From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton <lkcl@lkcl.net>
To: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>, SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: I am attempting to add a secadm_r
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2005 17:46:45 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050407164645.GX19784@lkcl.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <425553ED.1040703@redhat.com>
On Thu, Apr 07, 2005 at 11:38:21AM -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> around this, from sysadm_r. I know that, but when I was at DOD
> a couple of weeks ago they stated that they wanted a separate role from
> policy management, from the role of the system administrator. They
> did not care about this being protected, but wanted a way to stop
> accidentally modifying the machine. In DOD the System Administrator and
> the Security Administrator are different roles.
GREAT - if you get this working and can make it "look" like
the present method by setting secadm_r as an alias to sysadm_r
so it "looks" like sysadm_r has policy modification rights,
i would be DELIGHTED.
i too have a situation where a day-to-day operator is given _far_ too
much rights - including the right to be able to switch off selinux,
modify policy etc.
this is _way_ too trusting of the day-to-day operator, who
otherwise needs root-style access in order to manage files
in a special transfer area, and do other things to the box
that require root-level privileges (such as adding new user
accounts and setting up new file transfer areas)
if someone knows of a way to have two logins, one of which requires
one password to get to root-with-sysadm_r privileges, and one of which
requires a DIFFERENT password to get to root-with-secadm_r privileges,
and never the two shall meet, i would be DELIGHTED to hear of such a
method.
i have a customer in the process of testing the system i have set up
for them and i would like to be able to tell them that it is not
necessary to hammer into the operator that they must not do things like
disable selinux, edit the policy, i want to be able to tell them the
operator CANNOT disable selinux, edit the policy - but they can still
run adduser.
any assistance greatly appreciated.
l.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-04-07 16:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-04-07 15:38 I am attempting to add a secadm_r Daniel J Walsh
2005-04-07 16:46 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton [this message]
2005-04-07 17:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-04-07 17:45 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-04-07 17:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-04-07 18:33 ` Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
2005-04-19 4:43 ` Russell Coker
2005-04-07 16:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-04-07 16:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-04-07 17:10 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-04-07 19:25 ` Daniel J Walsh
2005-04-07 19:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-04-19 4:32 ` Russell Coker
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2005-04-08 0:50 Chad Hanson
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