From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Oleg Drokin Subject: Re: Behavior of tails with respect to shred, wipe, etc Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2002 09:36:28 +0300 Message-ID: <20021030093628.A5560@namesys.com> References: <15801.26994.705639.374241@laputa.namesys.com> <20021025200014.A1763@namesys.com> <20021030023217.GA9548@yzero> Mime-Version: 1.0 Return-path: list-help: list-unsubscribe: list-post: Errors-To: flx@namesys.com Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20021030023217.GA9548@yzero> List-Id: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Tom Vier Cc: reiserfs-list@namesys.com Hello! On Tue, Oct 29, 2002 at 09:32:17PM -0500, Tom Vier wrote: > > > I guess we should address this issue in reiser4. This is -security- > > > feature after all. Hans? It is not clear how to intehgrate this with > > > journalling though. > > Zero out all freed blocks (mount option). This will kill write performance > > though. > you could add support for the +s attr. zero-out current contents on delete. That won't work with editors that create temporary file, write new content into it and then rename that temp file into new one. > i'm the author of (one) wipe (aka ya-wipe, there's more than one "wipe") and > i made a point to be clear in the docs and on wipe.sf.net that encryption is > the only complete solution. my app is most useful for using on whole drives, Another one (for deleted data to stay deleted) is to zero out all freed blocks ;) > if you're going to sell it on ebay or something, and you want non-secret > personal stuff off (or at least invisible to almost all). Is that somehow better than badblocks -w /dev/hdX ? ;) Bye, Oleg