From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Tom Vier Subject: Re: Behavior of tails with respect to shred, wipe, etc Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 21:32:17 -0500 Message-ID: <20021030023217.GA9548@yzero> References: <15801.26994.705639.374241@laputa.namesys.com> <20021025200014.A1763@namesys.com> Reply-To: Tom Vier Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Return-path: list-help: list-unsubscribe: list-post: Errors-To: flx@namesys.com In-reply-to: <20021025200014.A1763@namesys.com> Content-Disposition: inline List-Id: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" To: reiserfs-list@namesys.com On Fri, Oct 25, 2002 at 08:00:14PM +0400, Oleg Drokin wrote: > > I guess we should address this issue in reiser4. This is -security- > > feature after all. Hans? It is not clear how to intehgrate this with > > journalling though. > > Zero out all freed blocks (mount option). This will kill write performance > though. you could add support for the +s attr. zero-out current contents on delete. it's sloppy, but like hans said, anyone serious about it should never let it hit the disk unencrypted. i'm the author of (one) wipe (aka ya-wipe, there's more than one "wipe") and i made a point to be clear in the docs and on wipe.sf.net that encryption is the only complete solution. my app is most useful for using on whole drives, if you're going to sell it on ebay or something, and you want non-secret personal stuff off (or at least invisible to almost all). -- Tom Vier DSA Key ID 0xE6CB97DA