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From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton <lkcl@lkcl.net>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: SE-Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: sshd transition points
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 18:31:13 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050216183113.GC6802@lkcl.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1108576417.20162.9.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>

On Wed, Feb 16, 2005 at 12:53:38PM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, 2005-02-16 at 10:26, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
> > i aim to add a setcon() into sshd's "input_userauth_request()"
> > function just after the point where the username is obtained,
> > such that any unauthorised IP addresses for that username will
> > immediately stop any further TCP traffic.
> 
> And this occurs in the unprivileged child process, not the monitor?  

 looks like it, yes.

> So
> the unprivileged child will timeout waiting for further input, die, and
> the monitor will cleanup?

 yes, it most likely will have to.

> > i will add a type_transition to the policy
> > 
> > 	 type_transition sshd_priv_t user_t:process sshd_priv_user_t;
> > 
> > i will temporarily use get_default_context() - if it works - to
> > obtain the user_t context, as the 2nd argument to
> > security_compute_create().
> > 
> > i will use security_compute_create() to look up the actual context
> > in my type_transition policy rule (sshd_priv_user_t).
> 
> And where does sshd_priv_t come from?  

> Unless you make some other
> change, you are still running in sshd_t at this point, right?
 
 yes.

 i dreamed up sshd_priv_t for no particular reason other than it
 would conceivably be better to run setcon("sshd_priv_t") first
 on the unprivileged child process, followed by the
 security_compute_create(), such that creating

	type_transition sshd_priv_t user_t:process sshd_priv_user_t;

 doesn't interfere with anything to do with sshd_t.

 plus, of course, it would be possible to lock down a set
 of insanely restrictive rules for sshd_priv_t (involving
 networking and pretty much nothing else), with the implicit
 possibility that sshd_t could have some networking permissions
 removed.

 l.


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  reply	other threads:[~2005-02-16 18:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-02-15 15:53 sshd transition points Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-15 16:22 ` Adding libseuser functionality to libselinux? Daniel J Walsh
2005-02-15 16:20   ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-15 16:49     ` Daniel J Walsh
2005-02-15 18:14 ` sshd transition points Stephen Smalley
2005-02-15 19:16   ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-15 19:22     ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-15 20:03       ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-15 20:57         ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 13:02           ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-16 13:51             ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 13:41               ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-16 14:30                 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-15 22:53         ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-15 23:17           ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-15 23:51             ` [patch] dynamic auto trans Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16  0:04             ` sshd transition points Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 13:10               ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-16 13:44                 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 13:39                   ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-16 15:11                     ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 15:26                   ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 17:50                     ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 17:59                       ` Peter K. Lee
2005-02-17 21:44                         ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-17 22:31                         ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 17:53                     ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-16 18:31                       ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton [this message]
2005-02-16 13:08           ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-16 13:45             ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-02-16 13:00         ` Stephen Smalley
2005-02-16 13:58           ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton

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