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From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
	Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	mhalcrow@us.ibm.com
Subject: [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp
Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 10:25:46 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050517152545.GA2944@halcrow.us> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050517152303.GA2814@halcrow.us>

This is the second in a series of seven patches to the BSD Secure
Levels LSM.  It moves the claim on the block device from the inode
struct to the file struct in order to address a potential
circumvention of the control via hard links to block devices.  Thanks
to Serge Hallyn for pointing this out.  Chris Wright observed that
using filp as a holder addresses the fact that multiple processes can
share an fd.

Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>

Index: linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl.orig/security/seclvl.c	2005-05-16 16:23:15.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl/security/seclvl.c	2005-05-16 16:27:27.000000000 -0500
@@ -487,46 +487,34 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* claim the blockdev to exclude mounters, release on file close */
-static int seclvl_bd_claim(struct inode *inode)
+/**
+ * Claim the blockdev to exclude mounters; release on file close.
+ */
+static int seclvl_bd_claim(struct file *filp)
 {
-	int holder;
 	struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
-	dev_t dev = inode->i_rdev;
+	dev_t dev = filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev;
 	bdev = open_by_devnum(dev, FMODE_WRITE);
 	if (bdev) {
-		if (bd_claim(bdev, &holder)) {
+		if (bd_claim(bdev, filp)) {
 			blkdev_put(bdev);
 			return -EPERM;
 		}
-		/* claimed, mark it to release on close */
-		inode->i_security = current;
+		/* Claimed; mark it to release on close */
+		filp->f_security = filp;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* release the blockdev if you claimed it */
-static void seclvl_bd_release(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_security == current) {
-		struct block_device *bdev = inode->i_bdev;
-		if (bdev) {
-			bd_release(bdev);
-			blkdev_put(bdev);
-			inode->i_security = NULL;
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 /**
  * Security for writes to block devices is regulated by this seclvl
  * function.  Deny all writes to block devices in seclvl 2.  In
  * seclvl 1, we only deny writes to *mounted* block devices.
  */
-static int
-seclvl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
+static int seclvl_file_permission(struct file *filp, int mask)
 {
-	if (current->pid != 1 && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) {
+	if (current->pid != 1 && S_ISBLK(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode)
+	    && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) {
 		switch (seclvl) {
 		case 2:
 			seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING "%s: Write to block "
@@ -534,7 +522,7 @@
 				      __FUNCTION__, seclvl);
 			return -EPERM;
 		case 1:
-			if (seclvl_bd_claim(inode)) {
+			if (seclvl_bd_claim(filp)) {
 				seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING "%s: Write to "
 					      "mounted block device denied in "
 					      "secure level [%d]\n",
@@ -565,15 +553,23 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* release busied block devices */
+/**
+ * Release busied block devices.
+ */
 static void seclvl_file_free_security(struct file *filp)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_dentry;
-	struct inode *inode = NULL;
-
-	if (dentry) {
-		inode = dentry->d_inode;
-		seclvl_bd_release(inode);
+	if (dentry && (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) {
+		struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+		if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)
+		    && filp->f_security == filp) {
+			struct block_device *bdev = inode->i_bdev;
+			if (bdev) {
+				bd_release(bdev);
+				blkdev_put(bdev);
+				filp->f_security = NULL;
+			}
+		}
 	}
 }
 
@@ -596,7 +592,7 @@
 static struct security_operations seclvl_ops = {
 	.ptrace = seclvl_ptrace,
 	.capable = seclvl_capable,
-	.inode_permission = seclvl_inode_permission,
+	.file_permission = seclvl_file_permission,
 	.inode_setattr = seclvl_inode_setattr,
 	.file_free_security = seclvl_file_free_security,
 	.settime = seclvl_settime,

  reply	other threads:[~2005-05-17 15:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-05-17 15:23 [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:25 ` Michael Halcrow [this message]
2005-05-17 16:09   ` [patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: move bd claim from inode to filp Christoph Hellwig
2005-05-17 16:49     ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 16:57       ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 19:46       ` Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 20:13         ` Al Viro
2005-05-17 15:26 ` [patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:27 ` [patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:27   ` Alexey Dobriyan
2005-05-17 15:30 ` [patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 15:31 ` [patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-17 17:33 ` [patch 1/7] BSD Secure Levels: printk overhaul dean gaudet
2005-05-19  1:29 ` Dave Hansen
2005-05-19 10:39   ` Bernd Petrovitsch
2005-05-19 20:55 ` [updated patch " Michael Halcrow
2005-05-19 21:41   ` Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20  5:19     ` aq
2005-05-20 15:03   ` [updated patch 2/7] BSD Secure Levels: bd_claim fixes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:06   ` [updated patch 3/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow suid and sgid on directories Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:09   ` [updated patch 4/7] BSD Secure Levels: memory alloc failure check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:10   ` [updated patch 5/7] BSD Secure Levels: allow setuid/setgid on root user processes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:13   ` [updated patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:15   ` [updated patch 7/7] BSD Secure Levels: remove redundant ptrace check Michael Halcrow
2005-05-20 15:20   ` [patch 8/7] BSD Secure Levels: unregister on sysfs failure Michael Halcrow

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