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From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org
To: =?utf-8?q?Nicol=C3=B2_Coccia_=3Cn=2Ecoccia96=40gmail=2Ecom=3E?=@aws-us-west-2-korg-oddjob-rhel9-1.codeaurora.org
Cc: alibuda@linux.alibaba.com, dust.li@linux.alibaba.com,
	sidraya@linux.ibm.com, wenjia@linux.ibm.com,
	mjambigi@linux.ibm.com, tonylu@linux.alibaba.com,
	guwen@linux.alibaba.com, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, nicolo.coccia@leonardo.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] net/smc: fix sleep-inside-lock in __smc_setsockopt() causing local DoS
Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 03:45:16 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <177864391679.3173643.11650967377034857635.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260510163414.16651-1-n.coccia96@gmail.com>

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>:

On Sun, 10 May 2026 12:34:13 -0400 you wrote:
> A logic flaw in __smc_setsockopt() allows a local unprivileged user to
> cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by holding the socket lock indefinitely.
> 
> The function __smc_setsockopt() calls copy_from_sockptr() while holding
> lock_sock(sk). By passing a userfaultfd-monitored memory page (or
> FUSE-backed memory on systems where unprivileged userfaultfd is disabled)
> as the optval, an attacker can halt execution during the copy operation,
> keeping the lock held.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [v3] net/smc: fix sleep-inside-lock in __smc_setsockopt() causing local DoS
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/a3fdd924d88c

You are awesome, thank you!
-- 
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html



      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-13  3:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-10 16:34 [PATCH v3] net/smc: fix sleep-inside-lock in __smc_setsockopt() causing local DoS Nicolò Coccia
2026-05-11  1:47 ` Dust Li
2026-05-13  3:45 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf [this message]

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