From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2003 16:53:55 +0200 From: Tom To: Russell Coker Cc: "Fleischman, Eric" , SELinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: Security Officer and System Administrator Separation of Duties Message-ID: <20031003165350.C30369@lemuria.org> References: <5B58696DB20B9140AD20E0685C573A6402992E48@xch-nw-09.nw.nos.boeing.com> <200310031655.06049.russell@coker.com.au> <20031003121858.H28703@lemuria.org> <200310032132.33691.russell@coker.com.au> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii In-Reply-To: <200310032132.33691.russell@coker.com.au>; from russell@coker.com.au on Fri, Oct 03, 2003 at 09:32:33PM +1000 Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Fri, Oct 03, 2003 at 09:32:33PM +1000, Russell Coker wrote: > I think that perhaps you misunderstood my message. My point is that anyone > who can write to programs such as fsck and run them in their usual context > can trivially bypass any other security restrictions. I get you. Yes, it appears that a good configuration will need a third role for software updates and machine-level configurations. -- http://web.lemuria.org/pubkey.html pub 1024D/2D7A04F5 2002-05-16 Tom Vogt Key fingerprint = C731 64D1 4BCF 4C20 48A4 29B2 BF01 9FA1 2D7A 04F5 -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.