From: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@broadcom.com>,
Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>,
Shivasharan S <shivasharan.srikanteshwara@broadcom.com>,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: megaraidlinux.pdl@broadcom.com, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] scsi: megaraid_sas: Use array_size() helper
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 16:27:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1592263673.7698.5.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200615214718.GA6970@embeddedor>
On Mon, 2020-06-15 at 16:47 -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> The get_order() function has no 2-factor argument form, so
> multiplication
> factors need to be wrapped in array_size().
>
> This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle and, audited and
> fixed
> manually.
>
> Addresses-KSPP-ID: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/83
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c | 8 ++++----
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c
> b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c
> index 319f241da4b6..6de44ed4cde7 100644
> --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c
> +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c
> @@ -5180,8 +5180,8 @@ megasas_alloc_fusion_context(struct
> megasas_instance *instance)
>
> fusion = instance->ctrl_context;
>
> - fusion->log_to_span_pages = get_order(MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT
> *
> - sizeof(LD_SPAN_INFO));
> + fusion->log_to_span_pages =
> get_order(array_size(MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT,
> + sizeof(LD_SPAN_INFO)))
> ;
What's the point of this? You're replacing a constant multiplication
the compiler can compute with one it can't on the theory there might be
an overflow, which is pretty far fetched given MAX_LOGICAL_DRIVES_EXT
is 256 and sizeof(LD_SPAN_INFO) is around 82.
I thought the whole point of overflow detection was to use it for
instances where we could be tricked into triggering one by userspace
which may result in a buffer under or overflow ... this is two
constants, how could this ever be a source of an exploit?
James
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-15 23:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-15 21:47 [PATCH] scsi: megaraid_sas: Use array_size() helper Gustavo A. R. Silva
2020-06-15 23:27 ` James Bottomley [this message]
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