Re: new kernel patch

[Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>]

On Mon, 16 Dec 2002 19:27, Stephen D. Smalley wrote:
> When an inode is allocated, its SID is initialized to the unlabeled
> initial SID (=> system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t), and its security class
> is initialized to the file class by default.  This log message indicates
> that a devfs inode reached a permission check without first being
> initialized by inode_doinit, likely due to a race between
> selinux_inode_post_lookup and a cached lookup.  The empty permission
> set is due to an inability to map the requested permission (likely search)
> to a permission in the file class.
>
> As a short term fix, I'd suggest the attached patch.  A proper fix requires
> adjusting the inode_init call in d_instantiate and the SELinux hook
> function to properly handle filesystems that rely on genfs_contexts.

This works.  I'll add it to my kernel-patch package for Debian.

Also I've updated my kernel-patch-2.5-lsm package to include your latest 
patch.

-- 
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