From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@lwn.net, jslaby@suse.cz,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.4.116
Date: Sun, 2 May 2021 11:51:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <161994906122792@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <161994906112085@kroah.com>
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index f473f4fe5a0c..cb1a446f832c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 4
-SUBLEVEL = 115
+SUBLEVEL = 116
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index ab2a4b7dfca5..bc439dcd438f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4263,40 +4263,51 @@ static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
}
+enum {
+ REASON_BOUNDS = -1,
+ REASON_TYPE = -2,
+ REASON_PATHS = -3,
+ REASON_LIMIT = -4,
+ REASON_STACK = -5,
+};
+
static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
- u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg)
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
+ u32 *alu_limit, u8 opcode)
{
+ bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) ||
(opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
- u32 off, max;
+ u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
+
+ if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
+ (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
+ return REASON_BOUNDS;
switch (ptr_reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_STACK:
/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
- * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP.
+ * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
+ * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
+ * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
*/
max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
- /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in
- * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here.
- */
- off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
- if (mask_to_left)
- *ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
- else
- *ptr_limit = -off - 1;
- return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
+ ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
+ break;
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
- if (mask_to_left) {
- *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
- } else {
- off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
- *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
- }
- return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
+ ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
+ ptr_reg->smin_value :
+ ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
+ break;
default:
- return -EINVAL;
+ return REASON_TYPE;
}
+
+ if (ptr_limit >= max)
+ return REASON_LIMIT;
+ *alu_limit = ptr_limit;
+ return 0;
}
static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@@ -4314,7 +4325,7 @@ static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
if (aux->alu_state &&
(aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
- return -EACCES;
+ return REASON_PATHS;
/* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
aux->alu_state = alu_state;
@@ -4333,14 +4344,22 @@ static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
}
+static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
+{
+ return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB;
+}
+
static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
- bool off_is_neg)
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux,
+ const bool commit_window)
{
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux;
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
- struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
+ bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
@@ -4358,18 +4377,33 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (vstate->speculative)
goto do_sim;
- alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
- alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
- BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
-
- err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg);
+ err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode);
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ if (commit_window) {
+ /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
+ * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
+ */
+ alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state;
+ alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit);
+ } else {
+ alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
+ alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
+ BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
+ }
+
err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
if (err < 0)
return err;
do_sim:
+ /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
+ * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
+ * stack.
+ */
+ if (commit_window)
+ return 0;
+
/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
* speculative execution from truncation as a result of
* masking when off was not within expected range. If off
@@ -4386,7 +4420,81 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
*dst_reg = tmp;
- return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
+ return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
+}
+
+static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+{
+ static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root";
+ const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
+ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
+
+ switch (reason) {
+ case REASON_BOUNDS:
+ verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, %s\n",
+ off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
+ break;
+ case REASON_TYPE:
+ verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation, %s\n",
+ off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
+ break;
+ case REASON_PATHS:
+ verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or scalars, %s\n",
+ dst, op, err);
+ break;
+ case REASON_LIMIT:
+ verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n",
+ dst, op, err);
+ break;
+ case REASON_STACK:
+ verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n",
+ dst, err);
+ break;
+ default:
+ verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n",
+ reason);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+{
+ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+
+ /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+ * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
+ */
+ if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (dst_reg->type) {
+ case PTR_TO_STACK:
+ if (check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
+ dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
@@ -4407,8 +4515,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
- u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {};
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
int ret;
dst_reg = ®s[dst];
@@ -4451,13 +4560,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
- case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
- if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
- off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- /* fall-through */
default:
break;
}
@@ -4472,13 +4574,15 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
!check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+ ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
+ &tmp_aux, false);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+ }
+
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
- ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
- return ret;
- }
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
* the s32 'off' field
*/
@@ -4529,11 +4633,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
- ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
- return ret;
- }
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
@@ -4614,22 +4713,13 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
- /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
- * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
- */
- if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
- if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
- check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
- return -EACCES;
- } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
- check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
- dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
- return -EACCES;
- }
+ if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+ ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
+ &tmp_aux, true);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
}
return 0;
@@ -4650,7 +4740,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
- u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
int ret;
if (insn_bitness == 32) {
@@ -4684,13 +4773,14 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
+ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
+ ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
- ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
- if (ret < 0) {
- verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
- return ret;
- }
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
@@ -4710,11 +4800,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
- ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
- if (ret < 0) {
- verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
- return ret;
- }
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c
index c162498a64fc..91869aea6d64 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
.result = REJECT,
},
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 1,
@@ -34,22 +34,23 @@
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
"check deducing bounds from const, 4",
.insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSLE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R6 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
.result = REJECT,
},
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
.result = REJECT,
},
@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
.result = REJECT,
.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
.result = REJECT,
.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
.result = REJECT,
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c
index 9baca7a75c42..c2aa6f26738b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -43,7 +42,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -69,7 +67,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R8 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -94,7 +91,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R8 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -141,7 +137,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -210,7 +205,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -260,7 +254,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -287,7 +280,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -313,7 +305,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -342,7 +333,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R7 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -372,7 +362,6 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 4 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
},
{
@@ -400,7 +389,5 @@
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.errstr = "unbounded min value",
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
.result = REJECT,
- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
index 0d621c841db1..c3f6f650deb7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, -8),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c
index 00b59d5d7a7f..28d44e6aa0b7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
.fixup_map_hash_16b = { 5 },
.fixup_map_array_48b = { 8 },
.result = ACCEPT,
- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps",
.retval = 1,
},
{
@@ -122,7 +120,7 @@
.fixup_map_array_48b = { 1 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
- .errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different pointers or scalars",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or scalars",
.retval = 0,
},
{
@@ -169,7 +167,7 @@
.fixup_map_array_48b = { 1 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
- .errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or scalars",
.retval = 0,
},
{
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-02 9:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-02 9:51 Linux 5.4.116 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-05-02 9:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2021-05-04 1:26 ` Samuel Zou
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