From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 09:22:41 -0700 From: Chris Wright To: Stephen Smalley Cc: Chris Wright , selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@wirex.com Subject: Re: [PATCH] remove selinux stacked ops Message-ID: <20050826162241.GG7762@shell0.pdx.osdl.net> References: <20050825221732.GR7991@shell0.pdx.osdl.net> <20050825225104.GC7762@shell0.pdx.osdl.net> <1125056906.5812.32.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1125057491.5812.38.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1125059398.5812.53.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii In-Reply-To: <1125059398.5812.53.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov * Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov) wrote: > On Fri, 2005-08-26 at 07:58 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > Ok, as with my prior comment, this one is also invalidated by the fact > > that the static inlines fall back to the cap_ functions if the operation > > is NULL. So I suppose this would work. > > Given these changes, what purpose does the capability module and the > CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES option serve anymore? Should capability.c > be removed entirely? I left it for two reasons. Making it built-in will mean you can't load another security module. Some distros use the module already, so it's compatibility. These aren't the best reasons to keep it long term. > Also seems to obsolete the cap_stack module in the stacking patch set. I believe so. thanks, -chris -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.