Re: kernel.org frontpage

[Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>]

On Wed, Jan 29, 2003 at 01:55:22PM -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> Yes, an intruder could leave a forged signature with a random key
> easily.  But to leave a forged signature with the key that's already
> on my keyring is a lot harder...

I believe a script signs the files on ftp.kernel.org, which means the
private key is on the master machine, probably without a pass phrase.
That means that if the master server is compromised, its highly likely
that a rogue file will have a correct signature.

As hpa says, the GPG signature provides no assurance that Linus put
up patch-2.5.60.bz2 and not some random other person.

The only way to be completely sure is for Linus to gpg-sign the patches
himself at source with a known gpg key using a secure pass phrase before
they leave his machine (preferably before the machine is connected to
the 'net to upload them for the really paranoid.)

-- 
Russell King (rmk@arm.linux.org.uk)                The developer of ARM Linux
             http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html