From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with tmda-scanned (Exim 4.33) id 1Bb34H-000104-GP for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 17 Jun 2004 16:01:01 -0400 Received: from exim by lists.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.33) id 1Bb34F-0000zX-Ue for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 17 Jun 2004 16:01:01 -0400 Received: from [199.232.76.173] (helo=monty-python.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.33) id 1Bb34F-0000zU-SQ for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 17 Jun 2004 16:00:59 -0400 Received: from [130.136.10.114] (helo=pob.cs.unibo.it) by monty-python.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.34) id 1Bb333-0002ul-Og for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 17 Jun 2004 15:59:45 -0400 Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2004 21:59:44 +0200 Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] Security house-cleaning Message-ID: <20040617195944.GB28154@cs.unibo.it> References: <20040617043838.GA1938@sentinelchicken.org> <1087484840.21569.108.camel@sherbert> <20040617151418.GD27872@cs.unibo.it> <20040617163740.GB20148@sentinelchicken.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20040617163740.GB20148@sentinelchicken.org> From: renzo@cs.unibo.it (Renzo Davoli) Reply-To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org List-Id: qemu-devel.nongnu.org List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org > Other future considerations: > - PCI Proxy support (if it is ever offically supported) > How will the host OS allow access by QEMU guest in this case? > - Other bus (USB, firewire, etc) direct access to real hardware The "safe" mode to do that is to define some kind of daemon running as root managing tha physical card or port access and qemu joins the daemon to have the services. The daemon can have config files for the sysadm to define each user privileges while the virtual machine itself runs with user permissions. The obvious problem in doing that is performance. renzo