From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: babu.moger@amd.com, jmattson@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Fix pkru save/restore when guest CR4.PKE=0, move it" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree
Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 15:39:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <158980917424929@kroah.com> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 37486135d3a7b03acc7755b63627a130437f066a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 18:59:06 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Fix pkru save/restore when guest CR4.PKE=0, move it
to x86.c
Though rdpkru and wrpkru are contingent upon CR4.PKE, the PKRU
resource isn't. It can be read with XSAVE and written with XRSTOR.
So, if we don't set the guest PKRU value here(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state),
the guest can read the host value.
In case of kvm_load_host_xsave_state, guest with CR4.PKE clear could
potentially use XRSTOR to change the host PKRU value.
While at it, move pkru state save/restore to common code and the
host_pkru field to kvm_vcpu_arch. This will let SVM support protection keys.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <158932794619.44260.14508381096663848853.stgit@naples-babu.amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 9e8263b1e6fe..0a6b35353fc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -578,6 +578,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
unsigned long cr4;
unsigned long cr4_guest_owned_bits;
unsigned long cr8;
+ u32 host_pkru;
u32 pkru;
u32 hflags;
u64 efer;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index e45cf89c5821..89c766fad889 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1372,7 +1372,6 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
- vmx->host_pkru = read_pkru();
vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
}
@@ -6564,11 +6563,6 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
- kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) &&
- vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
- __write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
-
pt_guest_enter(vmx);
if (vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->version)
@@ -6658,18 +6652,6 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
pt_guest_exit(vmx);
- /*
- * eager fpu is enabled if PKEY is supported and CR4 is switched
- * back on host, so it is safe to read guest PKRU from current
- * XSAVE.
- */
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
- kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE)) {
- vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
- if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
- __write_pkru(vmx->host_pkru);
- }
-
kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 98176b80c481..d11eba8b85c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -837,11 +837,25 @@ void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, vcpu->arch.ia32_xss);
}
+
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+ (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) ||
+ (vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU)) &&
+ vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
+ __write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state);
void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+ (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) ||
+ (vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU))) {
+ vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
+ if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
+ __write_pkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
+ }
+
if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) {
if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != host_xcr0)
@@ -3549,6 +3563,9 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
+ /* Save host pkru register if supported */
+ vcpu->arch.host_pkru = read_pkru();
+
/* Apply any externally detected TSC adjustments (due to suspend) */
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment)) {
adjust_tsc_offset_host(vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment);
next reply other threads:[~2020-05-18 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-18 13:39 gregkh [this message]
2020-05-18 14:46 ` FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Fix pkru save/restore when guest CR4.PKE=0, move it" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree Babu Moger
2020-05-18 19:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
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