--- rpc.patch Fri Jan 10 14:24:58 2003 +++ rpc.patch.new Fri Jan 10 14:40:40 2003 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- linux/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_rpc_tcp.c.old Thu Jan 1 10:00:00 1970 +++ linux/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_rpc_tcp.c Fri Jan 10 18:53:15 2003 -@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@ +@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@ +/* RPC extension for IP (TCP) connection tracking, Version 2.1 + * (C) 2000 by Marcelo Barbosa Lima + * - original rpc tracking module @@ -28,20 +28,20 @@ + ** + * Note to all: + * -+ * RPCs should not be exposed to the internet - ask the Pentagon; ++ * RPCs should not be exposed to the internet - ask the Pentagon; + * -+ * "The unidentified crackers pleaded guilty in July to charges -+ * of juvenile delinquency stemming from a string of Pentagon -+ * network intrusions in February. -+ * -+ * The youths, going by the names TooShort and Makaveli, used -+ * a common server security hole to break in, according to -+ * Dane Jasper, owner of the California Internet service -+ * provider, Sonic. They used the hole, known as the 'statd' -+ * exploit, to attempt more than 800 break-ins, Jasper said." ++ * "The unidentified crackers pleaded guilty in July to charges ++ * of juvenile delinquency stemming from a string of Pentagon ++ * network intrusions in February. ++ * ++ * The youths, going by the names TooShort and Makaveli, used ++ * a common server security hole to break in, according to ++ * Dane Jasper, owner of the California Internet service ++ * provider, Sonic. They used the hole, known as the 'statd' ++ * exploit, to attempt more than 800 break-ins, Jasper said." + * -+ * From: Wired News; "Pentagon Kids Kicked Off Grid" - Nov 6, 1998 -+ * URL: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,16098,00.html ++ * From: Wired News; "Pentagon Kids Kicked Off Grid" - Nov 6, 1998 ++ * URL: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,16098,00.html + ** + */ + @@ -88,12 +88,13 @@ +#include + +/* For future conections RPC, using client's cache bindings -+ * I'll use ip_conntrack_lock to lock these lists */ ++ * I'll use ip_conntrack_lock to lock these lists */ + +LIST_HEAD(request_p_list_tcp); + + -+static void delete_request_p(unsigned long request_p_ul) { ++static void delete_request_p(unsigned long request_p_ul) ++{ + struct request_p *p = (void *)request_p_ul; + + WRITE_LOCK(&ipct_rpc_tcp_lock); @@ -104,7 +105,8 @@ +} + + -+static void req_cl(struct request_p * r){ ++static void req_cl(struct request_p * r) ++{ + WRITE_LOCK(&ipct_rpc_tcp_lock); + del_timer(&r->timeout); + LIST_DELETE(&request_p_list_tcp, r); @@ -114,38 +116,41 @@ +} + + -+static void clean_request(struct list_head *list){ ++static void clean_request(struct list_head *list) ++{ + struct list_head *first = list->prev; + struct list_head *temp = list->next; + struct list_head *aux; + -+ if(list_empty(list)) return; ++ if (list_empty(list)) ++ return; + -+ while(first != temp) { ++ while (first != temp) { + aux = temp->next; + req_cl((struct request_p *)temp); + temp = aux; -+ } ++ } + req_cl((struct request_p *)temp); + return; +} + + +static void alloc_request_p(u_int32_t xid, u_int16_t proto, u_int32_t ip, -+ u_int16_t port){ ++ u_int16_t port) ++{ + struct request_p *req_p; -+ -+ /* Verifies if entry already exists */ -+ WRITE_LOCK(&ipct_rpc_tcp_lock); -+ req_p = LIST_FIND(&request_p_list_tcp, request_p_cmp, ++ ++ /* Verifies if entry already exists */ ++ WRITE_LOCK(&ipct_rpc_tcp_lock); ++ req_p = LIST_FIND(&request_p_list_tcp, request_p_cmp, + struct request_p *, xid, ip, port); + -+ if(req_p){ ++ if (req_p) { + /* Refresh timeout */ + if (del_timer(&req_p->timeout)) { -+ req_p->timeout.expires = jiffies + EXP; -+ add_timer(&req_p->timeout); -+ } ++ req_p->timeout.expires = jiffies + EXP; ++ add_timer(&req_p->timeout); ++ } + WRITE_UNLOCK(&ipct_rpc_tcp_lock); + return; + @@ -154,7 +159,7 @@ + + /* Allocate new request_p */ + req_p = (struct request_p *) kmalloc(sizeof(struct request_p), GFP_ATOMIC); -+ if(!req_p) { ++ if (!req_p) { + DEBUGP("can't allocate request_p\n"); + return; + } @@ -162,10 +167,10 @@ + { { NULL, NULL }, jiffies + EXP, (unsigned long)req_p, + NULL }}); + -+ /*Initialize timer */ ++ /* Initialize timer */ + init_timer(&req_p->timeout); + req_p->timeout.function = delete_request_p; -+ add_timer(&req_p->timeout); ++ add_timer(&req_p->timeout); + + /* Put in list */ + WRITE_LOCK(&ipct_rpc_tcp_lock); @@ -194,8 +199,8 @@ + + DEBUGP("new packet to evaluate ..\n"); + -+ /* This works for packets like handshake packets, ignore */ -+ if (len == ((tcph->doff + iph->ihl) * 4)) { ++ /* This works for packets like handshake packets, ignore */ ++ if (len == ((tcph->doff + iph->ihl) * 4)) { + DEBUGP("packet has no data (may still be handshaking). [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } @@ -228,13 +233,13 @@ + } + + -+ /* If packet is client packet */ ++ /* If packet is client packet */ + if (dir == IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL) { + + DEBUGP("packet is from the initiator. [cont]\n"); + + /* Tests if packet len is ok */ -+ if((tcplen - (tcph->doff * 4)) != 60) { ++ if ((tcplen - (tcph->doff * 4)) != 60) { + DEBUGP("packet length is not correct. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } @@ -249,7 +254,7 @@ + data = data + 5; + + /* Is one get port procedure? */ -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data) == 3) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data) == 3) { + + data++; + @@ -285,7 +290,7 @@ + DEBUGP("packet is from the receiver. [cont]\n"); + + /* Tests if packet len is ok */ -+ if((tcplen - (tcph->doff * 4)) != 32) { ++ if ((tcplen - (tcph->doff * 4)) != 32) { + DEBUGP("packet length is not correct. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } @@ -299,21 +304,21 @@ + ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u.all); + + /* Drop unexpected packets */ -+ if(!req_p) { ++ if (!req_p) { + DEBUGP("packet is not expected. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } + data = data++; + + /* Verifies if packet is really a reply packet */ -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data) != 1) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data) != 1) { + DEBUGP("packet is not a valid RPC reply. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } + data++; + + /* Is status accept? */ -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) { + DEBUGP("packet is not an RPC accept. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } @@ -323,18 +328,18 @@ + data = data + IXDR_GET_INT32(data) + 2; + + /* Is accpet status "success"? */ -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) { + DEBUGP("packet is not an RPC accept status of success. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } + data++; + -+ /* Get server port number */ ++ /* Get server port number */ + port_buf = (u_int16_t) IXDR_GET_INT32(data); + + /* Alright. This binding must be in internal expect list; + * If port == 0, then this service is not registred. */ -+ if(port_buf) { ++ if (port_buf) { + DEBUGP("port found: %u\n", port_buf); + + memset(&expect, 0, sizeof(expect)); @@ -345,7 +350,7 @@ + exp->mask.src.ip = 0xffffffff; + exp->mask.dst.ip = 0xffffffff; + -+ switch(req_p->proto) { ++ switch (req_p->proto) { + case IPPROTO_UDP: + exp->tuple.src.u.udp.port = 0; + exp->tuple.dst.u.udp.port = htons(port_buf); @@ -463,7 +468,7 @@ + DEBUGP("cleaning request list\n"); + clean_request(&request_p_list_tcp); + -+ for (port = 0; (port < MAX_PORTS) && ports[port]; port++) { ++ for (port = 0; (port < ports_n_c) && ports[port]; port++) { + DEBUGP("unregistering port %d\n", ports[port]); + ip_conntrack_helper_unregister(&rpc_helpers[port]); + } @@ -480,7 +485,7 @@ + --- linux/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_rpc_udp.c.old Thu Jan 1 10:00:00 1970 +++ linux/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_rpc_udp.c Fri Jan 10 18:53:09 2003 -@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@ +@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@ +/* RPC extension for IP (UDP) connection tracking, Version 2.1 + * (C) 2000 by Marcelo Barbosa Lima + * - original rpc tracking module @@ -508,20 +513,20 @@ + ** + * Note to all: + * -+ * RPCs should not be exposed to the internet - ask the Pentagon; ++ * RPCs should not be exposed to the internet - ask the Pentagon; + * -+ * "The unidentified crackers pleaded guilty in July to charges -+ * of juvenile delinquency stemming from a string of Pentagon -+ * network intrusions in February. -+ * -+ * The youths, going by the names TooShort and Makaveli, used -+ * a common server security hole to break in, according to -+ * Dane Jasper, owner of the California Internet service -+ * provider, Sonic. They used the hole, known as the 'statd' -+ * exploit, to attempt more than 800 break-ins, Jasper said." ++ * "The unidentified crackers pleaded guilty in July to charges ++ * of juvenile delinquency stemming from a string of Pentagon ++ * network intrusions in February. ++ * ++ * The youths, going by the names TooShort and Makaveli, used ++ * a common server security hole to break in, according to ++ * Dane Jasper, owner of the California Internet service ++ * provider, Sonic. They used the hole, known as the 'statd' ++ * exploit, to attempt more than 800 break-ins, Jasper said." + * -+ * From: Wired News; "Pentagon Kids Kicked Off Grid" - Nov 6, 1998 -+ * URL: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,16098,00.html ++ * From: Wired News; "Pentagon Kids Kicked Off Grid" - Nov 6, 1998 ++ * URL: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,16098,00.html + ** + */ + @@ -573,7 +578,8 @@ +LIST_HEAD(request_p_list_udp); + + -+static void delete_request_p(unsigned long request_p_ul) { ++static void delete_request_p(unsigned long request_p_ul) ++{ + struct request_p *p = (void *)request_p_ul; + + WRITE_LOCK(&ipct_rpc_udp_lock); @@ -584,7 +590,8 @@ +} + + -+static void req_cl(struct request_p * r){ ++static void req_cl(struct request_p * r) ++{ + WRITE_LOCK(&ipct_rpc_udp_lock); + del_timer(&r->timeout); + LIST_DELETE(&request_p_list_udp, r); @@ -594,25 +601,28 @@ +} + + -+static void clean_request(struct list_head *list){ ++static void clean_request(struct list_head *list) ++{ + struct list_head *first = list->prev; + struct list_head *temp = list->next; + struct list_head *aux; + -+ if(list_empty(list)) return; ++ if (list_empty(list)) ++ return; + -+ while(first != temp) { ++ while (first != temp) { + aux = temp->next; + req_cl((struct request_p *)temp); + temp = aux; -+ } ++ } + req_cl((struct request_p *)temp); + return; +} + + +static void alloc_request_p(u_int32_t xid, u_int16_t proto, u_int32_t ip, -+ u_int16_t port){ ++ u_int16_t port) ++{ + struct request_p *req_p; + + /* Verifies if entry already exists */ @@ -620,7 +630,7 @@ + req_p = LIST_FIND(&request_p_list_udp, request_p_cmp, + struct request_p *, xid, ip, port); + -+ if(req_p) { ++ if (req_p) { + /* Refresh timeout */ + if (del_timer(&req_p->timeout)) { + req_p->timeout.expires = jiffies + EXP; @@ -634,7 +644,7 @@ + + /* Allocate new request_p */ + req_p = (struct request_p *) kmalloc(sizeof(struct request_p), GFP_ATOMIC); -+ if(!req_p) { ++ if (!req_p) { + DEBUGP("can't allocate request_p\n"); + return; + } @@ -686,7 +696,7 @@ + + + /* FIXME: Source route IP option packets --RR */ -+ if(*chsm){ ++ if (*chsm) { + if (csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, udplen, IPPROTO_UDP, + csum_partial((char *)udph, udplen, 0))) { + DEBUGP("[note: failure to get past this error may indicate source routing]\n"); @@ -757,7 +767,7 @@ + } + + /* Tests if packet len is ok */ -+ if((udplen - sizeof(struct udphdr)) != 28) { ++ if ((udplen - sizeof(struct udphdr)) != 28) { + DEBUGP("packet length is not correct. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } @@ -768,21 +778,21 @@ + ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u.all); + + /* Drop unexpected packets */ -+ if(!req_p) { ++ if (!req_p) { + DEBUGP("packet is not expected. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } + data = data++; + + /* Verifies if packet is really a reply packet */ -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data) != 1) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data) != 1) { + DEBUGP("packet is not a valid RPC reply. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } + data++; + + /* Is status accept? */ -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) { + DEBUGP("packet is not an RPC accept. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } @@ -792,7 +802,7 @@ + data = data + IXDR_GET_INT32(data) + 2; + + /* Is accpet status "success"? */ -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) { + DEBUGP("packet is not an RPC accept status of success. [skip]\n"); + return NF_ACCEPT; + } @@ -803,7 +813,7 @@ + + /* Alright. This binding must be in internal expect list; + * If port == 0, then this service is not registred. */ -+ if(port_buf) { ++ if (port_buf) { + DEBUGP("port found: %u\n", port_buf); + + memset(&expect, 0, sizeof(expect)); @@ -932,7 +942,7 @@ + DEBUGP("cleaning request list\n"); + clean_request(&request_p_list_udp); + -+ for (port = 0; (port < MAX_PORTS) && ports[port]; port++) { ++ for (port = 0; (port < ports_n_c) && ports[port]; port++) { + DEBUGP("unregistering port %d\n", ports[port]); + ip_conntrack_helper_unregister(&rpc_helpers[port]); + } @@ -977,20 +987,20 @@ + ** + * Note to all: + * -+ * RPCs should not be exposed to the internet - ask the Pentagon; ++ * RPCs should not be exposed to the internet - ask the Pentagon; + * -+ * "The unidentified crackers pleaded guilty in July to charges -+ * of juvenile delinquency stemming from a string of Pentagon -+ * network intrusions in February. -+ * -+ * The youths, going by the names TooShort and Makaveli, used -+ * a common server security hole to break in, according to -+ * Dane Jasper, owner of the California Internet service -+ * provider, Sonic. They used the hole, known as the 'statd' -+ * exploit, to attempt more than 800 break-ins, Jasper said." ++ * "The unidentified crackers pleaded guilty in July to charges ++ * of juvenile delinquency stemming from a string of Pentagon ++ * network intrusions in February. ++ * ++ * The youths, going by the names TooShort and Makaveli, used ++ * a common server security hole to break in, according to ++ * Dane Jasper, owner of the California Internet service ++ * provider, Sonic. They used the hole, known as the 'statd' ++ * exploit, to attempt more than 800 break-ins, Jasper said." + * -+ * From: Wired News; "Pentagon Kids Kicked Off Grid" - Nov 6, 1998 -+ * URL: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,16098,00.html ++ * From: Wired News; "Pentagon Kids Kicked Off Grid" - Nov 6, 1998 ++ * URL: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,16098,00.html + ** + */ + @@ -1082,22 +1092,22 @@ +{ + int proc_ctr; + char *proc_ptr; -+ unsigned int proc_num; ++ unsigned int proc_num; + + DEBUGP("entered match_rpcs [%i] [%i] ..\n", i_procs, proc); + -+ if(i_procs == -1) ++ if (i_procs == -1) + return 1; + -+ for (proc_ctr=0; proc_ctr <= i_procs; proc_ctr++) { ++ for (proc_ctr=0; proc_ctr <= i_procs; proc_ctr++) { + -+ proc_ptr = c_procs; -+ proc_ptr += proc_ctr * IPT_RPC_CHAR_LEN; -+ proc_num = k_atoi(proc_ptr); ++ proc_ptr = c_procs; ++ proc_ptr += proc_ctr * IPT_RPC_CHAR_LEN; ++ proc_num = k_atoi(proc_ptr); + -+ if(proc_num == proc) ++ if (proc_num == proc) + return 1; -+ } ++ } + return 0; +} + @@ -1111,7 +1121,7 @@ + const u_int32_t *data; + enum ip_conntrack_dir dir; + const struct tcphdr *tcp; -+ const struct ipt_rpc_info *rpcinfo = matchinfo; ++ const struct ipt_rpc_info *rpcinfo = matchinfo; + struct request_p *req_p; + u_int32_t xid; + int port, portsok; @@ -1125,7 +1135,7 @@ + dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); + + /* we only want the client to server packets for matching */ -+ if(dir != IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL) ++ if (dir != IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL) + return 0; + + /* This does sanity checking on UDP or TCP packets, @@ -1134,24 +1144,24 @@ + * communications with the portmapper. + */ + -+ switch(ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.dst.protonum) { ++ switch (ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.dst.protonum) { + + case IPPROTO_UDP: + DEBUGP("PROTO_UDP [cont]\n"); -+ if(offset == 0 && datalen < sizeof(struct udphdr)) { ++ if (offset == 0 && datalen < sizeof(struct udphdr)) { + DEBUGP("UDP packet does not contain a complete UDP header. [drop]\n"); + return 0; + } -+ for(port=0,portsok=0; port <= ports_n_c; port++) { -+ if(ntohs(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u.all) == ports[port]) { ++ for (port=0,portsok=0; port <= ports_n_c; port++) { ++ if (ntohs(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u.all) == ports[port]) { + portsok++; + break; + } + } -+ if(portsok == 1) { -+ if((datalen - sizeof(struct udphdr)) != 56) { ++ if (portsok == 1) { ++ if ((datalen - sizeof(struct udphdr)) != 56) { + DEBUGP("UDP packet length is not correct for RPC content. [skip]\n"); -+ if(rpcinfo->strict == 1) ++ if (rpcinfo->strict == 1) + *hotdrop = 1; + return 0; + } @@ -1165,7 +1175,7 @@ + + /* Get RPC requestor */ + data = (const u_int32_t *)hdr + 7; -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data) != 3) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data) != 3) { + DEBUGP("UDP packet contains an invalid (non \"get\") requestor. [skip]\n"); + if(rpcinfo->strict == 1) + *hotdrop = 1; @@ -1175,8 +1185,8 @@ + + /* Get RPC procedure */ + data = (const u_int32_t *)hdr + 12; -+ if(match_rpcs((char *)&rpcinfo->c_procs, -+ rpcinfo->i_procs, IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) == 0) { ++ if (match_rpcs((char *)&rpcinfo->c_procs, ++ rpcinfo->i_procs, IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) == 0) { + DEBUGP("UDP packet contains illegal procedure request [%u]. [drop]\n", + (unsigned int)IXDR_GET_INT32(data)); + @@ -1187,7 +1197,7 @@ + ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.ip, + ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u.all); + -+ if(req_p){ ++ if (req_p) { + DEBUGP("found req_p for xid=%u proto=17 %u.%u.%u.%u:%u\n", xid, + NIPQUAD(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.ip), + ntohs(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u.all)); @@ -1217,20 +1227,20 @@ + + case IPPROTO_TCP: + DEBUGP("PROTO_TCP [cont]\n"); -+ if(offset == 0 && datalen < sizeof(struct tcphdr)) { ++ if (offset == 0 && datalen < sizeof(struct tcphdr)) { + DEBUGP("TCP packet does not contain a complete TCP header. [drop]\n"); + return 0; + } -+ if(ntohs(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u.all) == 111) { ++ if (ntohs(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u.all) == 111) { + + tcp = hdr; -+ if(datalen == (tcp->doff * 4)) { ++ if (datalen == (tcp->doff * 4)) { + DEBUGP("TCP packet does not contain any data. [match]\n"); + return (1 && (!offset)); + } + + /* Tests if packet len is ok */ -+ if((datalen - (tcp->doff * 4)) != 60) { ++ if ((datalen - (tcp->doff * 4)) != 60) { + DEBUGP("TCP packet length is not correct for RPC content. [skip]\n"); + if(rpcinfo->strict == 1) + *hotdrop = 1; @@ -1246,9 +1256,9 @@ + + /* Get RPC requestor */ + data = (const u_int32_t *)tcp + tcp->doff + 6; -+ if(IXDR_GET_INT32(data) != 3) { ++ if (IXDR_GET_INT32(data) != 3) { + DEBUGP("TCP packet contains an invalid (non \"get\") requestor. [skip]\n"); -+ if(rpcinfo->strict == 1) ++ if (rpcinfo->strict == 1) + *hotdrop = 1; + return 0; + } @@ -1256,8 +1266,8 @@ + + /* Get RPC procedure */ + data = (const u_int32_t *)tcp + tcp->doff + 11; -+ if(match_rpcs((char *)&rpcinfo->c_procs, -+ rpcinfo->i_procs, IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) == 0) { ++ if (match_rpcs((char *)&rpcinfo->c_procs, ++ rpcinfo->i_procs, IXDR_GET_INT32(data)) == 0) { + DEBUGP("TCP packet contains illegal procedure request [%u]. [drop]\n", + (unsigned int)IXDR_GET_INT32(data)); + @@ -1267,7 +1277,7 @@ + ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.ip, + ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u.all); + -+ if(req_p){ ++ if (req_p) { + DEBUGP("found req_p for xid=%u proto=6 %u.%u.%u.%u:%u\n", xid, + NIPQUAD(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.ip), + ntohs(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u.all)); @@ -1306,19 +1316,19 @@ + + +static int checkentry(const char *tablename, const struct ipt_ip *ip, void *matchinfo, -+ unsigned int matchsize, unsigned int hook_mask) ++ unsigned int matchsize, unsigned int hook_mask) +{ -+ if (hook_mask -+ & ~((1 << NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING) | (1 << NF_IP_FORWARD) | (1 << NF_IP_POST_ROUTING) ++ if (hook_mask ++ & ~((1 << NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING) | (1 << NF_IP_FORWARD) | (1 << NF_IP_POST_ROUTING) + | (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN) | (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT))) { + printk("ipt_rpc: only valid for PRE_ROUTING, FORWARD, POST_ROUTING, LOCAL_IN and/or LOCAL_OUT targets.\n"); -+ return 0; -+ } ++ return 0; ++ } + -+ if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ipt_rpc_info))) -+ return 0; ++ if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ipt_rpc_info))) ++ return 0; + -+ return 1; ++ return 1; +} + + @@ -1331,7 +1341,7 @@ +{ + int port; + -+ DEBUGP("incrementing usage counts\n"); ++ DEBUGP("incrementing usage counts\n"); + __MOD_INC_USE_COUNT(ip_conntrack_rpc_udp); + __MOD_INC_USE_COUNT(ip_conntrack_rpc_tcp); + @@ -1354,7 +1364,7 @@ + DEBUGP("unregistering match\n"); + ipt_unregister_match(&rpc_match); + -+ DEBUGP("decrementing usage counts\n"); ++ DEBUGP("decrementing usage counts\n"); + __MOD_DEC_USE_COUNT(ip_conntrack_rpc_tcp); + __MOD_DEC_USE_COUNT(ip_conntrack_rpc_udp); +} @@ -1411,25 +1421,25 @@ +#define EXPIRES (180 * HZ) + +/* For future conections RPC, using client's cache bindings -+ * I'll use ip_conntrack_lock to lock these lists */ ++ * I'll use ip_conntrack_lock to lock these lists */ + +/* This identifies each request and stores protocol */ +struct request_p { -+ struct list_head list; ++ struct list_head list; + -+ u_int32_t xid; -+ u_int32_t ip; -+ u_int16_t port; ++ u_int32_t xid; ++ u_int32_t ip; ++ u_int16_t port; + -+ /* Protocol */ -+ u_int16_t proto; ++ /* Protocol */ ++ u_int16_t proto; + -+ struct timer_list timeout; ++ struct timer_list timeout; +}; + +static inline int request_p_cmp(const struct request_p *p, u_int32_t xid, + u_int32_t ip, u_int32_t port) { -+ return(p->xid == xid && p->ip == ip && p->port); ++ return (p->xid == xid && p->ip == ip && p->port); + +} +