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From: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
To: hpa@zytor.com, kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com,
	wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com, luto@kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
	kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, lpieralisi@kernel.org,
	robh@kernel.org, kw@linux.com, bhelgaas@google.com,
	arnd@arndb.de, hch@infradead.org, m.szyprowski@samsung.com,
	robin.murphy@arm.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	isaku.yamahata@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
	jane.chu@oracle.com, seanjc@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: mikelley@microsoft.com
Subject: [Patch v4 01/13] x86/ioapic: Gate decrypted mapping on cc_platform_has() attribute
Date: Thu,  1 Dec 2022 19:30:19 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1669951831-4180-2-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1669951831-4180-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com>

Current code always maps the IO-APIC as shared (decrypted) in a
confidential VM. But Hyper-V guest VMs on AMD SEV-SNP with vTOM
enabled use a paravisor running in VMPL0 to emulate the IO-APIC.
In such a case, the IO-APIC must be accessed as private (encrypted).

Fix this by gating the IO-APIC decrypted mapping on a new
cc_platform_has() attribute that a subsequent patch in the series
will set only for guests using vTOM.

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c |  3 ++-
 include/linux/cc_platform.h    | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
index a868b76..2b70e2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
@@ -2686,7 +2686,8 @@ static void io_apic_set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys)
 	 * Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot
 	 * bits, just like normal ioremap():
 	 */
-	flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED))
+		flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
 
 	__set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags);
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
index cb0d6cd..7b63a7d 100644
--- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h
+++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
@@ -90,6 +90,18 @@ enum cc_attr {
 	 * Examples include TDX Guest.
 	 */
 	CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED,
+
+	/**
+	 * @CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED: Guest VM IO-APIC is encrypted
+	 *
+	 * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine with
+	 * an IO-APIC that is emulated by a paravisor running in the
+	 * guest VM context. As such, the IO-APIC is accessed in the
+	 * encrypted portion of the guest physical address space.
+	 *
+	 * Examples include Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using vTOM.
+	 */
+	CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
-- 
1.8.3.1


  reply	other threads:[~2022-12-02  3:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-02  3:30 [Patch v4 00/13] Add PCI pass-thru support to Hyper-V Confidential VMs Michael Kelley
2022-12-02  3:30 ` Michael Kelley [this message]
2022-12-06 19:22   ` [Patch v4 01/13] x86/ioapic: Gate decrypted mapping on cc_platform_has() attribute Borislav Petkov
2022-12-06 19:54     ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-29 11:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-29 16:02         ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-06 19:27   ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 02/13] x86/hyperv: Reorder code in prep for subsequent patch Michael Kelley
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 03/13] Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls Michael Kelley
2022-12-29 12:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 04/13] x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently Michael Kelley
2022-12-29 12:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-29 16:25     ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-09 19:10       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-09 19:14         ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-29 16:54     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2022-12-29 17:12       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 05/13] init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done Michael Kelley
2022-12-06 19:37   ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-12-06 20:13     ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-06 20:30       ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 06/13] x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms Michael Kelley
2023-01-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-09 17:37     ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-09 18:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 07/13] swiotlb: Remove bounce buffer remapping for Hyper-V Michael Kelley
2023-01-09 18:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 08/13] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second mapping of VMBus monitor pages Michael Kelley
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 09/13] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second way of mapping ring buffers Michael Kelley
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 10/13] hv_netvsc: Remove second mapping of send and recv buffers Michael Kelley
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 11/13] Drivers: hv: Don't remap addresses that are above shared_gpa_boundary Michael Kelley
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 12/13] PCI: hv: Add hypercalls to read/write MMIO space Michael Kelley
2022-12-02  3:30 ` [Patch v4 13/13] PCI: hv: Enable PCI pass-thru devices in Confidential VMs Michael Kelley
2023-01-09 18:47 ` [Patch v4 00/13] Add PCI pass-thru support to Hyper-V " Borislav Petkov
2023-01-09 19:35   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-12 14:03   ` Wei Liu
2023-01-19 17:58     ` Dexuan Cui
2023-01-20 11:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-20 12:42       ` Wei Liu

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