From: Dave Feustel <dfeustel@mindspring.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Cc: Ian Pratt <m+Ian.Pratt@cl.cam.ac.uk>,
Mark Williamson <mark.williamson@cl.cam.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: Is Xen affected by this x86 hardware security hole?
Date: Tue, 02 May 2006 12:18:54 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <200605021218.55288.dfeustel@mindspring.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200605021646.01099.mark.williamson@cl.cam.ac.uk>
On Tuesday 02 May 2006 10:46, Mark Williamson wrote:
> > Thanks for the resonses.
> >
> > For those interested in the gory details of a proof-of-concept exploit,
> > it's all laid out in the 16-page pdf by Loic Duflot:
> >
> > http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/fr/sciences/fichiers/lti/cansecwest2006-duflot-paper
> >.pdf
>
> Ah, interesting.
>
> It turns out this exploit is something new, in that it's not something I'd
> heard of before. But it looks mostly interesting to OpenBSD. Why? Because
> OpenBSD has more sane controls on the X Server than Linux, and so the fact
> that it can elevate privileges is worrysome. Since on Linux it (often) runs
> with superuser privileges anyhow, this attack isn't the main problem...
>
> Their exploit *does* show that mmap of the video ram, combined with the
> ability to access IO port 0xB2 is enough for a root exploit... I don't know
> if fbdev is restrictive enough to prevent this - OBSD have obviously tried to
> minimise X11's privileges and still found it circumventable.
>
> Nevertheless, Xen offers confinement. Also, as Keir pointed out, there are
> stricter restrictions on what even dom0 can do (and these can be made even
> more strict).
>
> Cheers,
> Mark
If it turns out that Xen has the capability to prevent this exploit in virtualized operating systems,
that capability could become a big inducement to use Xen all the time - certainly in my case.
--
Lose, v., experience a loss, get rid of, "lose the weight"
Loose, adj., not tight, let go, free, "loose clothing"
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-05-02 17:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-05-02 14:02 Is Xen affected by this x86 hardware security hole? Dave Feustel
2006-05-02 13:10 ` Mark Williamson
2006-05-02 13:25 ` Keir Fraser
2006-05-02 14:54 ` Dave Feustel
2006-05-02 15:46 ` Mark Williamson
2006-05-02 17:18 ` Dave Feustel [this message]
2006-05-02 16:08 ` Mark Williamson
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-05-02 13:54 Ian Pratt
2006-05-02 14:02 ` Mark Williamson
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