From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from jazzband.ncsc.mil (jazzband.ncsc.mil [144.51.5.4]) by tycho.ncsc.mil (8.12.8/8.12.8) with ESMTP id i4IBlHRb000556 for ; Tue, 18 May 2004 07:47:17 -0400 (EDT) Received: from jazzband.ncsc.mil (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by jazzband.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id i4IBlFAR013310 for ; Tue, 18 May 2004 11:47:15 GMT Received: from rhenium.btinternet.com (rhenium.btinternet.com [194.73.73.93]) by jazzband.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id i4IBlEHn013307 for ; Tue, 18 May 2004 11:47:14 GMT Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 11:44:14 +0000 From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton To: Les Bell Cc: Chris Babcock , selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: suggestion to help transition to selinux: dynamic loading of libselinux Message-ID: <20040518114414.GA28412@lkcl.net> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii In-Reply-To: Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Tue, May 18, 2004 at 07:50:34PM +1000, Les Bell wrote: > > "Chris Babcock" wrote: > > >> > Does this sound dangerous to anybody else? > << > > Does the design of SELinux depend on the state machine theory of security, > i.e. if a system starts in a secure state, and all transitions are secure, > then the system will remain secure? personally: i assume so (nothing else makes sense) on the basis that if you cannot change domain (because either libselinux is unavaiable or the programs that _use_ libselinux are somehow corrupted and unavailable) then you can go nowhere and therefore do no damage. > This design would seem unable to > support that theory, i.e. until the selinux library is loaded, there are no > constraints on the state of the machine. Just a thought. . . yes you are right: there are issues, mentioned by russell, from initialisation (sysvinit) where if /usr/lib/libselinux.so is unavaiable (corrupted and in /lost+found) then the initialisation scripts would need to be modified to halt boot-up if the system is booted with selinux=1. l. -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.