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From: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: akpm@osdl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Add user taint flag
Date: Mon, 22 May 2006 21:11:23 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060523011123.GA32164@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1148307276.3902.71.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org>

On Mon, May 22, 2006 at 04:14:36PM +0200, Arjan van de Ven wrote:
> On Sun, 2006-05-21 at 19:04 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> > Allow taint flags to be set from userspace by writing to
> > /proc/sys/kernel/tainted, and add a new taint flag, TAINT_USER, to be
> > used when userspace is potentially doing something naughty that might
> > compromise the kernel. 
> 
> we should then patch the /dev/mem driver or something to set this :)
> (well and possibly give it an exception for now for PCI space until the
> X people fix their stuff to use the proper sysfs stuff)

It may make sense to have an explicit taint flag which means direct
access to memory, via /dev/mem or otherwise, with exceptions for I/O
mapped memory not claimed by a device driver (and of course X until it
is fixed, or never, whichever comes first).

As I've mentioned, the original reason why I did this was because I
needed to mmap physical memory, which at the time when I originally
did things, /dev/mem didn't support except for the I/O mapped memory
range, and I assumed that any attempt to enhance /dev/mem's mmap()
capabilities in a patch intended for mainline wouldn't be looked at as
a friendly act.  In fact, I was so unhappy about being forced by the
RTSJ specification to do this insane thing that I wanted to make sure
that if it were ever used, it would set a TAINT flag to warn people
that just about anything unsane could have happened, and the system's
stability was at the mercy of the competence of Java application
programmers.  :-)

						- Ted

  parent reply	other threads:[~2006-05-23  1:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-05-21 23:04 [PATCH] Add user taint flag Theodore Ts'o
2006-05-22 10:36 ` Andrew Morton
2006-05-22 18:33   ` Theodore Tso
2006-05-22 23:49     ` Nick Piggin
2006-05-24 13:43   ` Stefan Seyfried
2006-05-22 12:17 ` Stephen C. Tweedie
2006-05-22 14:14 ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-05-22 14:35   ` Alan Cox
2006-05-22 14:29     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2006-05-22 18:56       ` Jan Engelhardt
2006-05-22 14:37     ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-05-23  1:11   ` Theodore Tso [this message]
2006-05-22 15:48 ` Randy.Dunlap
2006-05-23 18:45 ` Greg KH
2006-05-24 13:39   ` Theodore Tso
2006-05-24 13:55     ` Dave Jones
2006-05-24 14:15       ` Dave Jones
2006-05-25 15:01     ` Greg KH

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