Re: Security Officer and System Administrator Separation of Duties

[Tom <tom@lemuria.org>]

On Fri, Oct 03, 2003 at 04:55:06PM +1000, Russell Coker wrote:
> > What you certainly can do is create a sysadm_r that is limited in the
> > respect you wish, i.e. can not add/edit users or modify the policy.
> 
> To so that we need to have the package management system check package 
> signatures and only install files in types such as fsadm_exec_t if they are 
> from signed packages from the distribution (not local packages).  Then we 
> need to make sure that the administrator does not get write access to any 
> such files (if they can replace fsck then they can get direct file system 
> access and modify /etc/shadow etc).

For starters, I would simply disallow the sysadm_r write access to
these tools. Yes, that means only the secadm_r can update the policy
tools, but I'd consider that a feature, not a bug.



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