All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: ardb@kernel.org, daniel.marth@inso.tuwien.ac.at,
	keescook@chromium.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] efi: libstub: Disable struct randomization" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree
Date: Thu, 08 Sep 2022 19:00:31 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1662656431138159@kroah.com> (raw)


The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

Possible dependencies:

1a3887924a7e ("efi: libstub: Disable struct randomization")
cc49c71d2abe ("efi/libstub: Disable Shadow Call Stack")

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 1a3887924a7e6edd331be76da7bf4c1e8eab4b1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2022 19:20:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] efi: libstub: Disable struct randomization

The EFI stub is a wrapper around the core kernel that makes it look like
a EFI compatible PE/COFF application to the EFI firmware. EFI
applications run on top of the EFI runtime, which is heavily based on
so-called protocols, which are struct types consisting [mostly] of
function pointer members that are instantiated and recorded in a
protocol database.

These structs look like the ideal randomization candidates to the
randstruct plugin (as they only carry function pointers), but of course,
these protocols are contracts between the firmware that exposes them,
and the EFI applications (including our stubbed kernel) that invoke
them. This means that struct randomization for EFI protocols is not a
great idea, and given that the stub shares very little data with the
core kernel that is represented as a randomizable struct, we're better
off just disabling it completely here.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Reported-by: Daniel Marth <daniel.marth@inso.tuwien.ac.at>
Tested-by: Daniel Marth <daniel.marth@inso.tuwien.ac.at>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index d0537573501e..2c67f71f2375 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS			:= $(cflags-y) -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
 				   $(call cc-option,-fno-addrsig) \
 				   -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
 
+#
+# struct randomization only makes sense for Linux internal types, which the EFI
+# stub code never touches, so let's turn off struct randomization for the stub
+# altogether
+#
+KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS), $(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
+
 # remove SCS flags from all objects in this directory
 KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_SCS), $(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
 # disable LTO


                 reply	other threads:[~2022-09-08 17:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1662656431138159@kroah.com \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=daniel.marth@inso.tuwien.ac.at \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.