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From: forrest whitcher <fw@fwsystems.com>
To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Root-only systems
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2003 19:31:44 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20030120193144.57cabd3e.fw@fwsystems.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20030118044554.A19790@lemuria.org>

On Sat, 18 Jan 2003 04:45:55 +0100 
Tom <tom@lemuria.org> did inscribe thusly:

> On Sat, Jan 18, 2003 at 01:49:27AM +0100, Russell Coker wrote:
> > Also an audience member asked me if it would be possible to run a machine with 
> > all files and processes UID=0, which was a strange co-incidence as I have 
> > been planning to do that for play machine ][ (but I may have mentioned it on 
> 
> Well, essentially it would condense the current 2D matrix we have on
> permissions back to a one-dimensional system, only along the other
> axis.
> 
> It would definitely be interesting for embedded systems, consoles and
> other stuff that doesn't really have very much of a user concept. For

This is one way to go, and I think it has potential value as you say in
embedded systems.

I'm actually trying to go the other direction, and remove some of the 
Unix/Posix root concepts. Presently the lsm/selinux checks are run in
addition to the unix uid/gid checks, failing either can deny the 
privelege.

As a strong tool is in place, why for instance do we still want to 
require UID=0 to bind a low-number network port or access device 
drivers etc?

Otoh, I expect the number of places where UID=0 checks have been 
built into both the kernel and userspace tools may make practically
eliminating root from low-level operations a bit of a stretch.


forrest

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2003-01-21  0:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-01-18  0:49 Cambridge Security Group talk Russell Coker
2003-01-18  3:45 ` Tom
2003-01-18  5:57   ` Brian May
2003-01-21  0:31   ` forrest whitcher [this message]
2003-01-21  1:56     ` Root-only systems Russell Coker
2003-01-18  6:06 ` Cambridge Security Group talk Brian May
2003-01-19  6:13   ` Florian Hines
2003-01-19 16:57     ` Russell Coker
2003-01-25 22:06     ` selinux+Steven.Murdoch

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