.net,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jeremy.linton@arm.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, stefan.wahren@i2se.com,
suzuki.poulose@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com
Cc: stable-commits@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Patch "arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree
Date: Wed, 09 Oct 2019 10:04:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <157060824215141@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191008153930.15386-11-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation
to the 4.19-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
arm64-provide-a-command-line-to-disable-spectre_v2-mitigation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.19 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
From foo@baz Wed 09 Oct 2019 10:02:11 AM CEST
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2019 17:39:24 +0200
Subject: arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>, Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20191008153930.15386-11-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
[ Upstream commit e5ce5e7267ddcbe13ab9ead2542524e1b7993e5a ]
There are various reasons, such as benchmarking, to disable spectrev2
mitigation on a machine. Provide a command-line option to do so.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++----
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2866,10 +2866,10 @@
(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
are possible in the system.
- nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
- (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
- allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
- to spectre_v2=off.
+ nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E,ARM64] Disable all mitigations for
+ the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction)
+ vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
+ option.
nospec_store_bypass_disable
[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -189,6 +189,14 @@ static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization
: "=&r" (tmp));
}
+static bool __nospectre_v2;
+static int __init parse_nospectre_v2(char *str)
+{
+ __nospectre_v2 = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_nospectre_v2);
+
static void
enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
{
@@ -200,6 +208,11 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const str
if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
return;
+ if (__nospectre_v2) {
+ pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
return;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org are
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-meltdown.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-force-ssbs-on-context-switch.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-enable-generic-cpu-vulnerabilites-support.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-provide-a-command-line-to-disable-spectre_v2-mitigation.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-always-enable-spectre-v2-vulnerability-detection.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-docs-document-ssbs-hwcap.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-spectre-v1.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-speculative-store-bypass.patch
queue-4.19/kvm-arm64-set-sctlr_el2.dssbs-if-ssbd-is-forcefully-disabled-and-vhe.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-always-enable-ssb-vulnerability-detection.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-advertise-mitigation-of-spectre-v2-or-lack-thereof.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-ssbs-don-t-treat-cpus-with-ssbs-as-unaffected-by-ssb.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-skcipher-unmap-pages-after-an-external-error.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-cpufeature-detect-ssbs-and-advertise-to-userspace.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-ssbd-add-support-for-pstate.ssbs-rather-than-trapping-to-el3.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-fix-ssbs-sanitization.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-spectre-v2.patch
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-09 8:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-08 15:39 [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 00/16] arm64 spec mitigation backports Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 01/16] arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 02/16] arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 03/16] KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 04/16] arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 05/16] arm64: fix SSBS sanitization Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: fix SSBS sanitization" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 06/16] arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 07/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 08/16] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 09/16] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 10/16] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` gregkh [this message]
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 11/16] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 12/16] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 13/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 14/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 15/16] arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 16/16] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Force SSBS on context switch" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-09 8:04 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 00/16] arm64 spec mitigation backports Greg KH
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Greg KH
2019-10-09 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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