From: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
To: SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: policy patch
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 2004 17:59:34 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <200407111759.34090.russell@coker.com.au> (raw)
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 857 bytes --]
file_type_auto_trans(sysadm_t, user_home_dir_t, user_home_t)
I remove the above from domains/admin.te because it's granted to privhome by
macros/user_macros.te and sysadm_t has the privhome attribute.
checkpolicy_t should not be creating lnk_file, sock_file, or fifo_file objects
of type policy_config_t, and if there are sock_file or fifo_file objects of
type policy_src_t then it should not be reading them.
system_crond_t should not be trying to access device nodes of types that are
for files.
I still don't think that dmesg_t is appropriate for running dmesg from the
administrator shell.
--
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
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[-- Type: text/x-diff, Size: 2754 bytes --]
diff -ru /usr/src/se/policy/domains/admin.te ./domains/admin.te
--- /usr/src/se/policy/domains/admin.te 2004-05-30 16:26:57.000000000 +1000
+++ ./domains/admin.te 2004-07-08 19:20:25.000000000 +1000
@@ -31,4 +31,3 @@
# Add/remove user home directories
file_type_auto_trans(sysadm_t, home_root_t, user_home_dir_t, dir)
-file_type_auto_trans(sysadm_t, user_home_dir_t, user_home_t)
diff -ru /usr/src/se/policy/domains/program/checkpolicy.te ./domains/program/checkpolicy.te
--- /usr/src/se/policy/domains/program/checkpolicy.te 2004-06-03 14:11:05.000000000 +1000
+++ ./domains/program/checkpolicy.te 2004-07-09 11:17:36.000000000 +1000
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
# able to create and modify binary policy files
allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
+allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:file create_file_perms;
###########################
# constrain what checkpolicy can use as source files
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
# only allow read of policy source files
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
+allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
# allow test policies to be created in src directories
file_type_auto_trans(checkpolicy_t, policy_src_t, policy_config_t, file)
diff -ru /usr/src/se/policy/domains/program/crond.te ./domains/program/crond.te
--- /usr/src/se/policy/domains/program/crond.te 2004-07-11 17:37:09.000000000 +1000
+++ ./domains/program/crond.te 2004-07-09 07:17:19.000000000 +1000
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
allow crond_t cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
# Read /etc/security/default_contexts.
-r_dir_file( crond_t, default_context_t)
+r_dir_file(crond_t, default_context_t)
allow crond_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
allow crond_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@
')
# Stat any file and search any directory for find.
-allow system_crond_t file_type:file_class_set getattr;
+allow system_crond_t file_type:notdevfile_class_set getattr;
+allow system_crond_t device_type:{ chr_file blk_file } getattr;
allow system_crond_t file_type:dir { read search getattr };
# Create temporary files.
diff -ru /usr/src/se/policy/domains/program/dmesg.te ./domains/program/dmesg.te
--- /usr/src/se/policy/domains/program/dmesg.te 2004-06-17 15:10:38.000000000 +1000
+++ ./domains/program/dmesg.te 2004-07-04 18:17:42.000000000 +1000
@@ -9,7 +9,10 @@
#
# dmesg_exec_t is the type of the dmesg executable.
#
-daemon_base_domain(dmesg)
+# while sysadm_t has the sys_admin capability there is no point in using
+# dmesg_t when run from sysadm_t, so we use nosysadm.
+#
+daemon_base_domain(dmesg, , `nosysadm')
#
# Rules used for dmesg
next reply other threads:[~2004-07-11 7:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2004-07-11 7:59 Russell Coker [this message]
2004-07-12 13:30 ` policy patch Stephen Smalley
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2005-08-18 7:31 Russell Coker
2005-01-12 18:46 [Fwd: New policy patch] Daniel J Walsh
2005-01-21 20:36 ` James Carter
2005-03-29 16:47 ` Policy Patch Daniel J Walsh
2005-04-01 20:28 ` James Carter
2004-11-25 13:27 policy patch Russell Coker
2004-11-25 16:32 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-11-25 19:05 ` Russell Coker
2004-11-25 20:34 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-11-29 19:23 ` James Carter
2004-11-29 21:47 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-11-30 16:42 ` Daniel J Walsh
2004-10-13 5:55 Russell Coker
2004-10-13 20:17 ` James Carter
2004-08-24 8:18 Russell Coker
2004-08-24 12:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-08-24 16:54 ` Russell Coker
2004-08-27 20:58 ` James Carter
2004-08-28 13:46 ` Russell Coker
2004-08-30 20:24 ` James Carter
2004-07-12 14:12 Russell Coker
2004-07-12 19:46 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-07-04 5:04 Russell Coker
2004-07-07 20:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2002-12-03 14:47 Stephen D. Smalley
2002-11-29 11:45 Russell Coker
2002-09-21 4:39 Russell Coker
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