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From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>, Luka Renko <luka.renko@hermes.si>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@transmeta.com,
	Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>, Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com>,
	Tim Shimmin <tes@sgi.com>, Chris Mason <mason@suse.com>,
	Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>, Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>,
	Steve Best <sbest@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] backout the xattr override access checks flag
Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2003 23:16:48 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <200302232316.48664.agruen@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20030223193623.A21537@infradead.org>

Hello,

On Sunday 23 February 2003 20:36, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 23, 2003 at 08:28:23PM +0100, Luka Renko wrote:
> > I have concerns with kernel module temporarly changing capabilities of a
> > user process, however I am not sure if this is really the problem. I was
> > thinking in terms of SMP/preempt (EA calls can/will go to sleep) and
> > considering that this might be a security problem, however since we are
> > changing it per process it should probably be OK.
>
> Right.  And we're already doing similar things, see sys_access().

Okay, this seems sufficient confirmation that it is not dangerous to 
temporarily raise capabilities in a task, so we can get rid of the 
XATTR_KERNEL_CONTEXT flag. Instead, the HSM module should raise a capability 
before invoking the xattr inode operations.

-- Andreas.


  reply	other threads:[~2003-02-23 22:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-02-23 19:28 [PATCH] backout the xattr override access checks flag Luka Renko
2003-02-23 19:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2003-02-23 22:16   ` Andreas Gruenbacher [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2003-02-21 12:50 Luka Renko
2003-02-21 15:58 ` Christoph Hellwig
2003-02-21  3:20 Christoph Hellwig
2003-02-20 20:20 ` Andreas Dilger
2003-02-20 20:26   ` Christoph Hellwig
2003-02-21 10:20 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2003-02-21 15:54   ` Christoph Hellwig
2003-02-21 16:32     ` Andreas Gruenbacher

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