From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from jazzband.ncsc.mil (jazzband.ncsc.mil [144.51.5.4]) by tycho.ncsc.mil (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id LAA14053 for ; Wed, 1 Jan 2003 11:54:30 -0500 (EST) Received: from jazzband.ncsc.mil (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by jazzband.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id h01GsTI13323 for ; Wed, 1 Jan 2003 16:54:29 GMT Received: from tsv.sws.net.au (tsv.sws.net.au [203.36.46.2]) by jazzband.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id h01GsQf13319 for ; Wed, 1 Jan 2003 16:54:26 GMT Received: from lyta.coker.com.au (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by tsv.sws.net.au (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F5CF9246B for ; Thu, 2 Jan 2003 03:54:23 +1100 (EST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by lyta.coker.com.au (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E51637F for ; Wed, 1 Jan 2003 17:54:21 +0100 (CET) From: Russell Coker Reply-To: Russell Coker To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: latest policy patch Date: Wed, 1 Jan 2003 17:54:20 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Multipart/Mixed; boundary="Boundary-00=_80xE+oD9a/d3zVv" Message-Id: <200301011754.20570.russell@coker.com.au> Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov --Boundary-00=_80xE+oD9a/d3zVv Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline I've attached a policy patch against the latest CVS tree. It contains a number of patches I've already posted here and a new patch for login.te that uses a macro for the local_login_t and remote_login_t domains. This patch adds the attributes { mlstrustedreader mlstrustedwriter mlstrustedobject } to remote_login_t, I am not sure if this is OK. Also I added a number of small things to remote_login_t (such as access to check for new mail) to make it have equivalent functionality to local_login_t. I did this when I noticed that telnet logins to my system were not working due to policy deficiencies so I decided to do it right. -- http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page --Boundary-00=_80xE+oD9a/d3zVv Content-Type: text/x-diff; charset="us-ascii"; name="diff" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="diff" diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/misc/auth-net.te ./domains/misc/auth-net.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/misc/auth-net.te 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/misc/auth-net.te 2002-12-28 21:46:38.000000000 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +#DESC Policy for using network servers for authenticating users (IE PAM-LDAP) + +can_network(auth) +allow auth resolv_conf_t:file { getattr read }; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/bootloader.te ./domains/program/bootloader.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/bootloader.te 2002-12-16 17:06:02.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/bootloader.te 2002-12-13 21:03:06.000000000 +0100 @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ # for ldd allow bootloader_t { insmod_exec_t fsadm_exec_t }:file { rx_file_perms execute_no_trans }; +allow bootloader_t insmod_exec_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; dontaudit bootloader_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir search; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/crack.te ./domains/program/crack.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/crack.te 2002-12-03 15:56:39.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/crack.te 2002-12-13 21:03:18.000000000 +0100 @@ -35,4 +35,6 @@ allow crack_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read }; allow crack_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms; +allow crack_t fs_t:filesystem getattr; + dontaudit crack_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search }; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/crond.te ./domains/program/crond.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/crond.te 2002-12-03 15:56:39.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/crond.te 2002-12-13 21:03:38.000000000 +0100 @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ file_type_auto_trans(crond_t, var_log_t, cron_log_t) # Use capabilities. -allow crond_t crond_t:capability { setgid setuid net_bind_service }; +allow crond_t crond_t:capability { setgid setuid net_bind_service dac_override }; # Check entrypoint permission on crontab files. allow crond_t security_t:security compute_av; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/dpkg.te ./domains/program/dpkg.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/dpkg.te 2002-12-03 15:56:40.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/dpkg.te 2002-12-28 21:24:16.000000000 +0100 @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ can_exec(dpkg_t, init_exec_t) file_type_auto_trans(dpkg_t, tmp_t, tmp_dpkg_t) ifdef(`mta.te', ` -allow system_mail_t tmp_dpkg_t:file read; +allow system_mail_t tmp_dpkg_t:file { getattr read }; ') allow dpkg_t random_device_t:chr_file read; @@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, klogd_exec_t, klogd_t) domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, syslogd_exec_t, syslogd_t) ') +# mysqld is broken too +ifdef(`mysqld.te', ` +domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, mysqld_exec_t, mysqld_t) +') # for apt type apt_t, domain, admin, privmail; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/fsadm.te ./domains/program/fsadm.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/fsadm.te 2002-11-04 13:27:51.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/fsadm.te 2002-12-13 21:54:24.000000000 +0100 @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ type fsadm_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile; file_type_auto_trans(fsadm_t, tmp_t, fsadm_tmp_t) +# remount file system to apply changes +allow fsadm_t fs_t:filesystem remount; + # Use capabilities. allow fsadm_t fsadm_t:capability { sys_admin sys_rawio }; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/hotplug.te ./domains/program/hotplug.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/hotplug.te 2002-12-03 15:56:40.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/hotplug.te 2002-12-13 21:05:01.000000000 +0100 @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ domain_auto_trans(kmod_t, hotplug_exec_t, hotplug_t) domain_auto_trans_read(hotplug_t, insmod_exec_t, insmod_t) +allow hotplug_t insmod_exec_t:lnk_file read; domain_auto_trans_read(hotplug_t, mount_exec_t, mount_t) domain_auto_trans_read(hotplug_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t) ifdef(`pump.te', `domain_auto_trans_read(hotplug_t, pump_exec_t, pump_t)') diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/login.te ./domains/program/login.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/login.te 2002-10-23 21:38:17.000000000 +0200 +++ ./domains/program/login.te 2003-01-01 17:50:12.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # # Authors: Stephen Smalley and Timothy Fraser (NAI Labs) +# Macroised by Russell Coker # ################################# @@ -8,37 +9,74 @@ # and the remote_login_t domain. # +# $1 is the name of the domain (local or remote) +# I added "mlstrustedreader, mlstrustedwriter, mlstrustedobject" to +# remote_login_t, not sure if this is right +define(`login_domain', ` +type $1_login_t, domain, privuser, privrole, privlog, auth, privowner, mlstrustedreader, mlstrustedwriter, mlstrustedobject, privfd; +role system_r types $1_login_t; +every_domain($1_login_t) + +tmp_domain($1_login) + +# Use capabilities +allow $1_login_t self:capability { setuid setgid chown fowner fsetid net_bind_service sys_tty_config dac_override sys_nice sys_resource }; + +# Run shells in user_t by default. +domain_auto_trans($1_login_t, shell_exec_t, user_t) + +# Permit login to search the user home directories. +allow $1_login_t home_root_t:dir search; +allow $1_login_t home_dir_type:dir search; + +# Write to /var/run/utmp. +allow $1_login_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms; + +# Write to /var/log/wtmp. +allow $1_login_t wtmp_t:file rw_file_perms; + +# Write to /var/log/lastlog. +allow $1_login_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms; + +# Write to /var/log/btmp +allow $1_login_t faillog_t:file { append read write }; + +# Search for mail spool file. +allow $1_login_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms; +allow $1_login_t mail_spool_t:file getattr; +allow $1_login_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read; + +# Determine the set of legal user SIDs that can be reached. +allow $1_login_t security_t:security get_user_sids; + +# Obtain the SID to use for relabeling terminals. +allow $1_login_t security_t:security change_sid; + +# allow read access to default_contexts in /etc/security +allow $1_login_t default_context_t:file r_file_perms; + +') + ################################# # # Rules for the local_login_t domain. # # local_login_t is the domain of a login process # spawned by getty. +# +# remote_login_t is the domain of a login process +# spawned by rlogind. +# # login_exec_t is the type of the login program # -type local_login_t, domain, privuser, privrole, privlog, auth, privowner, mlstrustedreader, mlstrustedwriter, mlstrustedobject, privfd; -role system_r types local_login_t; -every_domain(local_login_t) type login_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type; type_transition init_t login_exec_t:process local_login_t; -type local_login_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile; -file_type_auto_trans(local_login_t, tmp_t, local_login_tmp_t) - -# Use capabilities. -allow local_login_t local_login_t:capability { setuid setgid chown fowner fsetid net_bind_service sys_tty_config dac_override sys_resource }; +login_domain(local) -allow local_login_t shadow_t:file { read getattr }; - -# Run shells in user_t by default. -domain_auto_trans(local_login_t, shell_exec_t, user_t) # But also permit other user domains to be entered by login. domain_trans(local_login_t, shell_exec_t, userdomain) -# Permit login to search the user home directories. -allow local_login_t home_root_t:dir search; -allow local_login_t home_dir_type:dir search; - # Do not audit denied attempts to access devices. dontaudit local_login_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file { getattr setattr }; dontaudit local_login_t removable_device_t:blk_file { getattr setattr }; @@ -52,29 +90,11 @@ # Do not audit denied attempts to access /mnt. dontaudit local_login_t file_t:dir r_dir_perms; -# Write to /var/run/utmp. -allow local_login_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms; - -# Write to /var/log/wtmp. -allow local_login_t wtmp_t:file rw_file_perms; - -# Write to /var/log/lastlog. -allow local_login_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms; - -# Write to /var/log/btmp -allow local_login_t faillog_t:file { append read write }; # Create lock file. allow local_login_t var_lock_t:dir rw_dir_perms; allow local_login_t var_lock_t:file create_file_perms; -# Search for mail spool file. -allow local_login_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms; -allow local_login_t mail_spool_t:file getattr; -allow local_login_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read; - -# Obtain the SID to use for relabeling terminals. -allow local_login_t security_t:security change_sid; # Read and write ttys. allow local_login_t tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms }; @@ -94,65 +114,24 @@ allow local_login_t var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms; allow local_login_t var_run_t:file create_file_perms; -# allow read access to default_contexts in /etc/security -allow local_login_t default_context_t:file r_file_perms; - -# Determine the set of legal user SIDs that can be reached. -allow local_login_t security_t:security get_user_sids; - ################################# # # Rules for the remote_login_t domain. # -# remote_login_t is the domain of a login process -# spawned by rlogind. -# -type remote_login_t, domain, privuser, privrole, privlog, auth, privowner, privfd; -role system_r types remote_login_t; -every_domain(remote_login_t) - -type remote_login_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile; -file_type_auto_trans(remote_login_t, tmp_t, remote_login_tmp_t) -# Use capabilities. -allow remote_login_t remote_login_t:capability { setuid setgid chown fowner fsetid net_bind_service sys_tty_config dac_override }; +login_domain(remote) -# Run shells in user_t by default. -domain_auto_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, user_t) # Only permit unprivileged user domains to be entered via rlogin, # since very weak authentication is used. domain_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain) -allow remote_login_t home_root_t:dir search; -allow remote_login_t home_dir_type:dir search; # Use the pty created by rlogind. ifdef(`rlogind.te', ` allow remote_login_t rlogind_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms }; ') -# Write to /var/run/utmp. -allow remote_login_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms; - -# Write to /var/log/wtmp. -allow remote_login_t wtmp_t:file rw_file_perms; - -# Write to /var/log/lastlog. -allow remote_login_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms; - -# Search for mail spool file. -allow remote_login_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms; -allow remote_login_t mail_spool_t:file getattr; - -# Obtain the SID to use for relabeling ptys. -allow remote_login_t security_t:security change_sid; - # Relabel ptys created by rlogind. ifdef(`rlogind.te', `allow remote_login_t rlogind_devpts_t:chr_file { relabelfrom relabelto };') allow remote_login_t ptyfile:chr_file { getattr relabelfrom relabelto }; -# allow read access to default_context in /etc/security -allow remote_login_t default_context_t:file r_file_perms; - -# Determine the set of legal user SIDs that can be reached. -allow remote_login_t security_t:security get_user_sids; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te ./domains/program/modutil.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/modutil.te 2002-12-16 17:06:04.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/modutil.te 2002-12-29 21:47:13.000000000 +0100 @@ -55,10 +55,7 @@ allow insmod_t var_log_ksyms_t:dir create_dir_perms; ifdef(`crond.te', ` -# for old modutils rw_dir_create_file(system_crond_t, var_log_ksyms_t) -# for new modutils that is 2.5 compatable -can_exec(insmod_t, bin_t) ') ################################# @@ -126,7 +123,7 @@ allow update_modules_t self:process { fork sigchld }; allow update_modules_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow update_modules_t modules_dep_t:file rw_file_perms; -r_dir_file(update_modules_t, modules_object_t) +file_type_auto_trans(update_modules_t, modules_object_t, modules_conf_t) domain_auto_trans_read(update_modules_t, depmod_exec_t, depmod_t) can_exec(update_modules_t, bin_t) allow update_modules_t { sbin_t bin_t }:dir search; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/nsd.te ./domains/program/nsd.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/nsd.te 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/nsd.te 2002-12-28 21:40:01.000000000 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +#DESC Authoritative only name server +# +# Author: Russell Coker +# +# + +################################# +# +# Rules for the nsd_t domain. +# +ifdef(`named.te', `', ` +type named_port_t, port_type; +') + +daemon_domain(nsd) + +# A type for configuration files of nsd +type nsd_conf_t, file_type, sysadmfile; +# A type for zone files +type nsd_zone_t, file_type, sysadmfile; + +r_dir_file(nsd_t, { nsd_conf_t nsd_zone_t }) +r_dir_file(initrc_t, nsd_conf_t) + +# Use capabilities. Surplus capabilities may be allowed. +allow nsd_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_bind_service }; + +allow nsd_t etc_t:{ file lnk_file } { getattr read }; +allow nsd_t resolv_conf_t:file { getattr read }; + +# nsd can use network +can_network(nsd_t) +# allow client access from caching BIND +ifdef(`named.te', ` +can_udp_send(named_t, nsd_t) +can_udp_send(nsd_t, named_t) +can_tcp_connect(named_t, nsd_t) +') + +# if you want to allow all programs to contact the primary name server +#can_udp_send(domain, nsd_t) +#can_udp_send(nsd_t, domain) +#can_tcp_connect(domain, nsd_t) + +# Bind to the named port. +allow nsd_t named_port_t:udp_socket name_bind; +allow nsd_t named_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind; + +allow nsd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow nsd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/postfix.te ./domains/program/postfix.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/postfix.te 2002-12-03 15:56:41.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/postfix.te 2002-12-28 21:07:50.000000000 +0100 @@ -82,14 +82,15 @@ allow postfix_master_t postfix_private_t:fifo_file create_file_perms; can_network(postfix_master_t) allow postfix_master_t smtp_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind; -allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:dir r_dir_perms; +allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:dir rw_dir_perms; +allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:file { rename getattr }; allow postfix_master_t postfix_prng_t:file getattr; -allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:file getattr; allow postfix_master_t privfd:fd use; allow postfix_master_t etc_aliases_t:file r_file_perms; create_dir_file(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t) allow postfix_master_t random_device_t:chr_file { read getattr }; allow postfix_master_t postfix_prng_t:file rw_file_perms; +file_type_auto_trans(postfix_master_t, var_spool_t, postfix_spool_t, dir) # allow access to deferred queue allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_t:dir create_dir_perms; @@ -125,6 +126,7 @@ allow postfix_smtpd_t { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t }:dir search; allow postfix_smtpd_t { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t }:sock_file rw_file_perms; allow postfix_smtpd_t postfix_master_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +allow postfix_smtpd_t etc_aliases_t:file r_file_perms; allow { postfix_smtp_t postfix_smtpd_t } postfix_prng_t:file rw_file_perms; @@ -134,7 +136,7 @@ # for a bug in the postfix local program dontaudit procmail_t postfix_local_t:tcp_socket { read write }; ') -allow postfix_local_t { etc_aliases_t }:file r_file_perms; +allow postfix_local_t etc_aliases_t:file r_file_perms; allow postfix_local_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow postfix_local_t postfix_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow postfix_local_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms; @@ -241,7 +243,7 @@ type postfix_spool_bounce_t, file_type, sysadmfile; create_dir_file(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t) create_dir_file(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_t) -allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir r_dir_perms; +allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir create_dir_perms; allow postfix_bounce_t self:capability { dac_read_search }; allow postfix_bounce_t postfix_public_t:sock_file write; allow postfix_bounce_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/procmail.te ./domains/program/procmail.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/procmail.te 2002-12-03 15:56:41.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/procmail.te 2002-12-16 17:19:07.000000000 +0100 @@ -22,12 +22,14 @@ allow procmail_t self:capability { sys_nice chown setuid setgid dac_override }; allow procmail_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms; -allow procmail_t { etc_t resolv_conf_t }:file r_file_perms; +allow procmail_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t resolv_conf_t }:file { getattr read }; allow procmail_t etc_t:lnk_file read; -allow procmail_t self:process { setsched fork sigchld }; +allow procmail_t self:process { setsched fork sigchld signal }; can_exec(procmail_t, { bin_t shell_exec_t }) -allow procmail_t self:fifo_file { read write getattr }; +allow procmail_t bin_t:dir search; +allow procmail_t bin_t:lnk_file read; +allow procmail_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow procmail_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms; allow procmail_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -50,3 +52,6 @@ # Do not audit attempts to access /root. dontaudit procmail_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search }; + +allow procmail_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write }; + diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te ./domains/program/quota.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/quota.te 2002-12-03 15:56:42.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/quota.te 2002-12-13 21:07:17.000000000 +0100 @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ rw_dir_create_file(initrc_t, quota_flag_t) allow quota_t fs_t:filesystem { getattr quotaget quotamod }; -allow quota_t home_root_t:dir getattr; +allow quota_t { home_root_t var_t usr_t src_t }:dir getattr; allow quota_t self:capability sys_admin; allow quota_t file_t:file quotaon; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/samba.te ./domains/program/samba.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/samba.te 2002-10-28 21:31:46.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/samba.te 2002-12-26 15:33:14.000000000 +0100 @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ allow smbd_t var_run_nmbd_t:file rw_file_perms; ifdef(`crond.te', ` -allow system_crond_t samba_etc_t:file { read getattr }; +allow system_crond_t samba_etc_t:file { read getattr lock }; ') ################################# @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ #allow smbd_t samba_etc_t:dir { search getattr }; file_type_auto_trans(smbd_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t, file) -allow smbd_t samba_etc_t:file { getattr read }; +allow smbd_t samba_etc_t:file { getattr read lock }; # Permissions for Samba cache files in /var/cache/samba allow smbd_t samba_var_t:dir { write remove_name add_name lock getattr search }; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/domains/program/slapd.te ./domains/program/slapd.te --- /tmp/policy/domains/program/slapd.te 2002-10-28 22:55:57.000000000 +0100 +++ ./domains/program/slapd.te 2002-12-28 21:07:50.000000000 +0100 @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ # read config files allow slapd_t { etc_t etc_slapd_t resolv_conf_t etc_runtime_t }:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms; +# for startup script +allow initrc_t etc_slapd_t:file read; + allow slapd_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow slapd_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir search; diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/crond.fc ./file_contexts/program/crond.fc --- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/crond.fc 2002-11-29 12:19:36.000000000 +0100 +++ ./file_contexts/program/crond.fc 2002-12-28 21:08:31.000000000 +0100 @@ -16,4 +16,5 @@ /var/spool/fcron system_u:object_r:cron_spool_t /var/spool/fcron/.* <> /var/spool/fcron/systab.orig system_u:object_r:sysadm_cron_spool_t +/var/spool/fcron/systab system_u:object_r:sysadm_cron_spool_t /var/run/fcron.fifo system_u:object_r:var_run_crond_t diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/fsadm.fc ./file_contexts/program/fsadm.fc --- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/fsadm.fc 2002-12-03 15:56:44.000000000 +0100 +++ ./file_contexts/program/fsadm.fc 2002-12-13 21:56:43.000000000 +0100 @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ /sbin/e2fsck system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune) system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/mkreiserfs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t +/sbin/resize.*fs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/e2label system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/mkfs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/mke2fs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t @@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ /sbin/sfdisk system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/cfdisk system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/fdisk system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t +/sbin/parted system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/tune2fs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/dumpe2fs system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t /sbin/swapon system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/initrc.fc ./file_contexts/program/initrc.fc --- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/initrc.fc 2002-10-28 22:56:00.000000000 +0100 +++ ./file_contexts/program/initrc.fc 2002-12-13 21:08:39.000000000 +0100 @@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ /usr/local/selinux/sbin/open_init_pty system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t /usr/sbin/run_init system_u:object_r:run_init_exec_t /usr/sbin/open_init_pty system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t +/etc/nologin.boot system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/modutil.fc ./file_contexts/program/modutil.fc --- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/modutil.fc 2002-12-16 17:06:32.000000000 +0100 +++ ./file_contexts/program/modutil.fc 2002-12-29 21:48:19.000000000 +0100 @@ -2,9 +2,10 @@ /etc/modules.conf(.old)? system_u:object_r:modules_conf_t /lib/modules(/.*)? system_u:object_r:modules_object_t /lib/modules/[^/]*/modules\..* system_u:object_r:modules_dep_t +/lib/modules/modprobe.conf system_u:object_r:modules_conf_t /sbin/depmod.* system_u:object_r:depmod_exec_t /sbin/modprobe.* system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t /sbin/insmod.* system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t -/sbin/insmod.static system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t +/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean system_u:object_r:sbin_t /sbin/rmmod.* system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t /sbin/update-modules system_u:object_r:update_modules_exec_t diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/nsd.fc ./file_contexts/program/nsd.fc --- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/nsd.fc 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ ./file_contexts/program/nsd.fc 2002-12-28 21:32:56.000000000 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +# nsd +/etc/nsd(/.*)? system_u:object_r:nsd_conf_t +/usr/sbin/nsd system_u:object_r:nsd_exec_t +/var/run/nsd.pid system_u:object_r:var_run_nsd_t diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/postfix.fc ./file_contexts/program/postfix.fc --- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/postfix.fc 2002-12-03 15:56:45.000000000 +0100 +++ ./file_contexts/program/postfix.fc 2002-12-28 21:08:31.000000000 +0100 @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ /usr/sbin/postsuper system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t /usr/sbin/rmail system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t /var/spool/postfix/active(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_t +/var/spool/postfix/hold(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_t /var/spool/postfix/incoming(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_t /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_maildrop_t /var/spool/postfix/pid system_u:object_r:var_run_t diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/postgresql.fc ./file_contexts/program/postgresql.fc --- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/postgresql.fc 2002-08-23 20:44:20.000000000 +0200 +++ ./file_contexts/program/postgresql.fc 2002-12-13 21:08:39.000000000 +0100 @@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ /var/run/postgresql(/.*)? system_u:object_r:var_run_postgresql_t /etc/postgresql(/.*)? system_u:object_r:etc_postgresql_t /var/log/postgres.log.* system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t +/var/log/postgresql(/.*)? system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t diff -ruN /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/slapd.fc ./file_contexts/program/slapd.fc --- /tmp/policy/file_contexts/program/slapd.fc 2002-07-12 17:19:44.000000000 +0200 +++ ./file_contexts/program/slapd.fc 2002-12-13 21:54:50.000000000 +0100 @@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ /var/lib/ldap(/.*)? system_u:object_r:slapd_db_t /var/lib/ldap/replog(/.*)? system_u:object_r:slapd_replog_t /var/run/slapd.args system_u:object_r:var_run_slapd_t +/etc/ldap/slapd.conf system_u:object_r:etc_slapd_t diff -ruN /tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te ./macros/program/ssh_macros.te --- /tmp/policy/macros/program/ssh_macros.te 2002-10-23 21:38:26.000000000 +0200 +++ ./macros/program/ssh_macros.te 2002-12-13 21:10:46.000000000 +0100 @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ allow $1_ssh_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; # Allow the user shell to signal the ssh program. -allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:process signal; +allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:process { signal setpgid }; # allow ps to show ssh allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:dir { search getattr read }; allow $1_t $1_ssh_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr }; --Boundary-00=_80xE+oD9a/d3zVv-- -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. 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