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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@lwn.net, jslaby@suse.cz,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 4.9.227
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2020 09:45:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1591861547137167@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <15918615479413@kroah.com>

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index b41046b5713b..a5225df4a070 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst
index 24f53c501366..b5fbc6ae9d5f 100644
--- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -12,4 +12,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    l1tf
    mds
    tsx_async_abort
-   multihit.rst
+   multihit
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling
diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..47b1b3afac99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses.  Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers.  According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+  =============  ============  ========
+  common name    Family_Model  Stepping
+  =============  ============  ========
+  IvyBridge      06_3AH        All
+
+  Haswell        06_3CH        All
+  Haswell_L      06_45H        All
+  Haswell_G      06_46H        All
+
+  Broadwell_G    06_47H        All
+  Broadwell      06_3DH        All
+
+  Skylake_L      06_4EH        All
+  Skylake        06_5EH        All
+
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        <= 0xC
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <= 0xD
+  =============  ============  ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+    CVE-2020-0543   SRBDS  Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+   serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+   bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+   logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+   legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=".  The option for this is:
+
+  ============= =============================================================
+  off           This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+                affected platforms.
+  ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs.  For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled       Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+                                enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+                                disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse.  Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index e05d65d6fcb6..40602517ca52 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4262,6 +4262,26 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 	spia_pedr=
 	spia_peddr=
 
+	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+			(SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+			exploit which can leak bits from the random
+			number generator.
+
+			By default, this issue is mitigated by
+			microcode.  However, the microcode fix can cause
+			the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+			much slower.  Among other effects, this will
+			result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+			The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+			the following option:
+
+			off:    Disable mitigation and remove
+				performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
 	ssbd=		[ARM64,HW]
 			Speculative Store Bypass Disable control
 
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index b0e1162fddfa..6c3c6e193621 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 9
-SUBLEVEL = 226
+SUBLEVEL = 227
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Roaring Lionus
 
diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c
index 9f96120eee6e..82464fae7772 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/setup.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/root_dev.h>
 #include <linux/console.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
@@ -333,12 +334,12 @@ static void arc_chk_core_config(void)
 	if ((unsigned int)__arc_dccm_base != cpu->dccm.base_addr)
 		panic("Linux built with incorrect DCCM Base address\n");
 
-	if (CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ != cpu->dccm.sz)
+	if (CONFIG_ARC_DCCM_SZ * SZ_1K != cpu->dccm.sz)
 		panic("Linux built with incorrect DCCM Size\n");
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_ICCM
-	if (CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ != cpu->iccm.sz)
+	if (CONFIG_ARC_ICCM_SZ * SZ_1K != cpu->iccm.sz)
 		panic("Linux built with incorrect ICCM Size\n");
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S
index 802a4ded9a62..e9df35249f9f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_mcount)
 ENTRY(ftrace_caller)
 	.globl	ftrace_regs_caller
 	.set	ftrace_regs_caller,ftrace_caller
+	stg	%r14,(__SF_GPRS+8*8)(%r15)	# save traced function caller
 	lgr	%r1,%r15
 #ifndef CC_USING_HOTPATCH
 	aghi	%r0,MCOUNT_RETURN_FIXUP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
index ff501e511d91..b9473858c6b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
@@ -8,6 +8,33 @@
 
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
 
+#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs)    GENMASK(maxs, mins)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
+ * @_family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_steppings:	Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY
+ * @_feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants
+ * required for this.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
+						    _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
+	.vendor		= X86_VENDOR_##_vendor,				\
+	.family		= _family,					\
+	.model		= _model,					\
+	.steppings	= _steppings,					\
+	.feature	= _feature,					\
+	.driver_data	= (unsigned long) _data				\
+}
+
 extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index fb457ba8ccc6..2cd5d12a842c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL		(18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
@@ -346,19 +347,20 @@
  */
 #define X86_BUG_ESPFIX		X86_BUG(9) /* "" IRET to 16-bit SS corrupts ESP/RSP high bits */
 #endif
-#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG	X86_BUG(10) /* Nulling a selector preserves the base */
-#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE	X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
-#define X86_BUG_MONITOR		X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
-#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400	X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
-#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN	X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
-#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1	X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
-#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2	X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
-#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
-#define X86_BUG_L1TF		X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
-#define X86_BUG_MDS		X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
-#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY	X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
-#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS		X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
-#define X86_BUG_TAA		X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
-#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT	X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG		X86_BUG(10) /* Nulling a selector preserves the base */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE		X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
+#define X86_BUG_MONITOR			X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
+#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400		X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN		X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1		X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
+#define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
+#define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
+#define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
+#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 8d162e0f2881..b12b0a50ad1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@
 #define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
 #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
 
+/* SRBDS support */
+#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL		0x00000123
+#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS			BIT(0)
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 5736306bdaab..e638e3bc3cb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ static inline int pmd_large(pmd_t pte)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+/* NOTE: when predicate huge page, consider also pmd_devmap, or use pmd_large */
 static inline int pmd_trans_huge(pmd_t pmd)
 {
 	return (pmd_val(pmd) & (_PAGE_PSE|_PAGE_DEVMAP)) == _PAGE_PSE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 24307d5bb4b8..5ef0a2b34261 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
 static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	mds_select_mitigation();
 	taa_select_mitigation();
+	srbds_select_mitigation();
 
 	/*
 	 * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
@@ -389,6 +391,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 }
 early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SRBDS: " fmt
+
+enum srbds_mitigations {
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL]		= "Mitigation: Microcode",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF]	= "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]	= "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+static bool srbds_off;
+
+void update_srbds_msr(void)
+{
+	u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return;
+
+	if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
+		return;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+	switch (srbds_mitigation) {
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
+		mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+		break;
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
+	 * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+	 */
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+	else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+	update_srbds_msr();
+	pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
 
@@ -1501,6 +1594,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
 	return "";
 }
 
+static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -1542,6 +1640,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
 		return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
+		return srbds_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1588,4 +1689,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index f490a4fab2f7..b16b6176738b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -956,9 +956,30 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues)		   \
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
+					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define SRBDS		BIT(0)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC),	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD),	SRBDS),
+	{}
+};
+
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
 {
-	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
 
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
@@ -978,29 +999,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
-		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
 	/*
@@ -1018,7 +1042,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+	/*
+	 * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
+	 * in the vulnerability blacklist.
+	 */
+	if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
+	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
+	    cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+		    setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1027,7 +1060,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
@@ -1450,6 +1483,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	mtrr_ap_init();
 	validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
 	x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
+	update_srbds_msr();
 }
 
 struct msr_range {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index 4350f50b5deb..fdeeab6b158c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ extern int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
 
 extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
index e42117d5f4d7..f46ffb3b295f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -33,13 +33,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
 
-	for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
+	for (m = match;
+	     m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+	     m++) {
 		if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
 			continue;
 		if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
 			continue;
 		if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
 			continue;
+		if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+		    !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+			continue;
 		if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
 			continue;
 		return m;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c
index bef36622e408..abd4fa587ca4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static void enter_uniprocessor(void)
 	int cpu;
 	int err;
 
-	if (downed_cpus == NULL &&
+	if (!cpumask_available(downed_cpus) &&
 	    !alloc_cpumask_var(&downed_cpus, GFP_KERNEL)) {
 		pr_notice("Failed to allocate mask\n");
 		goto out;
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static void leave_uniprocessor(void)
 	int cpu;
 	int err;
 
-	if (downed_cpus == NULL || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0)
+	if (!cpumask_available(downed_cpus) || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0)
 		return;
 	pr_notice("Re-enabling CPUs...\n");
 	for_each_cpu(cpu, downed_cpus) {
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 677c5f36674b..100850398dd3 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -550,6 +550,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
+			      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -558,6 +564,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -568,6 +575,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
 	&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
 	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
+	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c
index 95052373a828..681ac9bc68b3 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid-dmi-quirks.c
@@ -381,6 +381,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id i2c_hid_dmi_desc_override_table[] = {
 		},
 		.driver_data = (void *)&sipodev_desc
 	},
+	{
+		.ident = "Schneider SCL142ALM",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SCHNEIDER"),
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "SCL142ALM"),
+		},
+		.driver_data = (void *)&sipodev_desc
+	},
 	{ }	/* Terminate list */
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c
index 360b6e98137a..5a3a532937ba 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask,
 				u8 rdy_mask, u8 data_reg, int *val)
 {
 	int tries = 20;
-	__be16 buf;
 	int ret;
 
 	mutex_lock(&data->lock);
@@ -88,13 +87,12 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask,
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
-	ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(data->client,
-		data_reg, sizeof(buf), (u8 *) &buf);
+	ret = i2c_smbus_read_word_swapped(data->client, data_reg);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
-	*val = be16_to_cpu(buf);
+	*val = ret;
 
 	return 0;
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
index d0435c7631ff..9c938f9892b2 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/slcan.c
@@ -618,10 +618,9 @@ static int slcan_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	sl->tty = NULL;
 	tty->disc_data = NULL;
 	clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
-	slc_free_netdev(sl->dev);
 	/* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */
 	rtnl_unlock();
-	free_netdev(sl->dev);
+	slc_free_netdev(sl->dev);
 	return err;
 
 err_exit:
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c
index a65d7a60f116..ffa7e7e6d18d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/apple/bmac.c
@@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ bmac_get_station_address(struct net_device *dev, unsigned char *ea)
 	int i;
 	unsigned short data;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
 		{
 			reset_and_select_srom(dev);
 			data = read_srom(dev, i + EnetAddressOffset/2, SROMAddressBits);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c
index 714593023bbc..af922bac19ae 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <soc/fsl/qe/ucc.h>
 #include <soc/fsl/qe/ucc_fast.h>
 #include <asm/machdep.h>
+#include <net/sch_generic.h>
 
 #include "ucc_geth.h"
 
@@ -1551,11 +1552,8 @@ static int ugeth_disable(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth, enum comm_dir mode)
 
 static void ugeth_quiesce(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth)
 {
-	/* Prevent any further xmits, plus detach the device. */
-	netif_device_detach(ugeth->ndev);
-
-	/* Wait for any current xmits to finish. */
-	netif_tx_disable(ugeth->ndev);
+	/* Prevent any further xmits */
+	netif_tx_stop_all_queues(ugeth->ndev);
 
 	/* Disable the interrupt to avoid NAPI rescheduling. */
 	disable_irq(ugeth->ug_info->uf_info.irq);
@@ -1568,7 +1566,10 @@ static void ugeth_activate(struct ucc_geth_private *ugeth)
 {
 	napi_enable(&ugeth->napi);
 	enable_irq(ugeth->ug_info->uf_info.irq);
-	netif_device_attach(ugeth->ndev);
+
+	/* allow to xmit again  */
+	netif_tx_wake_all_queues(ugeth->ndev);
+	__netdev_watchdog_up(ugeth->ndev);
 }
 
 /* Called every time the controller might need to be made
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c
index 4143659615e1..264136dba674 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smsc911x.c
@@ -2506,20 +2506,20 @@ static int smsc911x_drv_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	retval = smsc911x_init(dev);
 	if (retval < 0)
-		goto out_disable_resources;
+		goto out_init_fail;
 
 	netif_carrier_off(dev);
 
 	retval = smsc911x_mii_init(pdev, dev);
 	if (retval) {
 		SMSC_WARN(pdata, probe, "Error %i initialising mii", retval);
-		goto out_disable_resources;
+		goto out_init_fail;
 	}
 
 	retval = register_netdev(dev);
 	if (retval) {
 		SMSC_WARN(pdata, probe, "Error %i registering device", retval);
-		goto out_disable_resources;
+		goto out_init_fail;
 	} else {
 		SMSC_TRACE(pdata, probe,
 			   "Network interface: \"%s\"", dev->name);
@@ -2560,9 +2560,10 @@ static int smsc911x_drv_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	return 0;
 
-out_disable_resources:
+out_init_fail:
 	pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
+out_disable_resources:
 	(void)smsc911x_disable_resources(pdev);
 out_enable_resources_fail:
 	smsc911x_free_resources(pdev);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c
index 11a4a81b0397..bcc5d1e16ce2 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-ipq806x.c
@@ -330,6 +330,19 @@ static int ipq806x_gmac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* Enable PTP clock */
 	regmap_read(gmac->nss_common, NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE, &val);
 	val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_PTP_EN(gmac->id);
+	switch (gmac->phy_mode) {
+	case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII:
+		val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_RGMII_RX_EN(gmac->id) |
+			NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_RGMII_TX_EN(gmac->id);
+		break;
+	case PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII:
+		val |= NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_GMII_RX_EN(gmac->id) |
+				NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE_GMII_TX_EN(gmac->id);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* We don't get here; the switch above will have errored out */
+		unreachable();
+	}
 	regmap_write(gmac->nss_common, NSS_COMMON_CLK_GATE, val);
 
 	if (gmac->phy_mode == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII) {
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
index fa8f7c40a384..804c52c35f07 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c
@@ -494,6 +494,9 @@ static int pppoe_disc_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (!skb)
 		goto out;
 
+	if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
+		goto abort;
+
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct pppoe_hdr)))
 		goto abort;
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
index cc841126147e..f870396e05e1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
+++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
@@ -867,7 +867,10 @@ static int slip_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	sl->tty = NULL;
 	tty->disc_data = NULL;
 	clear_bit(SLF_INUSE, &sl->flags);
+	/* do not call free_netdev before rtnl_unlock */
+	rtnl_unlock();
 	sl_free_netdev(sl->dev);
+	return err;
 
 err_exit:
 	rtnl_unlock();
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
index 5755eec00d7f..9a873616dd27 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -921,6 +921,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bbb, 0x0203, 2)},	/* Alcatel L800MA */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x0201, 4)},	/* TP-LINK HSUPA Modem MA180 */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)},	/* TP-LINK MA260 */
+	{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1031, 3)}, /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */
 	{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1040, 2)},	/* Telit LE922A */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1100, 3)},	/* Telit ME910 */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1101, 3)},	/* Telit ME910 dual modem */
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c b/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c
index a8d470010f5e..ea609dc7f081 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/cisco/airo.c
@@ -1928,6 +1928,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t mpi_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!",__func__);
 		return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 	}
+	if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) {
+		dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
+		return NETDEV_TX_OK;
+	}
 	npacks = skb_queue_len (&ai->txq);
 
 	if (npacks >= MAXTXQ - 1) {
@@ -2130,6 +2134,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t airo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!", __func__);
 		return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 	}
+	if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) {
+		dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
+		return NETDEV_TX_OK;
+	}
 
 	/* Find a vacant FID */
 	for( i = 0; i < MAX_FIDS / 2 && (fids[i] & 0xffff0000); i++ );
@@ -2204,6 +2212,10 @@ static netdev_tx_t airo_start_xmit11(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		airo_print_err(dev->name, "%s: skb == NULL!", __func__);
 		return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 	}
+	if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) {
+		dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
+		return NETDEV_TX_OK;
+	}
 
 	/* Find a vacant FID */
 	for( i = MAX_FIDS / 2; i < MAX_FIDS && (fids[i] & 0xffff0000); i++ );
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
index 4a197a32d78c..979fcef1d848 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id p54u_table[] = {
 	{USB_DEVICE(0x0db0, 0x6826)},	/* MSI UB54G (MS-6826) */
 	{USB_DEVICE(0x107b, 0x55f2)},	/* Gateway WGU-210 (Gemtek) */
 	{USB_DEVICE(0x124a, 0x4023)},	/* Shuttle PN15, Airvast WM168g, IOGear GWU513 */
+	{USB_DEVICE(0x124a, 0x4026)},	/* AirVasT USB wireless device */
 	{USB_DEVICE(0x1435, 0x0210)},	/* Inventel UR054G */
 	{USB_DEVICE(0x15a9, 0x0002)},	/* Gemtek WUBI-100GW 802.11g */
 	{USB_DEVICE(0x1630, 0x0005)},	/* 2Wire 802.11g USB (v1) / Z-Com */
diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c
index 798a32bbac5d..e023a679bdea 100644
--- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c
+++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c
@@ -184,8 +184,10 @@ static int st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev,
 		memcpy(atr_res->gbi, atr_req->gbi, gb_len);
 		r = nfc_set_remote_general_bytes(hdev->ndev, atr_res->gbi,
 						  gb_len);
-		if (r < 0)
+		if (r < 0) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
 			return r;
+		}
 	}
 
 	info->dep_info.curr_nfc_dep_pni = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c b/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c
index b5305f08b184..05b1c4f36b7b 100644
--- a/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c
+++ b/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c
@@ -30,19 +30,6 @@ static int qfprom_reg_read(void *context,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int qfprom_reg_write(void *context,
-			 unsigned int reg, void *_val, size_t bytes)
-{
-	void __iomem *base = context;
-	u32 *val = _val;
-	int i = 0, words = bytes / 4;
-
-	while (words--)
-		writel(*val++, base + reg + (i++ * 4));
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int qfprom_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct nvmem_device *nvmem = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
@@ -56,7 +43,6 @@ static struct nvmem_config econfig = {
 	.stride = 4,
 	.word_size = 1,
 	.reg_read = qfprom_reg_read,
-	.reg_write = qfprom_reg_write,
 };
 
 static int qfprom_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
index 9d555b63d2e2..d596b76eea64 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
@@ -394,8 +394,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(scsi_dev_info_list_add_keyed);
 
 /**
  * scsi_dev_info_list_find - find a matching dev_info list entry.
- * @vendor:	vendor string
- * @model:	model (product) string
+ * @vendor:	full vendor string
+ * @model:	full model (product) string
  * @key:	specify list to use
  *
  * Description:
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static struct scsi_dev_info_list *scsi_dev_info_list_find(const char *vendor,
 	struct scsi_dev_info_list *devinfo;
 	struct scsi_dev_info_list_table *devinfo_table =
 		scsi_devinfo_lookup_by_key(key);
-	size_t vmax, mmax;
+	size_t vmax, mmax, mlen;
 	const char *vskip, *mskip;
 
 	if (IS_ERR(devinfo_table))
@@ -449,15 +449,18 @@ static struct scsi_dev_info_list *scsi_dev_info_list_find(const char *vendor,
 			    dev_info_list) {
 		if (devinfo->compatible) {
 			/*
-			 * Behave like the older version of get_device_flags.
+			 * vendor strings must be an exact match
 			 */
-			if (memcmp(devinfo->vendor, vskip, vmax) ||
-					(vmax < sizeof(devinfo->vendor) &&
-						devinfo->vendor[vmax]))
+			if (vmax != strlen(devinfo->vendor) ||
+			    memcmp(devinfo->vendor, vskip, vmax))
 				continue;
-			if (memcmp(devinfo->model, mskip, mmax) ||
-					(mmax < sizeof(devinfo->model) &&
-						devinfo->model[mmax]))
+
+			/*
+			 * @model specifies the full string, and
+			 * must be larger or equal to devinfo->model
+			 */
+			mlen = strlen(devinfo->model);
+			if (mmax < mlen || memcmp(devinfo->model, mskip, mlen))
 				continue;
 			return devinfo;
 		} else {
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c
index 50d15748084a..af4b0a2021d6 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c
@@ -1512,6 +1512,7 @@ static int ufshcd_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
 
 	err = ufshcd_map_sg(hba, lrbp);
 	if (err) {
+		ufshcd_release(hba);
 		lrbp->cmd = NULL;
 		clear_bit_unlock(tag, &hba->lrb_in_use);
 		goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c b/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c
index 16f0def9df82..babf0a337e96 100644
--- a/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-dw.c
@@ -305,6 +305,9 @@ static int dw_spi_transfer_one(struct spi_master *master,
 	dws->len = transfer->len;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dws->buf_lock, flags);
 
+	/* Ensure dw->rx and dw->rx_end are visible */
+	smp_mb();
+
 	spi_enable_chip(dws, 0);
 
 	/* Handle per transfer options for bpw and speed */
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
index b8af9656e6da..f97275b90177 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static inline unsigned char *get_hdr_bssid(unsigned char *pframe)
 /* block-ack parameters */
 #define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
 #define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
+#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFC0
 #define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
 #define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
 
@@ -565,13 +565,6 @@ struct ieee80211_ht_addt_info {
 #define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_GF_STA_PRSNT	0x0004
 #define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_HT_STA_PRSNT	0x0010
 
-/* block-ack parameters */
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
-#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
-#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
-
 /*
  * A-PMDU buffer sizes
  * According to IEEE802.11n spec size varies from 8K to 64K (in powers of 2)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c
index f8964247c4c3..985f49a65906 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c
@@ -358,15 +358,14 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
 	 * tty fields and return the kref reference.
 	 */
 	if (rc) {
-		tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL);
-		tty->driver_data = NULL;
-		tty_port_put(&hp->port);
 		printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_open: request_irq failed with rc %d.\n", rc);
-	} else
+	} else {
 		/* We are ready... raise DTR/RTS */
 		if (C_BAUD(tty))
 			if (hp->ops->dtr_rts)
 				hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 1);
+		tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, true);
+	}
 
 	/* Force wakeup of the polling thread */
 	hvc_kick();
@@ -376,22 +375,12 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
 
 static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
 {
-	struct hvc_struct *hp;
+	struct hvc_struct *hp = tty->driver_data;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (tty_hung_up_p(filp))
 		return;
 
-	/*
-	 * No driver_data means that this close was issued after a failed
-	 * hvc_open by the tty layer's release_dev() function and we can just
-	 * exit cleanly because the kref reference wasn't made.
-	 */
-	if (!tty->driver_data)
-		return;
-
-	hp = tty->driver_data;
-
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&hp->port.lock, flags);
 
 	if (--hp->port.count == 0) {
@@ -399,6 +388,9 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
 		/* We are done with the tty pointer now. */
 		tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL);
 
+		if (!tty_port_initialized(&hp->port))
+			return;
+
 		if (C_HUPCL(tty))
 			if (hp->ops->dtr_rts)
 				hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 0);
@@ -415,6 +407,7 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
 		 * waking periodically to check chars_in_buffer().
 		 */
 		tty_wait_until_sent(tty, HVC_CLOSE_WAIT);
+		tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, false);
 	} else {
 		if (hp->port.count < 0)
 			printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_close %X: oops, count is %d\n",
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
index b4e7a7317713..d9eba7938917 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
@@ -125,7 +125,11 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(func_buf_lock); /* guard 'func_buf'  and friends */
 static unsigned long key_down[BITS_TO_LONGS(KEY_CNT)];	/* keyboard key bitmap */
 static unsigned char shift_down[NR_SHIFT];		/* shift state counters.. */
 static bool dead_key_next;
-static int npadch = -1;					/* -1 or number assembled on pad */
+
+/* Handles a number being assembled on the number pad */
+static bool npadch_active;
+static unsigned int npadch_value;
+
 static unsigned int diacr;
 static char rep;					/* flag telling character repeat */
 
@@ -815,12 +819,12 @@ static void k_shift(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
 		shift_state &= ~(1 << value);
 
 	/* kludge */
-	if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch != -1) {
+	if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch_active) {
 		if (kbd->kbdmode == VC_UNICODE)
-			to_utf8(vc, npadch);
+			to_utf8(vc, npadch_value);
 		else
-			put_queue(vc, npadch & 0xff);
-		npadch = -1;
+			put_queue(vc, npadch_value & 0xff);
+		npadch_active = false;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -838,7 +842,7 @@ static void k_meta(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
 
 static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
 {
-	int base;
+	unsigned int base;
 
 	if (up_flag)
 		return;
@@ -852,10 +856,12 @@ static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
 		base = 16;
 	}
 
-	if (npadch == -1)
-		npadch = value;
-	else
-		npadch = npadch * base + value;
+	if (!npadch_active) {
+		npadch_value = 0;
+		npadch_active = true;
+	}
+
+	npadch_value = npadch_value * base + value;
 }
 
 static void k_lock(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c
index f4bd08cfac11..a631975e050d 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c
@@ -1069,13 +1069,13 @@ afunc_bind(struct usb_configuration *cfg, struct usb_function *fn)
 	agdev->out_ep = usb_ep_autoconfig(gadget, &fs_epout_desc);
 	if (!agdev->out_ep) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%s:%d Error!\n", __func__, __LINE__);
-		return ret;
+		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
 	agdev->in_ep = usb_ep_autoconfig(gadget, &fs_epin_desc);
 	if (!agdev->in_ep) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%s:%d Error!\n", __func__, __LINE__);
-		return ret;
+		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
 	uac2->p_prm.uac2 = uac2;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c
index 534a3f6fa89c..474bb13b7dbb 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c
@@ -200,6 +200,11 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(struct file *file,
 	u8			test;
 	char			buf[18];
 
+	memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
+
+	if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	pm_runtime_get_sync(musb->controller);
 	test = musb_readb(musb->mregs, MUSB_TESTMODE);
 	if (test) {
@@ -208,11 +213,6 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(struct file *file,
 		goto ret;
 	}
 
-	memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
-
-	if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
 	if (strstarts(buf, "force host"))
 		test = MUSB_TEST_FORCE_HOST;
 
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index 737b6652a0b5..326e7109b8f8 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -1146,6 +1146,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_CC864_SINGLE) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_DE910_DUAL) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_UE910_V2) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1031, 0xff),	/* Telit LE910C1-EUX */
+	 .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(3) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1033, 0xff),	/* Telit LE910C1-EUX (ECM) */
+	 .driver_info = NCTRL(0) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG0),
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG1),
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
index 06916ddc3159..c59e6d4a8a61 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b3)},	/* Dell Wireless 5809e Gobi(TM) 4G LTE Mobile Broadband Card (rev3) */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b5)},	/* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b6)},	/* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
+	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cb)},	/* Dell Wireless 5816e QDL */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cc)},	/* Dell Wireless 5816e */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cf)},   /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81d0)},   /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c
index 93c696e2131f..0fbb34fcbddf 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c
@@ -305,6 +305,10 @@ static void usb_wwan_indat_callback(struct urb *urb)
 	if (status) {
 		dev_dbg(dev, "%s: nonzero status: %d on endpoint %02x.\n",
 			__func__, status, endpoint);
+
+		/* don't resubmit on fatal errors */
+		if (status == -ESHUTDOWN || status == -ENOENT)
+			return;
 	} else {
 		if (urb->actual_length) {
 			tty_insert_flip_string(&port->port, data,
diff --git a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
index 1abfe37314a0..df841a72b804 100644
--- a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
+++ b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
@@ -572,6 +572,10 @@ struct mips_cdmm_device_id {
 /*
  * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE expects this struct to be called x86cpu_device_id.
  * Although gcc seems to ignore this error, clang fails without this define.
+ *
+ * Note: The ordering of the struct is different from upstream because the
+ * static initializers in kernels < 5.7 still use C89 style while upstream
+ * has been converted to proper C99 initializers.
  */
 #define x86cpu_device_id x86_cpu_id
 struct x86_cpu_id {
@@ -580,6 +584,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 	__u16 model;
 	__u16 feature;	/* bit index */
 	kernel_ulong_t driver_data;
+	__u16 steppings;
 };
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \
@@ -588,6 +593,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
 #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
 #define X86_MODEL_ANY  0
+#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0
 #define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0	/* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */
 
 /*
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h
index 7e385b83b9d8..fe4b6b69d79a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/mmc/ioctl.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #define LINUX_MMC_IOCTL_H
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
 
 struct mmc_ioc_cmd {
 	/* Implies direction of data.  true = write, false = read */
diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
index 8ddd29476c0d..1fcaa174ed32 100644
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -604,10 +604,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct file *file,
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	/* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */
-	BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
-			UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
-
 	smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */
 	set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
 
@@ -886,6 +882,13 @@ int uprobe_register(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, struct uprobe_consumer *
 	if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * This ensures that copy_from_page() and copy_to_page()
+	 * can't cross page boundary.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
  retry:
 	uprobe = alloc_uprobe(inode, offset);
 	if (!uprobe)
@@ -1696,6 +1699,9 @@ static int is_trap_at_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr)
 	uprobe_opcode_t opcode;
 	int result;
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	pagefault_disable();
 	result = __get_user(opcode, (uprobe_opcode_t __user *)vaddr);
 	pagefault_enable();
diff --git a/kernel/relay.c b/kernel/relay.c
index 91e8fbf8aff3..5034cb3a339f 100644
--- a/kernel/relay.c
+++ b/kernel/relay.c
@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ struct rchan *relay_open(const char *base_filename,
 		return NULL;
 
 	chan->buf = alloc_percpu(struct rchan_buf *);
+	if (!chan->buf) {
+		kfree(chan);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	chan->version = RELAYFS_CHANNEL_VERSION;
 	chan->n_subbufs = n_subbufs;
 	chan->subbuf_size = subbuf_size;
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index 9e6035969d7b..b5d8d25173c6 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ unsigned long move_page_tables(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		new_pmd = alloc_new_pmd(vma->vm_mm, vma, new_addr);
 		if (!new_pmd)
 			break;
-		if (pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd)) {
+		if (pmd_trans_huge(*old_pmd) || pmd_devmap(*old_pmd)) {
 			if (extent == HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
 				bool moved;
 				/* See comment in move_ptes() */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index af3363f4543f..6f3c52943186 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ static struct in_device *inetdev_init(struct net_device *dev)
 	err = devinet_sysctl_register(in_dev);
 	if (err) {
 		in_dev->dead = 1;
+		neigh_parms_release(&arp_tbl, in_dev->arp_parms);
 		in_dev_put(in_dev);
 		in_dev = NULL;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index 6a924be66e37..da158a3acac4 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -426,8 +426,10 @@ static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
 	ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
-	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
+		kfree(tmp);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, elen + ivlen, iv);
 	aead_request_set_ad(req, assoclen);
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
index 36c7f616294a..fdc1de1cb4fa 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
@@ -1568,6 +1568,8 @@ int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net, int fd, int version, u32 tunnel_id, u32
 			 tunnel_id, fd);
 		goto err;
 	}
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		goto err;
 	switch (encap) {
 	case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP:
 		if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) {
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c
index 4a88c4eb2301..3817c3554641 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/udp.h>
 #include <net/inet_common.h>
-#include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
 #include <net/tcp_states.h>
 #include <net/protocol.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
@@ -208,15 +207,31 @@ static int l2tp_ip_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int l2tp_ip_open(struct sock *sk)
+static int l2tp_ip_hash(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
-	inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
+	if (sk_unhashed(sk)) {
+		write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
+		sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table);
+		write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
 
+static void l2tp_ip_unhash(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	if (sk_unhashed(sk))
+		return;
 	write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
-	sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table);
+	sk_del_node_init(sk);
 	write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
+}
+
+static int l2tp_ip_open(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
+	inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
 
+	l2tp_ip_hash(sk);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -598,8 +613,8 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip_prot = {
 	.sendmsg	   = l2tp_ip_sendmsg,
 	.recvmsg	   = l2tp_ip_recvmsg,
 	.backlog_rcv	   = l2tp_ip_backlog_recv,
-	.hash		   = inet_hash,
-	.unhash		   = inet_unhash,
+	.hash		   = l2tp_ip_hash,
+	.unhash		   = l2tp_ip_unhash,
 	.obj_size	   = sizeof(struct l2tp_ip_sock),
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	.compat_setsockopt = compat_ip_setsockopt,
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
index 28274f397c55..76ef758db112 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/udp.h>
 #include <net/inet_common.h>
-#include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
-#include <net/inet6_hashtables.h>
 #include <net/tcp_states.h>
 #include <net/protocol.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
@@ -221,15 +219,31 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int l2tp_ip6_open(struct sock *sk)
+static int l2tp_ip6_hash(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
-	inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
+	if (sk_unhashed(sk)) {
+		write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
+		sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_table);
+		write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
 
+static void l2tp_ip6_unhash(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	if (sk_unhashed(sk))
+		return;
 	write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
-	sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_table);
+	sk_del_node_init(sk);
 	write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
+}
+
+static int l2tp_ip6_open(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
+	inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
 
+	l2tp_ip6_hash(sk);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -732,8 +746,8 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip6_prot = {
 	.sendmsg	   = l2tp_ip6_sendmsg,
 	.recvmsg	   = l2tp_ip6_recvmsg,
 	.backlog_rcv	   = l2tp_ip6_backlog_recv,
-	.hash		   = inet6_hash,
-	.unhash		   = inet_unhash,
+	.hash		   = l2tp_ip6_hash,
+	.unhash		   = l2tp_ip6_unhash,
 	.obj_size	   = sizeof(struct l2tp_ip6_sock),
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	.compat_setsockopt = compat_ipv6_setsockopt,
diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
index 18f377306884..d6473b8d9a81 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
@@ -1296,7 +1296,7 @@ static int vsock_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags)
 	/* Wait for children sockets to appear; these are the new sockets
 	 * created upon connection establishment.
 	 */
-	timeout = sock_sndtimeo(listener, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+	timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(listener, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
 	prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(listener), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 
 	while ((connected = vsock_dequeue_accept(listener)) == NULL &&

      reply	other threads:[~2020-06-11  7:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-11  7:45 Linux 4.9.227 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-11  7:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]

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