From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton <lkcl@lkcl.net>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: SE-Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: xen 2.0 - adding selinux permissions
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2004 15:09:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20041124150927.GP5146@lkcl.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1101303556.22014.56.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
On Wed, Nov 24, 2004 at 08:39:16AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, 2004-11-23 at 17:03, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
> > - add in some new selinux security ids representing the xen commands
> > (create virtual machine, list virtual machines, shutdown a machine,
> > suspend-a-session-to-disk, etc.)
>
> I assume you actually mean add a new security class (xen) and define an
> access vector for it with permissions for each of these operations, not
> add a security identifier.
yes?
> As there is no real object for these
> requests, I suppose you could just make them task->self checks as with
> the existing capability checks. No need to add a new security id for
> the target.
okay, i must have misunderstood.
i envisage creating a xen_has_perm() and _that_ means adding
something to security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
#define XEN_VM_CREATE 0x00000001UL
#define XEN_VM_DESTROY 0x00000002UL, etc.
and creating a SECCLASS_XEN?
/* Check whether a task is allowed to perform a xen virtual machine
operation. */
int xen_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 perms)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
tsec = tsk->security;
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_XEN, perms, NULL, NULL);
}
what alternative to this approach is there?
bearing in mind that the xen daemon (running in the xen master)
offers access to the consoles of the guest operating systems.
i _really_ want to be able to stop that access from happening, or
at least control the circumstances under which access to the
guest's consoles is allowed!
at present, any program with access to port 8000 (on localhost or on
the LAN depending on a config option) can start a guest OS, kill an
existing one, access all consoles and start hacking away at the login
prompt, that sort of thing...
l.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2004-11-24 14:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2004-11-23 22:03 xen 2.0 - adding selinux permissions Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-11-24 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-11-24 15:09 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton [this message]
2004-11-24 15:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-11-24 15:49 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-11-24 15:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2004-11-24 17:10 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-11-24 18:13 ` Colin Walters
2004-11-24 20:19 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2004-11-25 1:15 ` Colin Walters
2004-11-25 9:22 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
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