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Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.3 X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 07:47:17 +0000 Subject: [dm-devel] [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm X-BeenThere: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: device-mapper development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Fan Wu , dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Sender: "dm-devel" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.7 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Deven Bowers Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs today. Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach, is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust of a current resource. The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which resource can be trusted. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review. + Introduce the concept of an ipe_context, a scoped way to introduce execution policies, used initially for allowing for kunit tests in isolation. v8: + Follow lsmname_hook_name convention for lsm hooks. + Move LSM blob accessors to ipe.c and mark LSM blobs as static. v9: + Remove ipe_context for simplification --- MAINTAINERS | 5 +++++ security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++----- security/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 8a5c25c20d00..5e27e84763cc 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10273,6 +10273,11 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git F: security/integrity/ima/ F: security/integrity/ +INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) +M: Fan Wu +S: Supported +F: security/ipe/ + INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER M: Antonino Daplas L: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e6db09a779b7..9f59add2d16c 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" source "security/landlock/Kconfig" +source "security/ipe/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" @@ -246,11 +247,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 18121f8f85cd..527b1864d96c 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/ # Object integrity file lists obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e4875fb04883 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration +# + +menuconfig SECURITY_IPE + bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM + allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access + control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow + admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly. + + If unsure, answer N. diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..571648579991 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + hooks.o \ + ipe.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9ed3bf4dcc04 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" + +static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = { +}; + +static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { +}; + +/** + * ipe_init - Entry point of IPE. + * + * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel + * start up. During this phase, IPE loads the properties compiled into + * the kernel, and register's IPE's hooks. The boot policy is loaded + * later, during securityfs init, at which point IPE will start + * enforcing its policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -ENOMEM - Context creation failed. + */ +static int __init ipe_init(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + + security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), "ipe"); + + return rc; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { + .name = "ipe", + .init = ipe_init, + .blobs = &ipe_blobs, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ee7ec3f3b55d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef IPE_H +#define IPE_H + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE " fmt "\n" + +#include + +#endif /* IPE_H */ -- 2.39.0 -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.129.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C424FC636D3 for ; Tue, 31 Jan 2023 13:51:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1675173092; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references:list-id:list-help: list-unsubscribe:list-subscribe:list-post; 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Mon, 30 Jan 2023 18:06:38 -0500 X-MC-Unique: ZCUExuL7NX-pluH1enmkBw-1 Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id EED8320E9FBB; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 14:58:41 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com EED8320E9FBB From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Subject: [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2023 14:57:16 -0800 Message-Id: <1675119451-23180-2-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> In-Reply-To: <1675119451-23180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1675119451-23180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.2 X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 13:51:24 +0000 X-BeenThere: linux-audit@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux Audit Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Fan Wu , dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Sender: "Linux-audit" X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.5 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: Deven Bowers Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs today. Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach, is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust of a current resource. The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which resource can be trusted. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review. + Introduce the concept of an ipe_context, a scoped way to introduce execution policies, used initially for allowing for kunit tests in isolation. v8: + Follow lsmname_hook_name convention for lsm hooks. + Move LSM blob accessors to ipe.c and mark LSM blobs as static. v9: + Remove ipe_context for simplification --- MAINTAINERS | 5 +++++ security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++----- security/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 8a5c25c20d00..5e27e84763cc 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10273,6 +10273,11 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git F: security/integrity/ima/ F: security/integrity/ +INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) +M: Fan Wu +S: Supported +F: security/ipe/ + INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER M: Antonino Daplas L: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e6db09a779b7..9f59add2d16c 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" source "security/landlock/Kconfig" +source "security/ipe/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" @@ -246,11 +247,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 18121f8f85cd..527b1864d96c 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/ # Object integrity file lists obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e4875fb04883 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration +# + +menuconfig SECURITY_IPE + bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM + allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access + control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow + admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly. + + If unsure, answer N. diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..571648579991 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + hooks.o \ + ipe.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9ed3bf4dcc04 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" + +static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = { +}; + +static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { +}; + +/** + * ipe_init - Entry point of IPE. + * + * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel + * start up. During this phase, IPE loads the properties compiled into + * the kernel, and register's IPE's hooks. The boot policy is loaded + * later, during securityfs init, at which point IPE will start + * enforcing its policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -ENOMEM - Context creation failed. + */ +static int __init ipe_init(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + + security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), "ipe"); + + return rc; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { + .name = "ipe", + .init = ipe_init, + .blobs = &ipe_blobs, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ee7ec3f3b55d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef IPE_H +#define IPE_H + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE " fmt "\n" + +#include + +#endif /* IPE_H */ -- 2.39.0 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 210DFC636D7 for ; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 22:58:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229966AbjA3W6s (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Jan 2023 17:58:48 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55228 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229495AbjA3W6n (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Jan 2023 17:58:43 -0500 Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E8A11A49C; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 14:58:42 -0800 (PST) Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id EED8320E9FBB; Mon, 30 Jan 2023 14:58:41 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com EED8320E9FBB DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1675119521; bh=mYR+OEaThgLLY/6YxfcXMNKUyeQmZ7wUTKxCR0+jVhs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=G0pG9aBJ5q3oNSfkvZqbi6sZ8UL2EysbWbse1Vhc9DFmNFmlIv8C6QZSKAPAdq/XM Lk4md5URozP7XpHaqbNqzEEkfmRjFjTpBihlO1w5412oZPNeTP+PnnIqIl7iyqQI2t 5VacINOrqfY5G/rL8FHVJrirU8jVYxVwpyWVCt0U= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2023 14:57:16 -0800 Message-Id: <1675119451-23180-2-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1675119451-23180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1675119451-23180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org From: Deven Bowers Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs today. Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach, is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust of a current resource. The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which resource can be trusted. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review. + Introduce the concept of an ipe_context, a scoped way to introduce execution policies, used initially for allowing for kunit tests in isolation. v8: + Follow lsmname_hook_name convention for lsm hooks. + Move LSM blob accessors to ipe.c and mark LSM blobs as static. v9: + Remove ipe_context for simplification --- MAINTAINERS | 5 +++++ security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++----- security/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/Makefile | 10 ++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 8a5c25c20d00..5e27e84763cc 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10273,6 +10273,11 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git F: security/integrity/ima/ F: security/integrity/ +INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) +M: Fan Wu +S: Supported +F: security/ipe/ + INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER M: Antonino Daplas L: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e6db09a779b7..9f59add2d16c 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" source "security/landlock/Kconfig" +source "security/ipe/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" @@ -246,11 +247,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,ipe,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 18121f8f85cd..527b1864d96c 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/ # Object integrity file lists obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e4875fb04883 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration +# + +menuconfig SECURITY_IPE + bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM + allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access + control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow + admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly. + + If unsure, answer N. diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..571648579991 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + hooks.o \ + ipe.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9ed3bf4dcc04 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "ipe.h" + +static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = { +}; + +static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { +}; + +/** + * ipe_init - Entry point of IPE. + * + * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel + * start up. During this phase, IPE loads the properties compiled into + * the kernel, and register's IPE's hooks. The boot policy is loaded + * later, during securityfs init, at which point IPE will start + * enforcing its policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -ENOMEM - Context creation failed. + */ +static int __init ipe_init(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + + security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), "ipe"); + + return rc; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { + .name = "ipe", + .init = ipe_init, + .blobs = &ipe_blobs, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ee7ec3f3b55d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef IPE_H +#define IPE_H + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE " fmt "\n" + +#include + +#endif /* IPE_H */ -- 2.39.0