From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@lwn.net, jslaby@suse.cz,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.18.19
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:36:37 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1661088955116194@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166108895535224@kroah.com>
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 23162e2bdf14..fc7efcdab0a2 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 18
-SUBLEVEL = 18
+SUBLEVEL = 19
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Superb Owl
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/pe.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/image.h>
@@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
return NULL;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
- return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
- VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-}
-#endif
-
const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
.probe = image_probe,
.load = image_load,
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
- .verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
+ .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
#endif
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 170d0fd68b1f..f299b48f9c9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -528,28 +527,11 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
return 0;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
- int ret;
-
- ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
- VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
- if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
- ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops = {
.probe = bzImage64_probe,
.load = bzImage64_load,
.cleanup = bzImage64_cleanup,
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
- .verify_sig = bzImage64_verify_sig,
+ .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
#endif
};
diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
index f31e29e8f1ca..b55d4c733fa8 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
@@ -311,6 +311,9 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register_user_buf(struct tee_context *ctx,
void *ret;
int id;
+ if (!access_ok((void __user *)addr, length))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex);
id = idr_alloc(&teedev->idr, NULL, 1, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
index 0e239a4c3b26..39c4c513bf97 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
@@ -323,6 +323,9 @@ static void merge_rbio(struct btrfs_raid_bio *dest,
{
bio_list_merge(&dest->bio_list, &victim->bio_list);
dest->bio_list_bytes += victim->bio_list_bytes;
+ /* Also inherit the bitmaps from @victim. */
+ bitmap_or(dest->dbitmap, victim->dbitmap, dest->dbitmap,
+ dest->stripe_npages);
dest->generic_bio_cnt += victim->generic_bio_cnt;
bio_list_init(&victim->bio_list);
}
@@ -864,6 +867,12 @@ static void rbio_orig_end_io(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio, blk_status_t err)
if (rbio->generic_bio_cnt)
btrfs_bio_counter_sub(rbio->bioc->fs_info, rbio->generic_bio_cnt);
+ /*
+ * Clear the data bitmap, as the rbio may be cached for later usage.
+ * do this before before unlock_stripe() so there will be no new bio
+ * for this bio.
+ */
+ bitmap_clear(rbio->dbitmap, 0, rbio->stripe_npages);
/*
* At this moment, rbio->bio_list is empty, however since rbio does not
@@ -1195,6 +1204,9 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
else
BUG();
+ /* We should have at least one data sector. */
+ ASSERT(bitmap_weight(rbio->dbitmap, rbio->stripe_npages));
+
/* at this point we either have a full stripe,
* or we've read the full stripe from the drive.
* recalculate the parity and write the new results.
@@ -1266,6 +1278,11 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
for (stripe = 0; stripe < rbio->real_stripes; stripe++) {
for (pagenr = 0; pagenr < rbio->stripe_npages; pagenr++) {
struct page *page;
+
+ /* This vertical stripe has no data, skip it. */
+ if (!test_bit(pagenr, rbio->dbitmap))
+ continue;
+
if (stripe < rbio->nr_data) {
page = page_in_rbio(rbio, stripe, pagenr, 1);
if (!page)
@@ -1290,6 +1307,11 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
for (pagenr = 0; pagenr < rbio->stripe_npages; pagenr++) {
struct page *page;
+
+ /* This vertical stripe has no data, skip it. */
+ if (!test_bit(pagenr, rbio->dbitmap))
+ continue;
+
if (stripe < rbio->nr_data) {
page = page_in_rbio(rbio, stripe, pagenr, 1);
if (!page)
@@ -1713,6 +1735,33 @@ static void btrfs_raid_unplug(struct blk_plug_cb *cb, bool from_schedule)
run_plug(plug);
}
+/* Add the original bio into rbio->bio_list, and update rbio::dbitmap. */
+static void rbio_add_bio(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio, struct bio *orig_bio)
+{
+ const struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = rbio->bioc->fs_info;
+ const u64 orig_logical = orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_sector << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+ const u64 full_stripe_start = rbio->bioc->raid_map[0];
+ const u32 orig_len = orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+ const u32 sectorsize = fs_info->sectorsize;
+ u64 cur_logical;
+
+ ASSERT(orig_logical >= full_stripe_start &&
+ orig_logical + orig_len <= full_stripe_start +
+ rbio->nr_data * rbio->stripe_len);
+
+ bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, orig_bio);
+ rbio->bio_list_bytes += orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+
+ /* Update the dbitmap. */
+ for (cur_logical = orig_logical; cur_logical < orig_logical + orig_len;
+ cur_logical += sectorsize) {
+ int bit = ((u32)(cur_logical - full_stripe_start) >>
+ fs_info->sectorsize_bits) % rbio->stripe_npages;
+
+ set_bit(bit, rbio->dbitmap);
+ }
+}
+
/*
* our main entry point for writes from the rest of the FS.
*/
@@ -1730,9 +1779,8 @@ int raid56_parity_write(struct bio *bio, struct btrfs_io_context *bioc,
btrfs_put_bioc(bioc);
return PTR_ERR(rbio);
}
- bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, bio);
- rbio->bio_list_bytes = bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
rbio->operation = BTRFS_RBIO_WRITE;
+ rbio_add_bio(rbio, bio);
btrfs_bio_counter_inc_noblocked(fs_info);
rbio->generic_bio_cnt = 1;
@@ -2036,9 +2084,12 @@ static int __raid56_parity_recover(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
atomic_set(&rbio->error, 0);
/*
- * read everything that hasn't failed. Thanks to the
- * stripe cache, it is possible that some or all of these
- * pages are going to be uptodate.
+ * Read everything that hasn't failed. However this time we will
+ * not trust any cached sector.
+ * As we may read out some stale data but higher layer is not reading
+ * that stale part.
+ *
+ * So here we always re-read everything in recovery path.
*/
for (stripe = 0; stripe < rbio->real_stripes; stripe++) {
if (rbio->faila == stripe || rbio->failb == stripe) {
@@ -2047,16 +2098,6 @@ static int __raid56_parity_recover(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
}
for (pagenr = 0; pagenr < rbio->stripe_npages; pagenr++) {
- struct page *p;
-
- /*
- * the rmw code may have already read this
- * page in
- */
- p = rbio_stripe_page(rbio, stripe, pagenr);
- if (PageUptodate(p))
- continue;
-
ret = rbio_add_io_page(rbio, &bio_list,
rbio_stripe_page(rbio, stripe, pagenr),
stripe, pagenr, rbio->stripe_len);
@@ -2134,8 +2175,7 @@ int raid56_parity_recover(struct bio *bio, struct btrfs_io_context *bioc,
}
rbio->operation = BTRFS_RBIO_READ_REBUILD;
- bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, bio);
- rbio->bio_list_bytes = bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+ rbio_add_bio(rbio, bio);
rbio->faila = find_logical_bio_stripe(rbio, bio);
if (rbio->faila == -1) {
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index f3e7680befcc..6a349ef1619f 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <uapi/linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
/* Location of a reserved region to hold the crash kernel.
*/
@@ -212,6 +213,12 @@ static inline void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len);
+#endif
+#endif
+
extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index ad005cd184a4..cc3179140a9f 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+ VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+ if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
+ ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+ VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
unsigned long buf_len)
{
diff --git a/net/sched/cls_route.c b/net/sched/cls_route.c
index 3f935cbbaff6..48712bc51bda 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_route.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_route.c
@@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ static int route4_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!nhandle) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replacing with handle of 0 is invalid");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
h1 = to_hash(nhandle);
b = rtnl_dereference(head->table[h1]);
if (!b) {
@@ -477,6 +482,11 @@ static int route4_change(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *in_skb,
int err;
bool new = true;
+ if (!handle) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Creating with handle of 0 is invalid");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (opt == NULL)
return handle ? -EINVAL : 0;
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-21 13:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-21 13:36 Linux 5.18.19 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-08-21 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
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